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Report on Administrative Law to the
Tennessee Law Revision Commission
DanielJ. Gifford*
In this article, Professor Gifford assesses existing Tennessee administrative law, and develops his suggestions to the Tennessee Law Revision
Commission concerning the advisability of a state administrative pro-

cedure act. He evaluates the federal Administrative ProcedureAct, and
the Model and Revised Model State Administrative ProcedureActs, and

concludes that the enactment of a generalized act based upon the
original Model Act would be most appropriate.

The following discussion of certain aspects of administrative law
is a revised version of a report prepared during the 1963-64 academic
year in response to a request by the Tennessee Law Revision Commission for an evaluation of issues to be considered in adopting an
administrative procedure act for the State of Tennessee. Because
one of the Model State Administrative Procedure Acts would probably
be used as the basis for a Tennessee Act, the discussion is based upon
a comparative analysis of the workings of the original Model Act, the
Revised Model Act, and the federal Administrative Procedure Act.
Whether a generalized administrative procedure act is desirable for
Tennessee depends in part upon how one assesses the present workings of the various administrative bodies within the state and the
present allocation of functions between courts and agencies. The
resolution of the question also depends upon an evaluation of whether
new statutory criteria would generate more uncertainty and dispute
than they would resolve and whether the uncertainties generated by a
new statute would be outweighed by procedural improvements in
various agencies. As will be apparent from the discussion throughout
the paper, there is great diversity in the tasks and functions of the
various administrative bodies; hence, the perennial question associated with administrative law reform must be faced squarely and
answered honestly: Is there sufficient common ground among the
several agencies that some aspects of their procedures can be treated
profitably under a single statute? If the answer is affirmative, then
that common ground must be specified.
Although the language has been tightened somewhat from that
contained in the report originally submitted to the Commission and
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo; formerly Associate
Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
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although some changes have been made, the following pages contain
substantially the original document. The reader is cautioned, therefore, that the report suffers from the limitations on research and
analyses which were imposed by the tight time schedule in which the
report was prepared. Also, I must confess at the outset my own lack
of first-hand knowledge and experience with rate proceedings. Those
recommendations which touch on rate matters are based largely upon
my evaluations of the analyses of others. The following pages, therefore, are at best a tentative statement of some of the issues-together
with some comments upon them-which Tennessee practitioners and
legislators might use as a basis for reflection upon the state of present
administrative procedure in Tennessee and for possible changes in
that procedure.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

A. Administrative Structure.-Administrative processes defy characterization because of the variety of issues and types of proof which
they encompass. Although administrative processes are commonly
divided into rule making and adjudication, there is no clear line
separating rule making from adjudication and large areas of administrative processes fall into a gray zone which possesses substantial
elements of both rule making and adjudication, and thus can properly
be said to be neither.' In proceedings to which named persons are
parties, decision-making methods vary greatly depending upon the
type of issues involved. In rate-making and other proceedings which
raise technical issues, 2 for example, the involvement of an agency staff
may be much greater than in proceedings without technical questions.
The presence of a technical issue may alter the structure of the
effective decision-making body to include technician-subordinates as
well as the agency head.3 This restructuring occurs, however, within
a procedural framework which seems to be organized on the assump4
tion that the agency head is the sole decision maker.
B. Semantic Problems.-Because administrative processes are relatively new instruments of government, they have not yet developed
a distinctive vocabulary. Instead, they have utilized the vocabulary
of the courts, creating a potential source of confusion for many, including the bar and the courts themselves. Words such as "fact,"
"law," "discretion," "substantial evidence," and "material evidence,"
which have accepted, if open-ended, meanings as applied to the judicial process, take on new and often not generally appreciated meanings when they are used to describe elements of administrative
processes which are often significantly different from their judicial
analogues. The similarity of language and the difference of function
contain substantial potential for misunderstanding. This potential is
especially strong in the development or application of policy in a
1. Thus, for example, the promulgation of "rules" which apply to only a few
persons have the particular aspects that are usually associated with adjudication.
2. See text accompanying notes 96-102 infra.
3. Bloomenthal, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Reform or
Retrogression?, 1963 DuKE L.J. 593, 618; Jaffe, Basic Issues; An Analysis in Symposium-Hoover Commission and Task Force Reports on Legal Services and Procedure, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273, 1283 (1955). See text accompanying notes 371-76
infra.
4. The Tennessee statutes, for the most part, do not advert to the reality of staff
or other assistance in the determination of a disputed issue by the agency head.
Some exceptions exist, however. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-513 (1955), which provides that in a hearing to determine the lawfulness of fire insurance rates charged, the
Commissioner of Insurance and Banking "may avail himself of the services of such
experts as he may deem necessary or advisable for that purpose."
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border area between "law" and "fact."5 Thus, a reviewing court ought
to give greater deference to an agency's evaluation of "evidentiary"
or "basic" facts into "secondary" facts 6 than it would to a trial judge's
evaluation of the same facts because, while appellate judges are as
competent to evaluate basic facts as a trial judge, they may not be as
well equipped as a specialized agency to evaluate such facts in light
of the relevant statutory purposes. Furthermore, the very creation of
an agency may be evidence of a legislative intent that the evaluation
of basic facts should be performed by that agency.7 The Tennessee
courts,8 however, have sometimes ignored this difference and have
equated their reviewing function over agencies with the reviewing
functions of appellate courts over trial courts. The shifting meanings
of the word "law" are illustrated by the fact that courts are prone to
say that they alone have the power to decide all questions of "law."'
However, when the legislature has given rule-making power to an
agency, the function of giving content, within a certain range, to the
"law" has been entrusted solely to the agency; the court's power to
resolve questions of law is only a power to interpret the outer limits
of administrative power.
C. Review Procedures.-These semantic difficulties resulting from

the application of judicial vocabulary to administrative proceedings
have tended to obscure from judges and counsel alike the proper relation of the courts to administrative bodies-a relation which ought to
be an allocation of function based upon relative competence. Even
when the courts have correctly appraised their function, however, they
have sometimes described their decision in words which were not
well-chosen and which may have been misleading.
II. RuE

MAucuG

A. In General.-"Rule" and "rule making" are imprecise terms frequently used in discussions of administrative processes. Rules are
usually thought of as having general application and prospective force,
although many acknowledged "rules" may not be very general and
5. The ambiguity of the terms "law" and "fact" in administrative processes constitutes one of the principal difficulties.
6. Cf. NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 432 (2d Cir. 1951) (Frank,
J., concurring).
7. Miller v. Wiley, 190 Tenn. 498, 230 S.W.2d 979 (1950); Reese v. Hake, 184
Tenn. 423, 199 S.W.2d 569 (1947); Ezell v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 319, 198 S.W.2d 809
(1947). See text accompanying notes 533-36 infra.
8. Tennessee Cartage Co. v. Pharr, 184 Tenn. 414, 199 S.W.2d 119 (1947).
9. E.g., Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n, 195 Tenn.
593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
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in some jurisdictions may be retroactive. The following discussion of
"rule making," therefore, is prefaced with separate treatments of general and prospective policy formulations.
B. General Policy Formulations.-Efficient administration is promoted by action which is, to the extent possible, of general rather than
of particular application.' The efficiency of dealing with many similar
matters at once through formulation of general rules or standards is
obvious." Such generalized policy formulations permit factors and
issues concerning negotiations and the institution of enforcement proceedings to be promptly'2 and consistently' 3 dealt with. Generalized
policy formulations also permit efficient disposition of questions, applications, and other requests from the public. When agency policy
formulations are made known prior to agency-public contact, the number of questions, applications, and requests, may well be reduced, with
a consequent saving in time by agency personnel. The extent to which
policy formulation can be performed on a general basis, however, will
vary with each agency and with types of issues.' 4 In instances in
which an issue occurs with relative infrequency, the formulation of
general principles for dealing with it may be an inefficient use of
agency time.15 In instances where superficially similar issues occur
in great variation of form, formulation of principles or guidelines may
be an impossibility and may carry with it a tendency to gloss over
important but unapparent differences.' 6 Since general principles or
guidelines may be formulated by an agency in varying degrees of
specificity, less specific principles permit matters to be worked out
later when the question of their application arises.
As members of the public become aware of agency policy formulations they may be in a position to guide their conduct accordingly.
This factor suggests that it is important for agencies charged with
furthering patterns of public conduct not only to formulate policies
but also to publicize them. It also suggests the importance, in fair10. Cf. 1 BENJAMIN, CoIamissIoNER's REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE ADJuDICATION IN
THE STATE OF NEW YoRK 296 (1942) [hereinafter cited as BENJAMIN REPORT].
11. Cf. I BENJAMIN REPORT 296.
12. Ibid.
13. Consistency is promoted by formulations of policy having general application
"particularly where there is a numerous adjudicating personnel." Ibid. See also id. at 258.

14. Id. at 295.
15. Cf. id. at 298, recognizing that "the amount of time available to an agency for
quasi-legislation, as against the other uses to which the time of the agency's personnel
might be put, is one consideration" against overly formal rule-making procedures.
It is also a consideration against fomulating some types of substantive rules.
16. Cf. dissent of Mr. Forbes to the Report of the Committee on Ratemaking, 15
AD. L. REv. 175, 179 (1963). "[T]he problem may be so specialized and varying in
nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule." SEC
v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 203 (1947).
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ness to the public, of publicizing policies with respect to which the
public will be held accountable.
C. Prospective Policy Formulations.-Prospectivepolicy formulations can have the effect of reducing the number and scope of issues
open to contest in enforcement proceedings and other adjudications
which decide, retroactively, the lawfulness of past conduct. 17 By thus
simplifying and shortening the adjudicatory process, such prospective
policy formulation may (1) save time and expense for both the agency
and the parties, and (2) give additional direction to that process.
To the extent, however, that such prospective policy formulations are
particular, rather than general, in their scope, the time and expense
saved in after-the-fact adjudications may be offset by time and expense
consumed in before-the-fact determinations of those issues.
From the standpoint of the regulated public, retroactive policy
formulation is objectionable when it is capable of interfering with their
reasonable expectations. 8 The sense of injustice resulting from such
interference will be especially strong (and perhaps vocal) when prospective policy formulation could or would have induced a course
of conduct which would not have conflicted with those policies or
would have conflicted with them in a lesser degree. Moreover, a
threat of retroactive policy formulation may seriously interfere with
the planning of future transactions by those subject to agency regula19
tion.
Retroactive policy formulation loses some of its objectionable features in those instances in which prospective policy formulation would
not substantially affect the course of conduct pursued by those subject to agency regulation. Indeed, in some cases a regulated person
might prefer a retroactive proceeding to prospective policy formulation. Thus, for example, a regulated utility might sometimes prefer
that the reasonableness of a rate be determined retroactively in a
reparations proceeding rather than in a proceeding setting future rates
if in the former proceeding it would have the advantage of using as
evidence the actual results of operations.
An agency will often be influenced to formulate policies prospectively by the desire to encourage certain patterns of conduct by those
subject to its control. The degree to which this influence operates
17. 1 BENJAMI- REPORT 296.
18. To the extent that the public is aware of policy trends, expectations of favorable
agency action may lose some of their reasonableness. Cf. Federal Water Serv. Corp.,
18 S.E.C. 231, 258 (1945).
19. 1 BENJAMIN REPoRT 259, 262, 296. It has been said that "The essence of
effective economic activity is planning." JAIFE & NATHANSON, CASES AND MATERUALS
ON ADmnqTArmrvs
LAw 408 (1961).
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will depend upon the likelihood that an announcement of prospective
policy formulation would encourage the desired conduct. An announcement that conduct, which prior to the announcement was generally believed to be lawful, will result in punishment is likely to have
the desired effect. When, however, the regulated public has merely
a general idea of what the agency expects from it, prospective policy
formulation and announcement which specifies in detail a type of
conduct which the agency finds objectionable may have the effect of
removing inhibitions on conduct which is not within the specifics of
that announcement but which previously was generally thought to
involve serious risk of agency displeasure. In such situations, the
agency may feel that it is not a part of its function to facilitate closeto-the-line conduct.2 0 Even where given conduct is generally believed
to cause agency displeasure, however, express confirmation of that
belief by the agency combined with an express or implied threat of
sanction for its performance may have an additional deterrent effect.
If the agency disclaims an exclusive effect for its new policy pronouncement, moreover, the likelihood of removing pre-existing inhibi21
tions on conduct may be reduced.
D. Facilitating Prospective Agency Action.-Retroactive interference with reasonable expectations can be minimized by publicizing
policy formulations and by avoiding, to the extent possible, the formulation of new policy in penalty proceedings.2 Despite the theoretical
inconsistency, agencies ought to be authorized to act prospectively
only (in the agencies' discretion) when issuing "interpretative" rules.23
The courts have a residual power to reverse adjudicative determinations for abuse of discretion whenever an agency improperly for20. See remarks, id. at 407. Although these remarks are addressed to declaratory
orders, they are applicable to prospective policy formulation, whether individually
or generally addressed: "there is some feeling that persons should not be enabled
to cut the pattern of their action to the minimum requirements of legality. Equity has

sometimes refused to specify the exact letter of performance in order to leave a margin
of doubt to promote generous compliance."
21. See text accompanying notes 22-26 infra for a consideration of means available
for encouraging prospective action.
22. While all adjudications are in a sense retroactive, it is desirable that the application of policy in penalty proceedings be confined to the extent possible to those
policies that the parties could reasonably have expected would be applied in an
adjudication. Compare SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).
23. Although an "interpretative" rule, since it is a construction of a pre-existing
statute or regulation, theoretically would apply retroactively as well as prospectively,
such a rule does not differ in practical effect from a 'legislative' rule which generally
has only prospective force. Specific authorization to confine interpretative rules to the
future in the agency's discretion would remove whatever doubts an agency might have
with respect to the propriety of considering hardships imposed upon regulated persons
in determining the scope (in time) of its "interpretative' rules.
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mulates new policy in a penalty proceeding; 24 this power, however, is
difficult to use and possesses significant susceptibility to abuse.'
Agencies should be encouraged to issue interpretative rules and
other policy statements by exempting such rules and policy statements from the mandatory imposition of formal rule-making requirements2 6 involving pre-issuance acceptance of written submissions and
other forms of public participation. Failure to exempt the agencies
from formal procedures might otherwise discourage them from making public disclosure of prior policy formulations which they intend to
apply in adjudications.
E. Public Participation in Rule Making. 1. In General.-Since
action that is often considered to be "rule making" varies in the degree
of its retroactive impact, in the persons to which it applies, in the
types of action to which it relates, and in the types of persons who
will be affected by the rule, it is difficult to discuss "rule making"
in a generic way.z0 Rather, it will be necessary at every point to advert
to the types of activity with which agency action is concerned and
to the necessity for confining limiting procedures to specific types of
regulation.
The principal justification for public participation in rule making is
that such participation serves as a means for an agency to obtain
information about the content of the area to be regulated and about
possible deficiencies or objections to particular rule provisions of
which it is unaware.2 This justification is lacking, of course, to the
extent that the agency concerned is itself knowledgeable in the subject matter being regulated.P Other suggested justifications for public
participation in rule making include a supposed public relations function through which a more willing and generous compliance with
rules is supposedly secured.30 Finally, public participation in the rule24. Cf. NLRB v. E & B Brewing Co., 276 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 908 (1961).
25. Cf. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947).
26. See Administrative Procedure Act § 4, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003
(1964) [hereinafter cited as APA]; MODEL STATE ADMNISTRA=TVE PocEDunE ACT § 2
[hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT]; REvISED MODEL STATE AoNIsTRATiVE PtocEDUim

ACT § 3 [hereinafter cited as REVImED MODEL ACT]. The federal act exempts "interpretative rules" from formal rule making procedures. APA § 4(a). Accord, GA. CODE
ANN. § 3A-104(a) (Supp. 1966); 01 REv. STAT. § 183.330(3) (Supp. 1965).
27. Cf. 1 BENJAMIN REPORT 27.
28. FINAL REPoaT OF Arr'y GEN. CoMInr. oN ADMNSTRATiV PnocEnURE 102 (1941)
[hereinafter cited as FnAL. REPORT]; II Wis. LEGISLAT vE COUNCIL REP. (Part II)ADMINISTRAVE RULE MAmIN 79 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Wis. REP.].
29. Cf. Cohen, Some Aspects of Marland Administrative Law, 24 MD. L. REV. 1, 13
(1964).
30. Wis. REP. 79.
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making process has been urged as an end desirable in itself as a form
of public participation in government. 31
2. Public ParticipationRequirements in the Federal and Model
Acts.-Under the federal act and the two Model Acts, requirements
for public participation depend in the first instance upon the definition
of rule making. The federal act defines3 2 "rule" broadly but excludes3 3
from formal rule-making requirements "interpretative rules, general
statements of policy, rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice" and "any situation in which the agency for good cause finds (and
incorporates the finding and a brief statement of the reasons therefor
in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest." The two
Model Acts define "rule' '34 slightly less broadly than does the federal
act, but (apart from "emergency" rules under the Revised Act) they
make no exceptions to their requirements for public participation,3 5
so that the overall scope of their public participation requirements is
broader than the scope of those requirements in the federal act.
It is not clear that the approach of the Model Acts is desirable.
Public participation often would be unnecessary since no one could
be adversely affected by many rule-making actions;3 6 sometimes adversely affected persons would be unable or unprepared to participate
in rule-making procedures; the agency may be so knowledgeable about
its intended action that public participation could not substantially
increase its knowledge; and in some cases, the cost of those procedures balanced against the incremental knowledge that the agency
would be likely to obtain from them would make such procedures
prohibitively expensive. The imposition of formal procedures, moreover, might in some instances dissuade an agency from informing
the public about policies which it has adopted and intends to apply
31. Ibid.
32. APA § 2(c).
33. APA § 4(a). Cf. GA. CODE: ANN. § 3A-104(a) (Supp. 1966); ORE. REv. STAT. §
183.330(3) (Supp. 1965).
34. MODEL AcT § 1(2); REVISED MODEL AcT § 1(7). The Georgia and Oregon
versions of the Model Acts exempt from notice and public participation requirements
general statements of policy and interpretive rules. GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-104(a) (Supp.
1966); OnE. REv. STAT. § 183.330(3) (Supp. 1965).
35. The Revised Model Act contains, in addition to public participation procedures
applicable to all rules, provisions for a mandatory oral hearing in the case of "substantive" rules when such a hearing is requested by a specified number of persons.
ERvisED MODEL AcT § 3(a)(2). See text accompanying notes 47-53 infra. See also
note 34 supra.
36. Benjamin, for example, sees little need for public participation in the formulation of procedural regulations. 1 BENjA-mw REPORT 300. Procedural regulations are
exempted from the notice requirements of the federal act. APA § 4(a).
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in adjudications. 7 Perhaps the best approach would be to combine a
broadly worded provision requiring a minimum form of public participation with the federal act's provision vesting agencies with power
to dispense with notice and formal procedures upon a finding that
be "impracticable, unnecessary,
notice and public participation would
8
or contrary to the public interest."
3. Mechanics of Notice.-The Model Act requires an agency adopting rules, "as far as practicable" to "publish or otherwise [to] circulate
notice of its intended action."3 9 The federal act and the Revised
Model Act, however, require notice by publication in an official bulletin which must include, inter alia, "either the terms or substance" of
the proposed rule or "a description of the subjects and issues involved."40 In addition, the Revised Act improves upon the federal act
by requiring mailed notice "to all persons who have made timely request of the agency for advance notice of its rule-making proceedings."41 The Revised Act requires that notice precede rule-making
action by twenty days except when "an imminent peril to the public
health, safety, or welfare requires otherwise;"42 neither the federal act
nor the Model Act requires a given period of time for notice. It
would be desirable for the interval between notice and presentation
of views to be long enough to permit adequate preparation of those
views. It would also be desirable for the notice to inform its recipients
of the deadline for the presentation of views.
4. Public ParticipationProceduresof the FederalAct and the Model
43
Acts.-Except for the special type of rule making discussed below,
which is required by statute to be "on the record after opportunity for
an agency hearing," the federal act provides that interested persons
be afforded an opportunity to submit written data, views, or arguments; oral argument or testimony is permitted in the discretion of
the agency.44 The original Model Act requires agencies to "afford
interested persons opportunity to submit data or views orally or in
37. Cf. 1 BENJAm

REPORT 298, where it is stated that "an administrative agency

cannot be forced to promulgate regulations; and too elaborate and time-consuming
quasi-legislative procedure might well discourage the process where it is important
to encourage it."

38. Such an approach seems to have been followed in Massachusetts. See the broad
(and precise) definition of "regulation" in MAss. ANN. LAWS cb. 30A, § 1(5) (1966),
and the agency power, in the case of the issuance of certain regulations, to dispense
with notice and opportunity to present views in MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 3(3)

(1966).
39. MODEL AcT § 2(3).
40. APA § 4(a)(3); REvisED MODEL AT § 3(a)(1).
41. REvisED MODEL AcT § 3(a) (1).
42. REmIsED MODEL AcT § 3(b).
43. See text accompanying notes 96-102 infra.

44. APA § 4(b).
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writing."45 The Revised Model Act similarly requires opportunity to

be afforded interested persons "to submit data, views or arguments,

orally or in writing,"46 but makes an oral hearing mandatory in the case
of "substantive" rules if requested by twenty-five persons, a governmental subdivision or agency, or an association having not less than
twenty-five members. 47 Sensing opportunities for abuse of the Revised
Act's oral hearing provision, the Kentucky Legislative Research Com-

mission suggested that the Revised Model Act's language be modified
to require a mandatory oral hearing "if requested by either ten percent
or twenty-five of the persons who will directly be affected by the

proposed regulation, or by a governmental subdivision, or by an

association having not less than twenty-five members." 48 Although the

modification was designed 49 to limit oral hearings to those directly

affected by proposed rule making action, it may partly fail in its

purpose, since the mandatory hearing provision seems still capable of
abuse through a demand for a hearing by an association having not

less than twenty-five members, although neither the association
nor its members would be "directly" affected by the proposed regula-

tion.50 While some states have followed the Revised Model Act

provisions, 51 and a few require mandatory "public hearings" for all or
much rule making,52 most states that have a comprehensive administrative procedure act seem either to have a rule-making provision like
the original Model Act, some less stringent provision, or none at all.5 3
45. MODEL AcT § 2(3).
46. REVISED MODEL ACT § 3(a) (2).
47. Ibid. Accord, Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 227.02(e) (1957). See note 51 infra.
48. Ky. LEGisLATIvE REsEARC H COmM'N REP. No. 12-ADxMuNIsTm rvE PROCEDURE
LAW IN K,'NrrucKY 59 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Ky. REP. No. 121.
49. The 10% insertion was made to assure a right to a hearing to persons who might
be substantially affected by a rule, although they were few in number. Ibid.
50. The failure to apply the "directly affected" language to associations is probably
an oversight. The Georgia version of the Revised Model Act has adopted the "directly
affected" phrase from the Kentucky report and has also failed to apply it to associations. GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-104(a)(2) (Supp. 1966).
51. The Revised Model Act provisions are embodied in GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-104
(Supp. 1966). Among administrative procedure statutes omitting provisions for public
303 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 42-35-3 (Supp. 1966); Wyo. Stat. ANN. § 9276.21 (Supp. 1965). Accord, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 22 7 .02(e) (1957).
52. A mandatory "public hearing" for all or a substantial amount of rule making
seems to be required by tHvwAu REV. LAws § 6C-3 (Supp. 1965); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 84-907 (1958); Omo REV. CODE AxN.
§ 119.03(c) (Baldwin 1964); VA. CODE
ANN. § 9-6.6 (1964). Massachusetts requires a mandatory public hearing for some
types of rule making and provides for oral or written public participation for other
types of rule making. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, §§ 2, 3 (1966). See also note 38
supra. MIN.
STAT. Ax.
§ 15.0412(4) (Supp. 1966) requires a mandatory "public
hearing" after notice to interested persons who have preregistered to be notified of
rule-making proceedings. Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 15.0412(3) (Supp. 1966).
53. Oral or written public participation seems to be made mandatory by ALmK
STAT. § 44.62.210 (1962); Aniz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1002(B) (1956); CAL. GOV'T
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5. Miscellaneous ProceduralMatters.-Taken literally, the language
of the Revised Model Act contains a suggestion of more personal
consideration of written submissions by the agency head than does the
federal act. The Revised Model Act expressly commands that, "the
agency shall consider fully all written and oral submissions respecting
the proposed rule,"54 whereas under the federal act an agency is required to consider only "all relevant matter presented." 5 In juxtaposition with that of the federal act, the language of the Revised Model
Act seems to contemplate a lesser use of staff help in sifting out
irrelevant and repetitious material.
The Revised Model Act further differs from the federal act by
requiring the agency to issue a "concise statement of the principal
reasons for and against" the adoption of the proposed rule, "incorporating therein its reasons for overruling the considerations urged
against its adoption" if such a statement is requested by an interested
person before the rule's adoption or within thirty days thereafter."
Although the federal act requires that the agency adopt "a concise
general statement" of the "basis and purpose" of the rules adopted,
whether anyone requests such a statement or not,57 such statement
need not be as detailed as the one required by the Revised Model
Act.
6. Challenges to the Validity of Rules Adopted with Defective
Procedure Under the Federal Act and the Model Acts.-The imposition of procedural requirements carries with it the danger that a rule
may be held invalid because of a failure by the agency promulgating
that rule to observe those procedural requirements. The federal act
CODE § 11425; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-2(2) (1963); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
77-421 (Supp. 1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 2351(3) (1964); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 41, § 245(c) (1965); McHr. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(21.2)(3) (1963); Or. REv. STAT.
§ 183.330(3) (Supp. 1965); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.04.020(3) (1965); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 29A-3-3 (1966). Cf. IowA CODE ANN. § 17A.3 (Supp. 1966). North Dakota

provides for public participation, in the discretion of the agency concerned, in the
form of a public hearing on a petition for reconsideration of a rule. N.D. CAT. CODE
Ann. § 28-32-04 (1960). Accord, IowA CODE ANN. § 17A.13 (Supp. 1966), except
that the public hearing is mandatory in Iowa. Compare IowA CODE ANN. § 17A.3
(Supp. 1966). Among administrative procedure statutes omitting provisions for public
participation in rule making are FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 120 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT.
ch. 536 (1953); and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710 (1960). Compare MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 30A, §§ 2, 3 (1966). See Ky. REv. STAT. § 13.125 (1963) (directions for
notice and hearing precatory only). Cf. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 6252-13(2)(c)
(1962) (procedural rules only).
54. RE IsED MODEL Acr § 3(a) (2).
55. APA § 4(b). Cf. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11425.
56. REVISED MODEL AT § 3 (a) (2).
57. APA § 4(b). The Oregon act which in general follows the original Model Act
here uses the quoted language of the federal act. ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.330(3) (Supp.
1965).
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handles the notice aspect of this problem by limiting mandatory notice
to publication in the Federal Register5 -a requirement with which
compliance is relatively easy. The Model Act prevents the problem
from arising in connection with notice by requiring an agency to
"publish or otherwise [to]
circulate notice of its intended action" only
"as far as practicable." 9 The Tennessee version of the Model Act
adopted for the Public Service Commission insulates rules from
challenge on grounds of either lack of notice or lack of opportunity
to be heard. It provides that:
no person shall be entitled to challenge the validity of such a rule, or the

amendment or repeal of such a rule, on the grounds that he failed to

60
receive such notice or that he was not given an opportunity to be heard.

Although the Revised Model Act provides 61 expressly that a rule shall
not be valid unless adopted in "substantial compliance" with the
notice and public participation provisions of the act, it provides a
two-year statute of limitations
on challenges to the validity of a rule
62
on procedural grounds.
7. Submission of Views in Writing.-Submission of views in writing
by interested members of the public, as provided in the federal act
and Model State Acts, is perhaps the simplest form of public participation in rule making. Although agencies should be receptive at all
times to the views of the public regarding their policies, 63 an invitation
to the public to submit views upon a proposed rule or draft of a
proposed rule may6 serve to focus public attention on the proposal,
and thus facilitate the presentation of informed views upon issues concerning which the agency is contemplating action. Collecting a number of such views at the same time and at a time when the agency's
attention is directed to the particular problems dealt with in a
proposed rule or draft may improve the quality of the rule being
promulgated.
58. APA § 4(a).
59. MODEL AcT § 2(3).

Cf. MODEL ACT § 6(2).

Compare MICH. STAT. AN. § 3.560(15)
(1961), which provides that the "filing or publication of a rule" raises "a rebuttable
60. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-202(d) (1955).

presumption" that the rule was duly adopted, issued or promulgated.
61. REvisED MODEL ACT § 3(c).
62. Ibid.
63. Cf. Wis. REP. 104; HAN-DBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CO~nUSSIONEaS
STATE LAws 243 (1943).

ON UNwoFoR

64. The formulation by an agency of a proposed draft may provide a focus for
comment by those concerned, but, as Benjamin has pointed out, "the process of
tentative formulation involves an element of prejudgment that may lead to a reluctance
to accept criticism and suggestions for change." 1 BENJAMIN REPORT 308. Benjamin,
however, felt that "if hearings are to be kept to the point and within reasonable
bounds, they must usually be directed to regulations already tentatively formulated."

Ibi&
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The submission of views in writing would facilitate the efficient
allocation of time within an agency in connection with the consideration of the points raised by those views. Thus, submission of
written statements would permit subordinate personnel within the
agency structure to synthesize and summarize the points raised in
those statements prior to their consideration by the agency head.3
Furthermore, the submission of written views would be conducive to
a more detailed presentation and a more thorough treatment of
issues by the persons submitting them than might be possible if
these views were submitted only through oral testimony. Other
advantages of a written-submittals method of public participation
include the absence (to the agency concerned) of recording and
transcribing expenses ordinarily associated with most forms of oral
hearings and the absence of a distance deterrent6 to public participation which, in some cases, would be connected with a public hearing
at a single location in the state.
The principal drawbacks to limiting public participation solely to
the submission and acceptance of written views are (1) the lack of
assurance to the public that its submissions are considered by the
agency head or by higher eschelon personnel or by any one;67 (2)
the lack of opportunity for oral exchange or discussion between persons
submitting views and agency officials68 and among the private persons
themselves; 69 and the absence of cross examination; (3) the burden
of preparing written submissions which might in some types of cases
65. Compare Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468

(1936),

which refers with

approval to "practicable administrative procedure in obtaining the aid of assistants
within the department" and to evidence being "sifted and analyzed by competent
subordinates." Cf. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53
(1936), quoted in Southern Continental Tel. Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n,
199 Tenn. 122, 126, 285 S.W.2d 115, 117 (1955), where it was stated that "judicial

judgment may be none the less independent because informal and aided by the sifting
procedures of an expert legislative agency."
66. Wis. REP. 91.

67. This may be the basis for the Revised Model Act provisions which expressly
command that "the agency shall fully consider all written and oral submissions respecting the proposed rule" and which require the agency if requested by an interested
person to "issue a concise statement of the principal reasons for and against its
adoption, incorporating therein its reasons for overruling the considerations urged
against its adoption." REVISED MODEL AcT § 3(a) (2).

68. The written submittals method of public participation, by itself, provides no
opportunity by which the agency or its staff can seek clarification about points made
ambiguously or without treatment in depth. Exchange between the agency or its
staff and the public could be supplied, however, by combining other forms of public

participation in which exchange is possible with the written submittals device.
69. Unless written submissions are made public during the rule making proceedings,
those submissions will not be fully exposed to challenge by opposing groups.
BEjJrr REPORT 308.

Cf. 1
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prove a deterrent to persons who would be willing to testify orally at
a hearing.
8. Delayed Effectiveness of Rules.-In addition to the provisions in
the federal act and the Revised Model Act providing for written
submissions with respect to proposed exercises of rule-making power,
those acts further require that normally final rules be promulgated in
advance of their effective date. 0 Besides serving to educate members
of the public so that they will be prepared to comply with a rule when
it becomes effective, 1 a rule's delayed effectiveness provides an
additional period in which the public may make known to the
promulgating agency deficiencies in the rule.72 It will be observed,
however, that delayed effectiveness will fail to perform its objectives
to the extent that the public is unaware of the rule or its provisions.
For that reason it is desirable that the rule be made known to
interested or affected persons prior to the commencement of the
delayed-effectiveness period. 3
9. Informal Consultation.-Another form of public participation in
rule making involves informal communication by an agency with
those who will be affected by a proposed rule. Such communications
can involve both written and personal contact."4 Because this device
can be utilized over a period of time 5 during which the agency is
refining its understanding of a regulatory problem and shaping its
ideas, it has some advantages over the written-submittals device.
Continuing and representative consulation by an agency with affected
interest groups may help that agency in formulating the terms of a
rule which will deal with a complex or technical problem. 6 Effective
70. APA § 4(c); REVISED MODEL ACT § 4(b).
71. Wis. REP. 110-11.
72. FiNAL REPORT 114-15; 1 BENJAMI-NN REPORT 309.
73. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.026(1) (1957) (rule effective on first day of
month following publication in the Wisconsin administrative register).
74. DAvis, ADMINISTnATIVE LAW TRF-AIsE § 6.02 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
DAvis]; FINAL REPORT 103; Wis. REP. 80-82; Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative
Rule-Making, 52 HARv. L. REv. 259, 274-76 (1938). An example of a statutory
provision which may expressly authorize such informal discussion is TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 59-1238 (Supp. 1966), which provides that the Commissioner of Insurance and
Banking shall establish an assigned risk plan with respect to automobile liability insurance policies "after consultation with the insurance companies authorized to issue
automobile liability policies in this state."
75. "Questionaire" type communications can be used with large numbers. DAvis
§ 6.02, at 365; cf. FINAL REPORT 112. However, informal consultation which is

continuing and representative can usually best be effected when the consultation involves a proposed rule or other regulatory problem which affects or may affect

only a small number of identifiable interest groups.
76. Consultation with the interest groups affected may also create some good will
for the agency among those subject to the rule.
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regulation of many areas would normally require a certain amount of

informal contact between an agency and those who will be regulated
or affected by a new rule. It is important, however, that the agencies

be aware of the dangers involved in concentrating their informal
contacts upon only one or a few regulated persons, and thereby
securing a biased or otherwise unrepresentative view of regulatory
problems.
10. Advisory Committees.-Another method of public participation

in rule making involves a device usually described as an advisory committee,77 which may be composed 7 of representatives of groups which

will be affected by a proposed exercise of rule-making power.7 9 While
in certain situations the use of an advisory committee may be advantageous, 8 the formation of such a committee carries with it the
danger of excluding 8 ' one or more affected interests.8 2 As a check
77. DAvis § 6.03; FNAL REPORT 103; Wis. REP. 83; Fuchs, supra note 74, at 275.

It has been suggested that there is a danger that an advisory committee will seek
to dictate to the agency, rather than to advise. To the extent that the agency or its
staff is unable or unwilling to question the committee about the bases upon which it
or its members have formed their conclusions, the likelihood of committee dictation
to the agency is increased. Such a situation would be most likely to exist when no
agency representative sits on the committee, when the committee is a permanent one
upon which the agency habitually relies, or when the agency is understaffed. The
Wisconsin Legislative Council recommended that the difficulty of committee dictation
to the agency could be met by making all advisory committees temporary rather than
permanent. Wis. REP. 85.

78. Besides the advisory committee which is composed of representatives of the
interests to be affected by the rule, the Wisconsin Legislative Council distinguished
two other types of advisory committee: "One is the technical advisory committee
composed primarily of experts whose function is to furnish technical advice rather
than to represent particular interests. Another is the interdepartmental coordinating
committee composed of governmental officials whose function is to furnish advice on
some problem which cuts across departmental lines." The Council noted that the
above two types of advisory committee and the committee composed of representatives
of interest groups "are not mutually exclusive and often can be profitably combined."
WIs. REP. 83.
79. Agency representation on the committee will help to insure that the committee
is kept aware of agency views and policies. This will encourage recommendations
that will have a substantial chance of acceptance by the agency.
80. Compare Frn~A REPORT 104: "The practice of holding conferences of interested
parties in connection with rule-making introduces an element of give-and-take on the
the part of those present and affords an assurance to those in attendance that their
evidence and points of view are known and will be considered. As a procedure for
permitting private interests to participate in the rule-making process it is as definite
and may be as adequate as a formal hearing. If the interested parties are sufflclently
known and are not too numerous or too hostile to discuss the problems presented
conferences have evident advantages over hearings in the development of knowledge
and understanding."
81. Representation of all affected interests is important (1) in order to insure that
all viewpoints have been presented in the discussion concerning the proposed rule;
and (2) because the formality of the committee will accentuate the lack of representation of the unrepresented groups, possibly engendering a feeling of resentment.
82. FNAL REPORT 104.

19671

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

against a failure of the committee to secure all opinions,83 consideration ought to be given to the holding of a subsequent public hearing"
in those instances in which all interested groups may not be represented on the committee.
11. Hearings.-Public participation can also be effected through
various types of hearings. One type of hearing might involve the
oral presentation of views by witnesses representing affected interests

and by interested members of the public. Such a hearing seems
reasonably well adapted to permitting many participants with as-

sorted points of view to participate and thereby to bring to the attention of the agency a wide spectrum of comment about the various
aspects of a proposed rule or proposed exercise of rule-maknig power.
Although the oral part of a hearing of this type may not be particularly

well adapted to an in depth exploration of particular substantive
objections to, or to improving the phrasing of, a technical or complex
rule or group of rules, the acceptance of written statements in
conjunction with such a hearing would provide a means whereby
detailed analytical arguments may be presented to the issuing agency.

A desirable feature of oral presentation is that it permits exchanges
between the presiding official(s) and witnesses. Such exchanges
may help to clarify points of testimony or to bring out the bases
upon which the witnesses' conclusions rest.
The most serious objection to this type of hearing is its expense in
the time of the presiding officials. 86 If it is deemed necessary to
83. Wis. REP. 85: "It has been asserted that important interests may be left unrepresented on a committee because of the difficulty of securing representation for
unorganized groups. It is true that the advisory committee system works best where
the various groups are well organized and readily distinguishable, but the disadvantages
of unrepresented interests can, to a large extent, be overcome by supplementing the
advisory committee technique with public hearings or by designating some members
of the advisory committee as public representatives."
84. See ibid. Accord, 1 BENJAMrN REPoRT 309 which suggests that "the consultative
method should normally be supplemented by the method of public hearings." The
Benjamin Report warns, however, that "those who participate in consultation are likely
to have more influence on the final result than those who participate in the public
hearings." Id. at 308.
85. The practice of swearing witnesses in legislative hearings is criticized as unnecessary in DAvis § 6.06, at 382. But cf. Wis. REP. 103 which suggests that "if
there is a tendency for persons appearing at hearings to present exaggerated and irrelevant views and arguments, there may be a psychological advantage in placing them
under oath."
86. Wis. REP. 91. This expense can be held to a minimum by judicious restriction
of the use of agency members as presiding officers. Compare id. at 102: "While it
is not essential that the head of an agency preside at hearings, it would seem desirable
for him or some representative of the agency's policy board to be present at hearings
on the more important or controversial rule proposals. This would tend to assure
interested parties that their views will be made known to the, ultimate rule-making
authority and to satisfy them that they have had their 'day in court."'
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record and transcribe the remarks of every witness who testifies,
these expenses also could be unduly large.87 If such a hearing is held
before a responsible agency official, however, in those situations in
which the substance of witnesses' oral remarks can be preserved in
notes, it may not be necessary, to record all testimony. This
would be true especially with respect to those witnesses who take
advantage of the opportunity to submit written statements accompanying their oral testimony. 88 And when recording of witnesses'
remarks is necessary, the use of a tape recorder can provide a record
at nominal cost 89 which, on the basis of notes taken at the hearing,
could be selectively transcribed.
Other problems relate to securing information and views from
all interested persons. To the extent that persons affected by a
proposed rule or proposed exercise of rule-making power are widely
scattered throughout the state, many may be deterred from testifying
by the expense and inconvenience of traveling to the hearing site. 0
This difficulty can be alleviated to some extent 9' by the use of multiplesite hearings. Finally, some persons or groups affected by a proposed
rule may be unwilling publicly to discuss in detail their views
about a proposed rule. This difficulty can be met by holding
closed hearing sessions or by permitting interested persons or groups
to confer privately with the agency in an off-the-record manner, 2
although closed hearing sessions and 9 off-the-record
consultations
3
present problems in some circumstances.
87. Wis. REP. 91. The Wisconsin Legislative Research Council estimated in 1955
that the cost of obtaining the services of a stenographic reporter would be $20 per day
and the average cost of transcribing testimony would be approximately $47 per day.
Id. at 103.
88. Thus, the Wisconsin Industrial Commission has recorded testimony at hearings,
but normally has not transcribed it, on the rationale that the oral hearing is merely
supplementary to the submission of written statements. Wis. REP. 57-58. See also id. at
103.
89. Bloomfield, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Reform or
Retrogression?, 1963 DuKE L.J. 593, 611-12.
90. 1 BENjMviN REPORT 308; Wis. RE'. 91.
91. Views and statements made at one hearing location, not known to participants in
a simultaneous hearing at another location, may fail to be challenged. 1 BENJAMIN
REPORT 308.
92. Wis. REP. 56, 91.

93. Information imparted to an agency in confidence sometimes cannot be easily
subjected to the critical comments of the public or affected persons. Although information gathered by receipt of written submissions might normally not be subject
to private criticism, as the agency action develops more of an adversary flavor among
private groups the lack of opportunity for some interests to challenge confidentially imparted information may become more important. Such" information, however, may
sometimes be exposed to challenge by disclosing the substance of the information
without identifying details; and information about industry practices often could be
challenged without knowledge of the identity of the person supplying that information.
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When the interests affected are few in number, a conference-type
hearing or meeting may be practicable. 94 In such a meeting representatives of the affected interests would meet with the agency and
its staff to discuss their objections to, or views upon, a proposed
exercise of the rule-making power. Such a meeting would permit a
maximum of meaningful interchange among the agency, its staff, and
each of the affected interests, and also would thus permit each
of the affected interests to direct itself to essential points of difference
without unnecessary consumption of time in expounding views about
points which were undisputed or which the agency had already
fully considered and rejected. By assisting in the clarification of
differences and in the promotion of rational oral presentation, such
an interchange might facilitate the development of subsequent written
presentation of complex points. 95
Because no clear line separates rule making from adjudication, some
types of agency action which are considered to be "rule making"
for some purposes involve the determination of issues which affect
substantial economic or other interests of opposing groups or of
identifiable firms. In some of these instances it may be desirable to
structure a hearing in more of an adversary manner.9 Adversary
rule-making hearings are provided for in the federal act. The act
provides for a hearing intermediate between the fully adjudicative
hearing and a normal rule-making hearing with respect to "rules required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing."O This intermediate type of hearing procedure, apart
from the notice, separation-of-functions, and other provisions of section 5 of the federal act, resembles the adjudicative procedures. 98
94. Wis. REP. 58.

95. There are always practical limits on the number of complex points that can
be adequately developed. If areas of agreement can be ascertained at the outset, the
available recourses of the parties and the agency can be devoted more adequately to
exploring remaining areas of disagreement.
96. See FiNAL RiEporw 109: "whether their number is great or small, they may often
gain or lose with relative finality in the rule-making proceeding itself. The content of
the regulations when issued may be definite and the consequences of noncompliance
severe, such as the loss of the right to do business. Under these circumstances, it may
be desirable to let affected parties treat the rule-making proceedings as adversary, so
that all the information, conclusions, and arguments submitted to the agency may be
publicly disclosed to opposing interests which may answer, explain, or rebut. For
this purpose the procedure of consultation and conference and of nonadversary hearings may be inadequate. Where this is the case, hearings, in which information is
introduced as evidence subject to refutation and often to cross-examination, have come
to be employed."
97. APA § 4(b).
98. The framework for this intermediate type of hearing is contained in §§ 7 and 8
of the federal act. Section 7 provides that the officers who preside at hearings must
be either the agency, an agency member, or an independent officer, vested with
certain procedural powers. Section 7 contains the act's evidence and burden of proof
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Basically, the intermediate type of healing requires decisions to be

based upon evidence contained in a record; and, it attempts to
ensure that the decision is made by a body that is familiar with the

issues.99 Familiarity with the record is promoted by narrowing the
issues presented to agency decision-makers through the mechanism of

an initial, recommended, or tentative decision, and by providing the

opportunity for the submission of written and oral arguments. 10 0
Although the act in terms commands that the record or those parts

of the record cited in the briefs be considered before a sanction can be
imposed or a rule or order issued, 101 it is somewhat ambiguous as to

whom the command is addressed. Familiarity with the record and
arguments by hearing officers and the agency is also promoted by the
requirement of a ruling upon each finding, conclusion, or exception
presented, and the further requirement that a statement of findings
and conclusions, and the reasons or basis for them, accompany every
decision. 102
12. Summary and Conclusions.-The various methods of public

participation in rule making are adapted to different ends and achieve
different purposes. Thus, the public hearing device permits an agency

to appraise itself of public reactions to a problem or to a proposed
rule. It has as one attribute a flagging function with respect
to problem areas. The oral part of such a hearing by itself may not
render much assistance to an agency in solving a problem of any
rules. Under § 7 parties are given the right to present their cases by oral or documentary evidence and to conduct such cross-examination "as may be required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts," and the decision must be confined to the record.
Section 8 of the act provides that whenever the agency has not presided at the reception of evidence, either an initial decision shall be made by an independent hearing
officer (who may or may not have been the presiding officer at the reception of evidence) or the agency may cause the record to be certified to it for an initial decision.
If the initial decision by the hearing officer is not appealed to or reviewed by the
agency, that decision becomes the decision of the agency. If the agency makes an
initial decision, an independent hearing officer is first required to make a recommended
decision. In lieu thereof the agency may issue a tentative decision or any of its "responsible" officers (who can be prosecuting or investigative officers) may recommend
a decision. Any such procedure may be omitted if the agency finds "upon the
record that due and timely execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably so
requires." Section 8 provides for the submission of findings and conclusions, exceptions
to prior decisions, and supporting reasons prior to each recommended, initial, tentative
or final decision, and requires a ruling upon each finding, conclusion or exception presented. Every decision is required by § 8 to include a statement of findings and conclusions and the reasons therefor upon all the material issues of fact, law or discretion.
99. See note 98 supra.
100. APA § 8. See note 98 supra.
101. APA § 7(c): "no sanction shall be imposed or rule or order be issued except
upon consideration of the whole record or such portions thereof as may be cited by
any party .. "
102. APA § 8(b).
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complexity which it uncovers. This flagging function may be useful,
however, in focusing agency attention upon problem areas prior
to the initiation of rule making. Also, after the general lines of a
proposed new rule have been worked out a public hearing serves
as a check on the conclusions of the agency and its staff and as a
check upon the representative character of an advisory committee.
Informal consultation, however, may be useful over the whole process
of rule making, including intermediate and formulating stages
where advisory committees may be most useful. Acceptance of written
statements is well adapted not only to a thorough treatment of relatively narrow issues, but also to the wide coverage of issues which the
public hearing can achieve. For example, written statements would be
highly useful for the thorough presentation of policy arguments made
with respect to the conclusions to be drawn from economic data. Also,
some agencies seek widespread comment on rules by promulgating
them in advance of their effective date in order that, by the submission
of written statements or otherwise, defects can be brought to the
agency's attention for correction prior to their effectuation.
It would be unwise to specify in detail the procedures to be used
in every instance of rule making. 03 Moreover, legislation is not
capable 0 4 of requiring the use of some types of public participation,
such as informal consultation. 0 5 Legislation can be used, however,
to set forth standards or principles embodying procedural objectives'0 8
which the several agencies can implement in ways that are adapted
to their particular needs. Thus, agencies could be instructed legislatively about the desirability of employing some form of public
participation whenever that participation would facilitate the acquisition of information which would be needed or useful in rule making,
or when public participation in a form such as a public hearing.
would be advantageous due to the substantial impact of proposedrule making. An across-the-board imposition of the acceptance of
103. 1 BENjANmN REPORT 312. Benjamin notes that rule-making circumstances vary
too much to make any single form of procedure always desirable. In general, rulemaking procedure is of less importance than adjudicative procedure because the publication of rules will subject them to general criticism and the rules are open to revision
by both the agency and the legislature. Id. at 298, 312.
104. FnAxL REPor 105.
105. Appendix to Statement of Additional Views and Recommendations of Messrs.
McFarland, Stason, and Vanderbilt in A CODE OF STANDARDS oF FAim ADmNmITAnrE
PnoCEDURE § 209; FnaL REPoRT 228. Compare, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.018
(1957): "An agency may use informal conferences and consultations as means of
obtaining the viewpoints and advice of interested persons with respect to contemplated
rule making. Each agency also is authorized to appoint committees of experts orinterested persons or representatives of the general public to advise it with respect to
any contemplated rule making. The powers of such committees shall be advisory only."
106. FNAL REPOiRT 215.
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written submittals as a minimum form of public participation might

be unobjectionable, if it were limited to substantive rules and if the
agencies were permitted to dispense with those procedures when
they found them unnecessary or wasteful. 1 7
F. Publication of Agency Rules and Policy Formulations. 1. Provisions of Present Law.-At present, the Tennessee Code provides0 8

for the printing and filing with the Secretary of State of "rules
and regulations" of every state executive officer, board, department,
bureau, authority, and commission which is authorized by law
to promulgate rules and regulations "concerning the administration,
enforcement and interpretation of any law of this state, except such
as relate to the organization or internal management of such agency."
The Code further provides for the maintenance of those rules and

regulations at the office of the Secretary of State and at the principal
office of the agency promulgating them. Each agency is required by

statute to furnish printed copies of its rules and regulations to any
person who requests them.
Because the Code makes express reference to "interpretation," it

appears to require the filing of so-called interpretative rules. It is
probable, however, that many statements of policy would not be
sufficiently definite to be considered as "rules or regulations" subject
to the filing requirement. The "internal management" exception 1 9

to printing and filing requirements may encompass instructions to
agency personnel and, on a broad interpretation, rules governing
agency procedures." 0 The Code provides"' for the issuance of a
107. See text accompanying notes 27-38 supra.
108. TENN.CODE ANN. §§ 4-501 through 4-505 (1955).
109. An analogue to the internal management exception of TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-501
(1955) is found in the original APA § 3(2) which exempts from public information
requirements "any matter relating solely to the internal management of an agency."
The Model Act attempts to tighten this exception by adding the modifying phrase
"and not directly affecting the rights of or procedures available to the public." MODEL
ACT § 1(2). Substantially similar language is in the REVISED MODEL ACT § 1(7) (A).
In the Revised Model Act, moreover, the exception relates only to publication and
not to other forms of public information. REVSrED MODEL ACT §§ 1(7)(A), 2(a)(3).
A narrow reading of the federal "internal management" exception was urged in U.S.
CO1M'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcuTIvE BRANCH OF THE Cov T, REPORT OF TIH
148 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
TASE: FORCE ON LEGAL SEnVICE AND PnOCEDUu
HoovEr COM' dN TAsK FORCE REP.]. Cf. Freedom of Information Act § 3(c) (2), 80
Stat. 250 (1966).
110. The internal management exception to rule publication requirements of the
Model Acts would not excuse the publication of procedural rules. MODEL Acr §§ 1(2),
2(1), 4; REVsED MODEL ACT §§ 1(7), 2(2), 5. Compare original APA §§ 2(c), 3(2),
3(a)(2).
111. TENN.CODE ANN. § 4-506 (1955).
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"written opinion or decision" by state "boards and commissions" when

such is requested in writing by a party to a hearing, but there is no
requirement that the opinion be filed with the Secretary of State,
that it be maintained in his office or at the office of the agency,
or that it be made otherwise available to the public. A responsibility
rests on the boards and commissions issuing those, opinions, therefore,
to ensure that any new policy formulation embodied in an opinion
or decision be promulgated as a rule to which the public will have
access." 2 Moreover, the phrase, "boards and commissions" in the
provision dealing with written opinions" 3 is narrower than the
phrase "executive officer, board, department, bureau, authority, and
commission" used in the provision 1 4 dealing with the promulgation
of rules and regulations. Since both provisions constitute part of
the same chapter, there is an implication that a "written opinion or
decision" is not required in the case of a hearing conducted by an
executive officer, department, bureau, or authority. Since little reason
exists for differentiating the latter agencies from boards and commissions in connection with the desirability of written opinions, the
narrower coverage of the written opinion provision ought to be
broadened.
2. Types of Agency Rules to Which the Public Should Have Access.
-The public should have access to all rules, standards, criteria, and
other conduct-formulating principles by which agency action affecting
the public is governed or influenced, unless secrecy serves a public
purpose or unless the cost or other burden of making that information
publicly available outweighs its informative value 'to the public. Public
availability should mean not merely availability to persons affected by
agency action, but also availability to everyone; intelligent agency
action should be able to withstand and to profit from the criticism
of the press, scholars, and interested but unaffected members of the
public.
(a) Formal Rules, Interpretations,and Policy Statements Addressed
to the Public.-Easy public access to, and widespread knowledge of,
agency policies embodied in formal rules, interpretations, and policy
statements is generally desirable as a means of fostering conduct in
conformity with those policies. Except as cost factors become important or the demand for identifiable kinds of agency policy formulations.
begins to lag,115 no distinction ought to be made in publicizing formal
112. See text accompanying notes -114-15 infra. Cf. text accompanying notes 153-61
infra.
113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-506 (1955).
114. TFNN. CODE ANN. § 4-501 (1955).

115. See text accompanying note 160 infra.
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rules, interpretations, or policy statements. 1 6

(b) Policy Statements Addressed to Particular Members of the
Public.-Because opinions in adjudications are in form addressed

primarily to the parties in the case, present law directs that these
opinions be furnished only to parties. However, adjudicative opinions
may contain policy statements or formulations which have applicability to others. Accordingly, when opinions do contain policy state-

ments or formulations which would add significantly to public
knowledge of policy currently being pursued by an agency, at least

those portions of them that can adequately convey the full policy
117
statement or formulation should be made available to the public.

(c) Policy Statements Addressed to Agency Personnel.-The federal

agencies have been criticized" 8 for providing agency personnel with
secret instructions which have verged on substantive rules." 9 Whether
or not the Tennessee agencies have disguised substantive rules in the

form of instructions to personnel so as to come within the "internal
management" exception to rule filing and printing requirements, I am
not aware. While it is obviously unjust to penalize persons for failure
to conform with rules whose content is kept secret, it does not appear
that every type of instruction to agency personnel which may embody
116. The APA as originally enacted requires publication in the Federal Register of
"statements of general policy or interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency
for the guidance of the public." See criticism of the failure of some agencies to
comply with the act in Newman, Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on
Publication of Federal Regulations, 63 HeAR. L. Rmv. 929-43 (1950). Compare Freedom of Information Act, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), discussed in text accompanying notes 12338 infra. The Revised Model Act requires the publication (with certain exceptions) of
all "rules." "Rule" is defined to mean "each agency statement of general applicability
that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy. . . ." REVISED MODEL ACT
§§ 1(7), 5. In addition to the requirement that "rules" be published the act further
provides that each agency shall "make available for public inspection all rules and all
other written statements of policy or interpretations formulated, adopted, or used by
the agency in the discharge of its duties." REvisED MODEL AcT § 2(a)(3). Section
2(a)(3) requires that policy formulations excluded from the definition of "rule" and
thus not required to be published be made available for public inspection. The Hoover
Commisison Task Force recommended that all agency interpretations and policy statements be made available to the public. HoovEm COI~NIr'N TASK FORCE REP. 150. This
was the basis of the Revised Model Act provision quoted above. Comment to § 2,
HANDBooK or THE NATiONAL CONFERENCE OF CONLAmSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAws 209 (1961). Accord, FINAL REPOnT 26-29. But see note 119 infra.
117. Newman, supranote 116, at 936-37.
118. FiNAL REPORT 29; Newman, supra note 116, at 939-41.
REP. 150.

See also HoovLt

Cowmx'N TASK FORcE

119. Cf.

HoovER CoimeN TASK FoRcE REP. 149.

Some types of instructions to

agency personnel ought to have a claim to secrecy. Consider, e.g., the various types
of instructions and guides which govern criteria to be used by agency employees in
the settlement of cases. Disclosure of at least some types of instructions which deal
with appraisals of evidence issues might unduly weaken an agency employee's band in
bargaining situations. Cf. text accompanying notes 406, 410-13 infra.
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factors touching on substantive matters ought to be publicized. 120
(d) UnarticulatedPolicy Formulations and Secrecy.-In areas in

which an agency wishes to prohibit conduct which is generally considered unobjectionable, the agency must make known its disapproval
of a practice before that practice will be discouraged. The specificity
or generality in which the agency speaks is an important factor in
determining the extent of the conduct-inhibiting effect of an agency
pronouncement. To the extent that an agency is considered generally
to disapprove of a given practice, the burden of uncertainty as to how
far the agency disapproval extends rests upon the regulated public.
Agency promulgation of a rule articulating in detail the extent of
the agency disapproval would remove the inhibitions in the regulated
public concerning activity which fell within the pre-existing area of
uncertainty but outside of the area of articulated disapproval. Such
articulation would shift the burden of uncertainty from the regulated
public to the agency; the agency would then bear the burden of
being certain that the rule prohibited all undesirable conduct under
pain of removing inhibitions upon conduct not specifically prohibited.
A conscientious agency, therefore, would always consider whether its
rules and policy pronouncements carried a risk that undesirable conduct might be encouraged because of their specificity. In general,
however, when an agency has formulated policy for its own use in
future dealings with the public, the public ordinarily ought to be
informed of that policy and, at the very least, ought to have access
to it. Even where an agency is unsure about the scope of its objections to certain kinds of conduct, disclosure of the operative standards
of evaluation used by that agency may not unduly encourage undesirable conduct if the agency's uncertainty is reflected in standards
which are open-ended on their face.
These reasons indicate that relatively firm agency policy formulations ought to be made public, at least where knowledge of those
formulations would facilitate business or other private planning.
Tentative policy formulations, however, probably should not be
governed by a rigid rule. Their publication perhaps ought to depend
upon the degree of certainty or doubt entertained by the agency with
respect to those formulations, and upon an assessment of their effect
upon conduct.
The Benjamin Report suggests 121 that nondisclosure or secrecy
120. See note 119 supra and text accompanying notes 406, 410-13 infra. Cf. text

accompanying notes 120-22 infra.
121. 1 BENjA-IN

REP RT 259:

"especially in the early stages of administrative

adjudication in a given field, an administrative tribunal, which must decide the
particular cases before it, may still with reason be unwilling to commit itself for
the future on the basis of its present decisions, and may reasonably prefer to leave
its decisions unpublished until its views are further crystallized." See also id. at 296.
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should be permitted concerning policy formulations which the agency
has made of necessity in connection with adjudications or other circumstances, the wisdom of which the agency is unsure, on the apparent rationale that publication of such a policy formulation may
encourage public conduct in accord with the formulated policy.
While the agency's objectives in such situations can evoke some
sympathy, the public has an interest in knowing what policies have
been in fact formulated and applied, even though those policies are
subject to revision. Moreover, the agency can discourage 122 reliance
upon its opinions by stating that its policies have not crystallized and
that it has not as yet had the opportunity to consider fully the points
involved. Although nondisclosure of an application of an uncertain
policy formulation cannot be clearly distinguished from nondisclosure
of an unapplied tentative policy formulation as its effect on the encouragement of possibly undesirable conduct, the fact that application
may evidence a firmer commitment to the policy plus a general dislike
of secret government activity induces me to reject the suggestion of
the Benjamin Report.
An agency ought to have discretion to keep secret those policy
formulations which restrictively govern enforcement and penalty
criteria. These rules may simply reflect judgments as to how an
agency's limited resources can most efficiently be utilized; they may,
for example, be reflected in instructions to enforcement personnel to
spend most of their time investigating more serious violations. Again,
rules codifying an agency practice of overlooking minor infractions
and reserving heavier penalties for serious violations may be based on
an assessment of the regulatory methods which are best equipped to
promote agency-desired conduct by regulated persons. Public access
to those rules might tend to encourage infractions to which severe
penalties would not attach.
(e) Materials Required To Be Published Under the FederalAct and
the Model State Acts.-In addition to publication requirements relating
to organizational and procedural information, section 3 of the federal
Administrative Procedure Act, as originally enacted, required every
agency to publish in the FederalRegister "substantive rules adopted as
authorized by law and statements of general policy or interpretations
formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the
public."m Although the federal act defines "rule" broadly to include,
inter alia, "any agency statement of general or particular applicability
and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law
or policy" and expressly includes in the rule definition prospective
122. Such discouragement may not be complete, however.
123. APA § 3(a).
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rate making and approvals of corporate or financial structure, 1 publication in the FederalRegister of many rules of particular applicability has been avoided by section 3s exclusion of "rules addressed to
and served upon named persons in accordance with law" from its
publication requirements25 Although the definition of "rule" appears
broad enough to encompass most policy formulations, the phrase "substantive rules adopted in accordance with law" does not encompass all
policy formulations, viz., it does not encompass "procedurar' policy
formulations. 126 The noninclusiveness of the phrase may be important in reading the proper meaning into the additional publication
requirement regarding "statements of general policy or interpretations
formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the
public." It is possible for some administrative "statements" to be
made to one or a few individuals, with no intention that they be
made available to the public at large.1 7 In such circumstances the
original section 3 apparently would not require publication; nor
under restrictive interpretations of other provisions of section 3
would administrative statements to one or a few individuals be open
to public inspection. 128 A newly enacted revision of section 3, however, omits the phrase "formulated and adopted by the agency for
the guidance of the public" and requires publication of "statements
of general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated
and adopted by the agency."n 9 The amendment also contains a public
disclosure requirement pertaining to "statements of policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency and are not
published in the Federal Register." 130 Under the amendment, agency
policy statements to one or a few individuals will be available to the
public at large at least for inspection and copying. The quoted
124. APA § 2(c).
125. APA § 3(a)(3).
126. Section 3(a)(2) of the original federal act provided for the publication of
procedural requirements in the Federal Register.
127. See, e.g., Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal Revenue Service:
A Statement of Principles, N.Y.U. 20cm INST. ON FED. TAx. 1 (1962). Mr. Caplin
argues that authority can more easily be delegated to subordinate personnel to answer
individual taxpayer requests for tax rulings when widespread reliance upon those rulings
is not anticipated.
128. Since almost any final agency action would seem to be either a "rule" or an
"order" as those terms are defined in APA 88 2(c), (d), the public availability requirements of APA § 3(b) would seem to apply to almost all final agency actions.
A restrictive interpretation of those sections, however, seems implicit in the NLRB
Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.117(b) (1965) which restricts access to
regional director and General Counsel decisions not to prosecute unfair labor practice
charges.
129. Freedom of Information Act § 3(a)(D), 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
130. Freedom of Information Act § 3(b)(B), 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
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provisions of the new section 3, however, do not seem to affect
publication or disclosure practices concerning policy statements13made
1
to one or a few individuals by subordinate agency personnel.
The phrase "formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance
of the public," which modifies the publication requirement for "statements of general policy or interpretations" in the original section 3,
might also allow agencies to avoid mandatory publication of policies
of leniency towards minor infractions or initial violators of agency
rules. 132 Policies of this kind might be practical for adoption, but
agencies would rarely intend that members of the public guide their
conduct by them. Under the new section 3, which omits that phrase,
agencies wishing to avoid public disclosure of leniency policies might
have to rely on an absence of agency "statements" of those policies,
which, in turn, would require a reading of "statements" as used in
section 3 as excluding internal agency descriptions of their leniency
policies addressed to themselves or to agency employees. This potential for embarrassment was probably unforeseen by the drafters
of the new section 3; it illustrates the dangers involved in adopting
publication requirements
which are both detailed and general in
133
their application.
The only requirement of public disclosure of adjudicative opinions
contained in the federal Administrative Procedure Act, as originally
enacted, was a provision making those opinions and orders "available
to public inspection." Even there an exception was made for "those
required for good cause to be held confidential and not cited as
precedents."' 34 The amendment gives the public an express right to
copy as well as to inspect and expressly requires disclosure of concurring and dissenting opinions. 35 The "good cause"'3 6 exception has
been 1eliminated
in favor of a list of more specific and narrower exemp37
tions.

No obligation to publish adjudicative opinions, is contained

in the amended act; however, the texts of significant adjudicative
131. The provisions of the amendment quoted in the text refer to policies which
have been adopted by the agencies. They would seem therefore, to exclude statements
of subordinate personnel which have not been adopted by the agencies. Nice questions may arise under the act about subordinates exercising authority delegated to
them by their agency. In a sense all authority exercised by subordinate agency personnel
is derived from the agency for whom they work. Statements of subordinate personnel
may be affected, however, by § 3(c) of the amendment.
132. See text following note 122 supra.
133. Cf. text accompanying notes 657-63 infra.
134. APA § 3(b). The amendment contains an injunction against using publicly
unavailable opinions as precedents. But can an agency official preclude acting in at
least partial reliance upon a prior opinion of which he has knowledge? If lie can
and does, is he trying to be inconsistent? Compare DAvis § 4.10, at 89-90 (Supp. 1965).
135. Freedom of Information Act § 3(b), 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
136. APA § 3 (b).
137. Freedom of Information Act § 3(c), 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
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opinions of many of the major federal agencies are published apart
from the Federal Register-Code system. 138
The original and Revised Model State Administrative Procedure
Acts contain almost identical publication provisions. 39 They provide
for the publication of all effective "rules." Since the publication
requirements of the Model Acts relate to "rules," agencies will not
be required to publish policy formulations if they do not fall within the
definitions of a "rule." The original Model Act defines "rule" broadly,
excepting only internal management regulations "not directly affecting
the rights of or procedures available to the public."14 The Revised
Model Act defines "rule" as:
each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets,
or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or
practice requirements of any agency. The term includes the amendment or
repeal of a prior rule, but does not include (A) statements concerning only
the internal management of an agency and not affecting private rights or
procedures available to the public, or (B) declaratory rulings issued pursuant
to Section 8, or (C) intra-agency memoranda. 14 '

Since procedural information is required to be adopted in "rule" form
under both acts, 42 it is governed by their publication requirements.
"Rule," under both acts, would seem to include internal directives
and regulations to the extent that they affect private "rights" and,
under the Revised Act, are not embodied in "intra-agency memoranda." Since most agencies administer statutes which deal with
"privileges" rather than "rights," the use of the latter term in the
Model Acts may create only a narrow obligation to publish internal
rules. 4 3 The Revised Act appears to exclude from its publication
requirement (and from its rule-making procedures) any policy formulation which an agency chooses to embody in a memorandum. It
would further appear that almost any written matter which is not
in printed form might be aptly described as a memorandum. The
"rule" definitions apparently do not include opinions in adjudications
even though such opinions would seem to interpret "law or policy"
and even though they contain statements generally applicable to
138. A noninclusive list of federal agencies whose significant decisions are published
would include the Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Communications Commission,
Federal Power Commission, Federal Trade Commission, National Labor Relations
Board, and the Securities & Exchange Commission.
139. MODEL AcT § 4; REvIsED MODEL AcT § 5.
140. MODEL AcT § 1(2).

141. REvIsED MODEL AcT § 1(7).
142. MODEL AcT § 2(1); REVISED MODEL AcT § 2(a)(2). Compare MODEL AcT
§ 2(2), with REvIsED MODEL AcT § 2(a) (1).
143. In appropriate cases, however, it is hoped that courts might give a broad meaning to the term "rights."
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matters regulated by the issuing agencies. The exclusion of adjudicative opinions from the "rule" definitions and hence from the publication requirements seems to follow from the fact that the procedures
required for the adoption of a "rule," under both acts, are incompatible with adjudicative procedures. In this connection, the exclusion of "declaratory rulings" from the "rule" definition of the Revised
Act suggests that a more precise definition would also have excluded
opinions in contested cases. 1 " Although adjudicative opinions and
the three express exceptions to the definition of "rule" are not
required by the Revised Act to be published, sections 2(a) (3) and
(4) of that act require that an agency shall:
(3) make available for public inspection all rules and all other written
statements of policy or interpretations formulated, adopted, or used by the
agency in the discharge of its functions;
(4) make available for public inspection all final orders, decisions, and
opinions.

Although "rules" whose publication is omitted because publication
would be "unduly cumbersome, expensive, or otherwise inexpedient"
are required to be "made available on application to the adopting
agency In printed or processed form," opinions, memoranda, and
similar policy formulations other than "rules" are required merely to
be made available for public inspection. 145 The rationale for the
differing treatment may be a judgment that opinions and memoranda
may be in less demand than "rules," and that imposing the printing
or processing requirements on the agencies for opinions and memoranda would, therefore, be too burdensome or expensive. To the extent
that agencies are conscientious in incorporating all of their policy
formulations (including those developed in adjudications) into their
rules, the rationale of the Revised Model Act may gain additional
support. It would be desirable, however, that those documents
available for public inspection also be available for copying and
photographing.
3. Means by Which Agency Rules and Policy Formulations Can Be
Made Accessible.
(a) In General.-In determining the means by which information
about current 46 agency policies can be made available to the public,
144. An opinion would seem to implement or interpret law or policy. REVISED MODErL
AcT § 1(7). The Massachusetts act recognizes this and excludes decisions in adjudicatory proceedings from its definition of "regulation." MASS. ANN. LAWs cli. 30A, §
1(5)(e) (1966).
145. RvisED MODEL Acr § 2(4). Even availability for public inspection was not
required by the original Model Act.
146. Difficulties encountered in keeping published rules current seem to have been
major stumbling blocks in the efforts of several states to publicize administrative action.
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it must be borne in mind that there are various degrees and kinds of
availability. The maintenance of one or more filing establishments
in which agency information is made accessible to the public constitutes a certain minimal degree of public availability. Publication in
a privately owned newspaper also makes agency information publicly
available. Publication in an administrative bulletin probably achieves
a higher degree of public availability. Distribution of information
concerning agency policies via mailing lists compiled on an agency
basis, subscription to which is available to any interested person,
is a different kind of public availability, as is publication in books or
pamphlets furnished or sold by agency or other government personnel.
(b) Methods of PublicationUnder Federal and State Statutes.-In
the federal publication system, rules are published principally in the
Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations. The Register
is published daily except Sundays, Mondays, holidays, and days following holidays. Periodically, most of the rules which have been
published in the Federal Register are incorporated into the Code of
Federal Regulations.147 The Code has been entirely revised several
times since its first edition in 1938, and supplements are published at
least annually. 48 Rules of individual agencies are also published, and
groups of rules for which a separable demand exists are often separately obtainable. 149 Although opinions in applications are required
by the federal Administrative Procedure Act only to be made available
for public inspection, 50 many important opinions are published separately from the Register-Codesystem-l
The provisions of the two Model Acts provide that a designated
government officer "shall compile, index, and publish all effective
rules adopted by each agency" and that "Compilations shall be supplemented or revised as often as necessary [and at least once every
2 years]." 152 The acts also provide for the publication of "a
[monthly] bulletin" which is designed to keep the compilations up
to date. Finally, they provide that omissions may be made from the
compilations and bulletins if the omitted material could only be
Wis.

REP. 151-53. See also HADY, ADamINISTATIVE Poc:EDurE LEGISLATION IN THE
STATES 40-41 (1952), referring to the inconvenience entailed under the California

system of replacing superseded pages in the California Administrative Code.
147. See, e.g., Newman, supranote 116, at 948-49.
148. See, e.g., Cohen, Publication of State Administrative Regulations-Reform in
Slow Motion, 14 BUFFALo L. REv. 410, 414 (1965).
1.49. E.g., INTsTATE COiMERCE COMISSION PAMPHLET: GENERAL RULES OF
PRAcT CE (1962).
150. APA § 3(b). See text accompanying note 138 supra.
151. See note 138 supra.
152. MODEr. AcT § 4; REVISED MODEL AcT § 5.
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published in the compilations and bulletins with difficulty and if the
material is available for distribution on request.15 3 The provisions of
the acts seem to require publication of a compilation of all rules 1of4
all agencies rather than compilations of rules by each agency.
They are silent about publication of groups of rules which are less
than all of the rules promulgated by an agency and for which there
exists a separable demand. They say nothing about the form of publication-whether in bound volumes (with or without "pocket" supplements), in loose leaf form, or in pamphlets.
State legislation concerning publication of agency rules varies
considerably. Some states have enacted the language of the Model
Acts substantially verbatim; 155 others under different statutory provisions, have taken the direction which seems to be suggested by the
Model Acts and have enacted or adopted publication systems em153. MODEL ACT § 4(3); REVISED MODEL ACT § 5(c).
154. This is the interpretation made in Cohen, supra note 148, at 416. Compare,
however, the use of the plural "compilations" in MODEL ACT § 4(1), and REVISED
MODEL ACT § 5(a), with the singular "the compilation" in MODEL ACT § 4(3). Cf.
REViSED MODEL ACT § 5(c). The plural form of "compilations" in MODEL ACT § 4(4)

and REVIsED MODEL ACT § 5(d) is not helpful because it is used in conjunction with
the plural "bulletins" and both acts establish only one bulletin. MODEL ACT § 4(2);
REvisED MODEL ACT § 5(b).

Compare the additional language in OaE. REv. STAT.

§ 183.360(1) (Supp. 1965).
155. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-107 (Supp. 1966); Mo. REv. STAT. § 11140.103
(1959) (omits authorization to exclude rules whose publication would be cumbersome,
expensive or inexpedient); ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.360 (Supp. 1965); R.I. GEN. LAws
ANte. § 42-35-5 (Supp. 1966); WAsi. REv. CODE ANN. § 34.04.050 (1965). The
Washington statute omits the direction to "publish" the compilation, but since the
compilation is required to be made available at a price covering publication costs, it is
not entirely clear that the omission was not an oversight. See also note 156 infra.
Michigan, which has a statute largely based on the original Model Act, has adopted
more detailed publication provisions. Michigan requires the Secretary of State to
"compile, index, and publish all administrative rules . . . in a publication to be known
as the Michigan administrative code." A "revised edition" of the code is required to
be published "when directed . . . by the legislature." Quarterly and annual supplements to the code are required to be published. Each quarterly supplement is required to contain the rules filed "not less than 30 days before the end of the
preceding calendar quarter" and the annual supplement is required to include "all
rules theretofore published in a calendar year." Both the quarterly and annual supplements are required to be indexed. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(12) (Supp. 1965).
Under the Michigan system a researcher is required to search through the code, the
annual supplement, and the quarterly supplement since the last annual supplement,
He is then sure that his information is current within three months. The Michigan
statute contemplates separate publication by the agencies of their rules and groups
of their rules, MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.560(12a), 3.560(13) (1961), and attempts to
provide for economical separate publication by providing for the maintenance of the
text and type of the administrative code and supplements in order to facilitate such
separate publications of the individual agencies. MicHr. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(12a) (1961).
The law further requires the code to be "arranged, indexed and printed in such
manner as to make the type or plates available and convenient for the publication of
separate pamphlets or the portions relating to different state agencies." Micu. STAT.
ANN. § 3.560(13) (1961).
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bodying administrative codes kept current

-by

periodic bulletins

(which in some cases are in the form of insertable loose-leaf pages) .156

Some states, however, including some which have followed the

Model Acts in other respects, have expressly provided for rules compilations on an agency basis. Some of these states have also expressly
provided for separate agency publication of separable groups of
rules. 157 Some state statutes which are partially based on the Model
156. Administrative codes are provided for in ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.130 (1962);

CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11409-15 (Supp. 1966); CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 4-50 (1966);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.051 (Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1570 (1961); IowA
CODE ANN. § 17.21 (Supp. 1966); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 77-427 (Supp. 1965);

Ky. REv. STAT. § 13.096 (1962); Micir. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(12) (Supp. 1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 35.93 (Supp. 1966). See also ML4NN. STAT. ANN. § 15.0413(5)
(Supp. 1966). Cf. N.J. CONST. art 5, § 4 (1947). Among the states adopting the
publication provisions of the Model Acts are GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-107 (Supp. 1966);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 1140.103 (1959); ORE. REv. STAT. § 183.360 (Supp. 1965); R. I.
GEN. LAws ANN. § 42-35-5 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 34.04.050 (1965).
Cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, §§ 255, 256 (1965). See A=z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1006
(1956), referred to in note 159 infra. See also notes 157, 158, 160, & 167 infra. See
generally Ky. REp. No. 12, 5; Wis. REP. 153; HEADy, ADMImnsTRATIVE PRocEDURE
LEGISLATION nr ME STATES 38-40 (1952); Cohen, Publication of State Administrative
Regulations-Reform in Slow Motion, 14 BUFFALO L. REv. 410, 416-18, 423-26 (1965).
In some states rules publication systems embody a rules compilation in loose-leaf
form which is supplemented with periodic bulletins which are also published in looseleaf form and which can be inserted in the compilations at appropriate places. In
some such states it is possible to purchase the complete compilation or only those parts
of the compilation in which the purchaser is interested and subscriptions to the bulletins
may be had for all issues or only for those issues which pertain to any one or more
parts of the compilations. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 35.93(7) (Supp. 1966). See
also HEADy, op. cit. supra at 39; KY. REP. No. 12, 5. Wisconsin agencies are permitted
to distribute copies of their rules, but normally are expected to use the plates of the
compilation and bulletin.
A loose-leaf mechanism eliminates the need for periodic editions of a rules compilation
which exists under the federal bound-volume system. It also eliminates the slight inconvenience of pocket supplements and the necessity of checking periodic bulletins
published between pocket supplements. It is expensive, however, and has been
criticized for imposing upon subscribers the task of inserting pages into the compilation!
Wis. RE'. 166, 173. Cf. HEADY, op. cit. supra at 40-41.
Apart from state systems which provide for subscriptions by interested persons to
be notified of new rule making or for the immediate newspaper publication of new
rules, none of the state systems have the currency of the federal system because none
of them provides a counterpart to the almost daily Federal Register. It is not clear,
however that absolute currency in a rules compilation and supplement would be worth
the effort and expense that would be required to achieve it. A subscription procedure
might, in many cases, be the best combination of economy and effectiveness with which
to seek currency. Encouragement of the regulated public to check with agencies for
recent rules changes before acting upon the basis of published rules would also seem
to be a practical alternative.
157. Rules publication on an agency basis is contemplated by HAWAI REv. LAws §
6C-5 (Supp. 1965); IDAHo CODE ANW. § 67-5205 (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 247 (1965); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § 6 (1965); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-903, 905
(1958); Ono RE v. CODE ANN. § 119.05 (Baldwin 1964); VA. CODE ANNT. § 9-6.7
(Supp. 1966); W. VA. CODE § 29A-3-7 (1966). See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, §
1710.21 (Supp. 1966). See also Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-276-23 (Supp. 1965). Most of
these statutes permit a further break-down into publication by regulatory subject
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Acts lack provisions for the publication of a periodic bulletin., 8 Some
states use means other than publication to inform the public about the

existence of rules.159

The high cost of producing and revising a comprehensive adminis-

trative code probably accounts for the failure of some states to adopt
such a system, and for the emphasis in some statutes, partially based
on the Model Acts, upon publication on an agency basis.'

The

failure of some states to adopt periodic bulletins containing rules of all
that such a publication would be
agencies is probably due to doubts 161
worth its cost to its potential users.
matter. The present Maryland provision has replaced a publication provision based
upon the original Model Act. Cf. CAL. GoVT CODE § 11414; IowA CODE ANN. § 17A.14
(Supp. 1966). Compare IND. ANN. STAT. § 60-1508 (1961) (authorization for rules
publication on agency basis), with § 60-1507 (administrative code). See also note 167
infra. See Cohen, supra note 156, at 423-26 for a list of publication sources in the
various states.
158. Statutes which are at least partially based on the original or Revised Model
Acts and which do not provide for the publication of a monthly or other periodic
bulletin published less than once a year include HAwAi REv. LAws § 6C-5 (Supp.
1965); IDAo CODE ANN. § 67-5205 (Supp. 1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 2353

(1964); MD.ANN. CODE art. 41, § 247 (1965); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 6 (1966);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 84-903, 905 (1958); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.7 (1964); Wyo. STAT.

AsNN. § 9-276.23 (Supp. 1965). Compare Mnnqr. STAT. ArN. § 15.0413(5) (Supp.
1966), with MIN. STAT. ANN. § 15.047(1) (Supp. 1966).
159. North Dakota, for example, provides for filing copies of each rule in every
county of the state and also provides that each rule "shall be mailed . . . to the
secretary of the state bar association." N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-03 (1960). A requirement similar to the quoted provision previously existed in MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 15.045 (1946). Mailing copies of new rules to subscribers to such a service is a
method used to inform the public about new rules, inter alia, in COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-16-2(11) (1963). See also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-2(9) (1963) (inspection
and copying). Inspection and copying is used, inter alia, under N.C. GEN. SrAT. §§
143-97 (1964). See also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, §§ 701-04 (Supp. 1965); cf. Aim. STAT.
ANN. § 5-503 (1956). Compare ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 127, §§ 268-268.1 (Supp. 1966).
Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1006 (1956) is unclear as to whether copies of a compilation are to be printed and sold or whether inspection and copying of a compilation
prepared for official use only is contemplated.
160. Cost, plus lack of demand for an administrative code, would weigh against such
publication. Professors Frankel and Gelihorn reported with respect to the New York
code that: "When the newly compiled volumes appeared as the legislature had directed, only 58 sets were sold throughout the entire State of New York; and in no
year were more than 70 of the annual supplements purchased. During the first dozen
years, direct printing costs alone (exclusive of all the added personnel and overhead
costs) came to $113,888.04; total sales were $11,471.85." Hearings on S. 1663 Before
the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 678 (1964). Heady reported that in 1951 there
were 160 standing subscriptions to the entire California bulletin and about 1,100
partial subscriptions. HEADY, op. cit. supra note 156, at 40. The small number of
subscriptions to the entire bulletin may have been due to the fact that access to the
complete compilation could be had at all law libraries and that reprints of the rules
of the individual agencies were easily available.
161. Cf.notes 156 & 160 supra.
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4. Recommendations. (a) In General.-It is difficult to make recommendations concerning the publication of agency rules and policies
which would be applicable without distinction to all agencies and to
all types of rules and policies. Of course, a comprehensive publication system like the FederalRegister and Code of Federal Regulations
would be ideal, but the cost of establishing and administering such a
system would probably vastly outweigh the benefit that could be
expected from it. In large measure, therefore, the amount and
kind of publicity which should be given to the publication of agency
rules and policies ought to be guided by the objectives of efficient
regulation and fairness to affected persons.
(b) Administrative Efliciency.-In some areas, efficient regulation
will be promoted by publicizing agency rules and policies so that
all those who wish to comply with them will be able to do S0.162
Opinions of the Attorney General, which perform in large measure
the function of agency rules, are generally not published; yet the administrative interpretations of the tax laws, for example, are governed
by those opinions. 163 If the administration of the revenue department
could be more cheaply and efficiently carried out by publicizing those
opinions and thereby shifting to the taxpaying public a greater share
of the burden of complying with the tax laws, then economy of
administration would suggest that these opinions be published.
(c) Policies Governing the Issuance of Initial Licenses.-In initial
license determinations, agency policies by definition, become known
to the affected party in the decision granting or denying the license.
Since the denial of an initial license does not involve the imposition
of a penalty for past conduct, knowledge of agency policy prior to the
submission of a license application may not be as necessary as it would
be in areas in which agency policy determines the imposition of
penalties. 164 Prior knowledge of agency policies is desirable here, however, in order to facilitate business or other planning in regard to
activities for whose completion ultimate agency approval will be
necessary. Knowledge of the standards applied by an agency to
determine initial license grants is also desirable in order to assist
persons in meeting agency requirements for licensing, and to facilitate
informed argument to the agency about the propriety of initial license
grants.
162. See text preceding note 115 supra and text following note 120 supra.
163. See the discussion of Attorney General's opinions in text accompanying notes

611-19 infra; cf, text accompanying notes 571-75 infra.
164. But an interference with reasonable expectations, especially when one has
invested substantial sums in those expectations may create hardship akin to a penalty.
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(d) Rules Embodying Standardsof Conduct for Violation of Which
Penalties Are Imposed.-It is important that agency rules or policies
which are used as criteria by which the lawfulness of past conduct is
judged in penalty proceedings be publicized to those persons subject
to them. Thus, in penalty proceedings involving conduct which has
allegedly deviated only from agency rules, justice would normally require that no person be punished who did not have an adequate opportunity to learn of those rules before acting. 165
In those areas in which an agency deems itself responsible for shaping or developing patterns of conduct to conform to agency or statutory
policy, an agency may feel that imposing penalties is an awkward (and
perhaps largely unworkable) way to achieve its result-especially if
regulated persons are in doubt about those policies. Consequently,
such an agency would tend to inform persons subject to its regulation
of its views as to proper conduct or to issue reminders to them, and to
impose punishments only as a last resort when those admonitions and
reminders were ignored. This practice, which is required by the federal act and the Revised Model Act prior to license revocations proceedings, 166 would eliminate much of the injustice which would result
from a failure to promulgate rules ahead of time.
(e) Forms of Publication.-As long as each agency makes copies
of its rules available to any person requesting them, the form in
which the rules are reproduced ought to be determined by the respective agencies in accordance with dictates of economy and convenience. Probably the agencies would decide on the basis of their
experience that separable demands exist for various groupings of
rules, and thus cost might be reduced by making those various rule
groupings available separately. 167 The agencies should take steps to
keep their rules publications current, as by including mimeographed
attachments to rules booklets. Providing mailing list service to subscribers of current and prospective rules changes in a manner analogous to that provided for in the Revised Model Act, 68 wherever a
165. FumLER, THE MORArr OF LAw 51 (1964).
166. See text following note 478 infra.
167. 1 BENfAMIN REPORT 325, noting that the purchase price of a general rules
publication "may be prohibitive for many individuals who are in fact interested only
in a limited field. It is desirable, therefore, that, as far as practicable, the regulations
of individual agencies, subdivided as far as is practicable, should be available for
separate distribution or purchase;" Wis. REP. 151: "If all or most rules are printed
in a single bound volume, there . . . is some loss of economy due to the fact that
very few people are interested in obtaining all rules in existence, yet they are required to purchase all in order to obtain the few in which they are interested;"
Newman, Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of Federal
Regulations, 63 HAXav. L. REv. 929, 954 (1950), referring to the "convenience and
economies" resulting from the reprints of rules of individual agencies.
168. Rlv ED MODE-L AcT § 3(a)(1). See text following note 146 supra.
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demand for such a service is found to exist, would also be desirable.
Finally, agency personnel should be aware of their responsibilities
for informing the public of current policies and standards; and, accordingly, they should take every opportunity, by furnishing requested
advice and by volunteering information or agency publications, to
assist interested an daffected persons in planning their conduct to
conform with those policies. 169
G. Petitionsfor Adoption of Rules.-The federal act and the Model
Acts each contain provisions expressly conferring upon "interested"
persons the right to petition agencies for the adoption of an amendment or repeal of a rule (including an "interpretative" rule) .'7 If, in
the absence of other proceedings, a petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule would be considered to be done "in connection with [an] agency proceeding," the federal act seems to require that denials of rule-making petitions be made promptly and
that the ground for denial be stated. 71 If a federal agency wished
neither to deny a petition nor to grant it immediately (as might be the
case, for example, if the agency wanted to conduct further study on
a rule proposed by a petitioner), the effect of the act's provisions concerning notice and statement of grounds is unclear. The general intent of the statute seems to require the agency to notify the petitioner
about the status of his proposed rule and the reasons for that status.
The original Model Act provides in section 5 that:
Any interested person may petition an agency requesting the promulgation,
amendment, or repeal of any rule. Each agency shall prescribe by rule the
form for such petitions and the procedure for their submission, consideration,

and disposition.
Under the Model Act, the obligation imposed upon agencies to act
upon a petition requesting the exercise of their rule-making power is
a nebulous one. The agencies are themselves entrusted with formullating by rule the procedures which will govern their consideration
and disposition of such petitions. If an agency fails to formulate such
procedures, its obligation to consider and act upon a rule-making
petition never comes into being. In 1943, Wisconsin enacted a petition-for-rule-making provision similar to that contained in the Model
Act. The Wisconsin Legislative Council reported in 1955172 that only
12 out of 46 administrative agencies had promulgated the procedural
169. Cf. HoasKy, THE WASnINGToN LAwYER 92-97 (1952).

170. APA §§ 2(c), 4(d). MODEL
171. APA §6(d).
172. Wis. REP. 105-06.

ACT §§ 1(2), 5; REVISED Acr §§

1(7), 6.
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rules called for by that provision, and that only four agencies had
received formal petitions for the adoption of rules, although most
had received informal requests for rule-making action. The staff of
the Council stated that "on the basis of our research, it seems reasonable to conclude that the type of provision presently existing in
Wisconsin is not functioning as it was intended to function. It has
been largely ignored by both the agencies and the public." The staff
recommended "that the form and content of and the procedure for
submitting such a petition be prescribed by statute," and that an
agency's duty to act on a rule-making petition be spelled out by
statute. The staff concluded that a provision which "would require
an agency either to hold a hearing on a petition or to deny it in
writing" would be advisable.
Legislative prescription of a form for a rule-making petition which
could be superseded by affirmative agency action seems as useful as
the mandatory form suggested by the Wisconsin Council; it would
also possess an element of flexibility lacking to the Council suggestion.'73 The second suggestion of the Wisconsin Council seems to have
been followed in section 6 of the Revised Model Act which, after
repeating practically verbatim the provisions of section 5 of the
original Model Act, adds the following sentence:
Within 30 days after submission of a petition, the agency either shall deny
the petition in writing (stating its reasons for the denials) or shall initiate
rule-making proceedings in accordance with Section 3.
It is generally agreed that private persons should be able to
petition agencies to exercise their rule-making powers, but it is not
clear that energies should be obligated to act upon every petition
within a thirty-day period. 17 4 In order to protect agencies from
dissipating their agencies in answering a rash of rule-making petitions,
each agency ought to be allowed to deal collectively with petitions
raising similar points and to excuse itself from any time limit when
compliance with such a time limit would interfere with the efficient
administration of the statutes entrusted to it. Furthermore, an agency
should be free to give additional study to a problem raised in a
rule-making petition rather than be forced to accept or reject a
proposed rule which may be poorly drafted or badly thought out.
In an attempt to protect the agencies from harassment by frivolous
173. Ky. REP'. No. 12, 63. The Commission adopted this provision from MAss.
ANt. LAws ch. 30A, § 4 (1966). Accord, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-44 (1966).
174. The Oklahoma version of the Revised Model Act has substituted "a reasonable
time" for the 30-day period in which agency action on a petition for rule-making
action is required. OKRA. STAT. Ax. tit. 75, § 305 (1965).
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petitions, Wisconsin limited the right to petition to municipalities,
corporations, and five or more interested persons. 175 The Kentucky
Legislative Council recommendations, which modified section 3(a)
(2) of the Revised Model Act by requiring that the twenty-five or
more persons who could force a mandatory rule-making hearing must
be "directly affected," 17 6 did not use a similar approach in connection
with petitions for the adoption of rules. The difference in approach
is probably due to the belief that rule-making proceedings not
involving oral hearings are not so great an imposition upon an agency's
functioning. The degree to which rule-making proceedings interfere
with the proper functioning of an agency, however, may depend
partially upon the deadlines imposed for deciding rule-making petitions and the extent to which the personal attention17 7of the agency
head is required in the disposition of those petitions.
III. DECLARAToRY DETEMINAToINs
A. Declaratory Rulings by Agencies.-The federal act and the two
Model Acts provide for the issuance of declaratory rulings by agencies178 and for judicial review of those rulings. 17 9 The federal act and
the original Model Act merely authorize agencies to issue declartory
orders; 80 the Revised Model Act is less clear than the other two
acts about the power of agencies to refuse to issue declaratory rulings. 18' Requiring agencies to issue declaratory rulings on all requests
made to them might impose too great a burden on agency time and
energies. If mandatory declaratory rulings were to be required, some
showing that the persons seeking rulings are seriously contemplating
175. Wis.

STAT.

A

x.

§ 227.015 (1957).

176. Ky. REP. No. 12, 59. See text accompanying note 48 supra.

177. Cf. text accompanying notes 181-82 infra.
178. APA § 5(d); MODEL Acr § 7; REVsED MODEL AcT § 8. Compare the Michigan
administrative code (which follows closely the original Model Act) containing no provision for declaratory rulings by agencies. MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 3.560(21.1)-3.560(21.
10) (1961).
179. The federal act impliedly authorizes judicial review of rulings by providing
that a declaratory order may be made "with like effect as in the case of other orders."
APA § 5(d). Similarly, the Revised Model Act states that "rulings disposing of
petitions [for declaratory rulings] have the same status as agency decisions or orders
in contested cases." REvisED MODEL AcT § 8. The original Model Act expressly provides for judicial review of declaratory rulings. MODEL AcT § 7.
180. APA § 5(d); MODEL Ac § 7.
181. Section 8 of the Revised Model Act requires agencies to provide by rule "for
the filing and prompt disposition of petitions for declaratory rulings...." The section seems to contemplate that all petitions will be acted upon. Note, however, that the
obligation of an agency to dispose of rulings petitions is technically dependent upon
its fulfillment of its obligation to adopt procedural rules pertaining to declaratory
proceedings. Cf. text accompanying note 172 supra.
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the conduct requested to be ruled upon perhaps ought to be required.-1
Agencies will probably be more likely to give information to those
who ask for it about specific factual situations than to promulgate
detailed rules having general applicability. They may be hesitant
to use formal proceedings, some of which may be time-consuming
and expensive as a means of giving information about current policies.
Thus, declaratory rulings might be most useful in situations where
evidentiary hearings would be unnecessary to ascertain basic facts and
where only legal issues or policy considerations are involved. These
considerations may partially explain the success of the federal tax
13
rulings procedures under which rulings are issued upon stated facts.
Tending to discourage agencies from issuing rulings, however, may be
the fear that they will be held to rulings despite the occurrence of
new factors with which the rulings did not deal and that ambiguous
rulings will be interpreted adversely to the issuing agencies. The
prospect of a change in agency policy may also tend to discourage
agencies from issuing rulings.'8
In seeking to promote certain types of conduct, agencies may not
only avail themselves of the opportunity to enlighten persons about
agency views concerning the propriety or legal consequences of their
proposed conduct, but also may hesitate to take action against persons who have acted in good faith upon information furnished to
them by those agencies. Conformity by agencies to the advice which
they have previously given encourages the public to seek agency advice and encourages conduct in conformity with the advice given. 185
The bar and the agencies should become aware of other and less
formal avenues of communication than declaratory rulings. "No action" letters, oral assurances of "no action," and discussions with staff
members on enforcement policies may serve as well or better than
formal declaratory rulings in many situations.
B. Declaratory Judgments by Courts.-The two Model Acts contain provisions for seeking a judicial declaratory judgment concern182. I do not mean to recommend the adoption of technical criteria resembling, for
example, requirements of "standing" to sue in the federal courts. I would suggest that
the expense and time of an agency which would be consumed in rendering a requested
ruling should be balanced against the need for the ruling. An agency perhaps ought
to be more ready to assume the existence of need during slack periods. Moreover, in
cases where the preparation of a ruling request involves a substantial expenditure to
the petitioner, that fact alone might indicate that the petition is not a frivolous one.
Cf. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ActoNr 523-24 (1965).
183. See Caplin, supra note 127, at 9, 13, where it is stated that the Internal
Revenue Service gives between 30,000 and 40,000 rulings a year.
184. Cf. Ky. REP,. No. 12, 67.
185. Honstsy, op. cit. supra note 169, at 94.
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ing the "validity" of agency rules. 186 In addition, the Revised Model
87
Act provides for judicial determinations of rule "applicability."
Both acts have expressly negated any obligation upon a person challenging an agency rule in a declaratory judgment proceeding to request agency relief before coming into court. They do require, however, that the agency which has issued the challenged rule be made
a party to the court proceedings. 188
A number of reasons can be given why, in at least some circumstances, a person challenging an agency rule should be required to seek
relief initially before that agency: Prior resort to the agency concerned
would afford it an opportunity to interpret the challenged rule, to
exercise discretion not to enforce it, or to waive its application to
the case at hand. In some of these instances, an apparent dispute
may be disposed of at the administrative level, and courts will be
left to deal with the more difficult controversies. 189 Also, initial resort
to the agency which has issued a rule provides that agency with an
opportunity to state reasons upon which it relies to support the
validity of the challenged rule as it applies to the case at hand; hence
Ac § 7.
AcT § 7. The Revised Model Act's declaratory judgment provisions have been followed in IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5207 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit.75, § 306 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 42-35-7 (Supp. 1966). FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 120.30 (Supp. 1966) also expressly provides for declaratory judgments on the
applicability of agency rules. Compare KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1701 (1964).
186.
187.

MODEL

AcT § 6;

REvISED MODEL

REvISED MODEL

Cf. Mo. REv. STAT. §1140.105 (1959).

Most state administrative procedure statutes

which contain declaratory judgment provisions, however, provide merely for declaratory
judgments on the validity of agency rules. ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.300 (1962); ARIz.
R v. STAT. ANN. § 41-1007 (1956); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11440; GA. CODE ANN. § 3A111 (Supp. 1966); HAwAII REv. LAws § 6C-7 (Supp. 1965); MD. ANN. CODE art. 41,
§ 249 (1965); MnN. STAT. ANN. § 15.0416 (Supp. 1966); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-911
(Supp. 1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-26-25 (1961); ORE. REV. STAT. § 183.400 (Supp.
1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.9 (1964); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 34.04.070 (1965);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-4-2 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN, § 227.05 (Supp. 1966).
See also COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-5 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § 7
(1966); Omno REv. CODE ANN. § 119.11 (Baldwin 1964). The Georgia and Hawaii
statutes are of particular interest because, although they are both based principally
upon the Revised Model Act, they have not adopted that Act's provision for a declaratory
judgment upon the "applicability" of an agency rule. The Hawaii statute also provides that a declaratory judgment on rule validity may be obtained by any "interested
person." HAw.An REv. LAws § 6C-7 (Supp. 1965). This is another modification of
the language of the Model Acts which may suggest that more lenient standards on
who may be a plaintiff are embodied in the Hawaii statute than in the Model Acts.
An opposite inference may be contained in the Georgia version of the Revised Model
Act which apparently does not recognize interference with a "privilege" as a basis for
instituting a declaratory judgment action. GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-111(a) (Supp. 1966).
188. MODEL AcT § 6 (1); REvIsED MODEL ACT § 7.
189. In those cases, however, in which an administrative hearing would not be
necessary for the involved agency to determine the application of the challenged rule
to the plaintiff, the agency could make that determination as a party to the -court proceedings. An early statement of the inapplicability of the challenged rule to the
plaintiff ought to result in the termination of the lawsuit.
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the court which later passes upon the rule will be better informed. 90
Under the Model Acts, resort must be made to the agency which has
issued a challenged rule by means of the declaratory judgment proceeding to which the agency is a party. This delayed resort ameliorates to some extent the permission in those acts to proceed
immediately in court. In some cases, however, an agency may be
unable merely as a party to court proceeding and without a prior
administrative investigation adequately to determine how to interpret a given rule to the particular concrete situation involved in the
case or whether to waive the rule's application to that case, or to
specify the factors which it deems important in applying that rule to
the person challenging it.191
The Model Act's provision for judicial declarations of rule validity
without prior resort to the agency concerned may be of limited value
to persons unsure of the applicability of rules to themselves.192 A
declaration that the challenged rule is inapplicable would probably
satisfy most plaintiffs. Under the original Model Act's procedure,
such a declaration would principally be within the agency's
discretion to give or to withhold. Accordingly, despite the Model
Act's permission for a plaintiff to meet the agency for the first time
in court, an initial resort to the agency would normally be of substantial practical importance. Under the Revised Model Act's procedure, a court may be asked to pass upon the applicability of an
agency rule without a prior administrative determination of applicability.193 That act seems to be drawn on the assumptions either that
any policy-formulating roles which agencies may have in determining
rule applicability can be performed as parties to court litigation,
or that policy formulation is generally exhausted in the process
of making rules. As to the first assumption, the easiest case in which
an agency could decide upon its policy as a party to court proceedings would be one in which no "factual" dispute existed; 194 yet
in this situation prior resort to the agency should be inexpensive
190. Cf. Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
191. In certain types of cases, agencies may need to conduct their own hearings or
investigations in order to be able to determine their own positions.
192. Cf. Wise v. McCanless, 183 Tenn. 107, 191 S.W.2d 169 (1945), invalidating
a regulation only in its application to the plaintiff. Wise held a one-year liquor store
license valid when the Commissioner of Finance and Banking issued a regulation prohibiting the operation of a liquor store within one hundred feet of a building to which
the public was admitted and in which alcoholic beverages were consumed. Wise's store
was so situated. The court upheld the reasonableness of the regulation but invalidated
its application to the plaintiff for the remainder of his license period.
193. RmusED MODEL AcT § 7.
194. Cf. JAFn, op. cit. supra note 182, at 436; Jaffe, The Exhaustion of Adininistrative Remedies, 12 BuF17Ao L. REv. 327, 338 (1963).
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and should result in a speedy determination. 195 It is possible that
most agencies could adequately perform their policy formulating
functions as parties to court proceedings, but that procedure might
prove awkward in some instances. 19 The second assumption fails
to make proper differentiations among the various kinds of agency
activities. New policy formulation in penalty proceedings ought
generally to be avoided; penalties should be imposed for violations
of agency rules only as those rules are generally understood or
perceived by those to whom they apply. But in promoting or encouraging future conduct, agencies are not punishing; accordingly, they
should have some freedom to develop new policies in deciding upon
particular applications of existing rules.
The Revised Model Act's declaratory judgment provision raises a
number of problems to which it provides no answers. Does it authorize a court to determine that an applicant for a license is qualified for that license under a rule of an agency? Does it permit a
person whose license is threatened with revocation for violation of
an agency rule to have the validity of his conduct under that rule
determined by a court rather than by the agency? Will the institution
of a declaratory judgment suit divest an agency of jurisdiction to conduct a revocation proceeding? If so, will that divestiture occur even
after the agency has instituted its own proceeding? Will the termination of the agency proceeding prevent a redetermination on the merits
of the applicability of an agency rule to the party concerned in a
declaratory judgment action? What would such a provision do to
the enforcement of a rule issued by the Tennessee Commissioner
of Agriculture that pastures on which animals having infectious
diseases are located must be quarantined? Would it permit the court
to determine for itself the degree to which a quarantine is necessary?
Could agencies sometimes avoid the impact of the declaratory judgment provision by adopting rules providing for affirmative agency
approval of specified courses in conduct? Existing case law would
probably aid in answering some of these questions; 197 nevertheless
195. If the reason that an agency refused to determine a question of rule applicability when requested to do so is lack of staff, then requiring court determinations
of rule applicability would place on the courts a burden that might be borne by
that agency if its staff were expanded. On the other hand, to the extent that deciding
cases of rule applicability diverted agency and staff time from more important matters,
court determinations of rule applicability in unimportant cases might be desirable.
See text accompanying note 200 infra.
196. See text accompanying notes 190-191 supra.
197. In refusing to grant declaratory relief on questions presented in pending
criminal proceedings, the Tennessee courts may have given some indication of the
approach which they might normally take towards pending license revocation proceedings. The rationale behind their refusals to entertain declaratory judgment suits in the
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they raise some often neglected operational aspects of the Revised

Model Act's declaratory judgment provision.
Although it would normally be wise under either act for regulated

persons to make some initial resort to the agency concerned before
attacking one of its rules in court, a practical aspect of dispensing
with the initial resort to that agency as a legal prerequisite to a court
challenge may be a shift of some bargaining power to a regulated
person who, in negotiations with the agency, may threaten court
attack on a rule without necessarily seeking relief in formal agency
proceedings. The elimination of a requirement first to proceed before

the agency before coming into court would facilitate challenges to
rules, and hence would increase the bargaining power of a potential

challenger whenever the total costs of litigating in a declaratory
judgment suit appear substantially less than the total costs of litigating
in an administrative proceeding which might be followed by a declaratory judgment suit. The ability immediately to seek court review
of a rule might also speed up agency decisions about rule applicability. 98
Having suggested earlier some of the reasons why an initial agency

determination of rule applicability would normally be desirable, it remains to be said that when an agency has exhausted its policy formu-

lating function in making a rule and when interpretation of that rule
needs only the skill which a court possesses, a court could properly
face of pending or imminent criminal proceedings seems to have been concern that
judicial economy would be furthered by permitting the questions in dispute to be
decided in the pending criminal litigation (which offered adequate means to have
the questions answered) and a concern that the chancery courts' jurisdiction not be
"extended" into the criminal area. E.g., Johnson City v. Caplan, 194 Tenn. 496, 253
S.W.2d 725 (1952); Erwin Billiard Parlor v. Buckner, 156 Tenn. 278, 300 S.W. 565
(1927). If this latter reluctance was based upon a felt need to avoid disrupting
ordinary criminal procedures, then it is possible that the courts would refuse to
interfere by declaratory or injunctive suits with agency proceedings involving certifications, license revocations, etc. Existing case law suggests that such a reluctance would
be especially strong where the agency concerned had not yet fully formulated its
policies or had not yet exercised the enforcement discretion committed to it. General
Sec. Co. v. Williams, 161 Tenn. 50, 29 S.W.2d 662 (1930); North British & Mercantile
Co. v. Craig, 106 Tenn. 621, 62 S.W. 155 (1901). Cf. Erwin Billiard Parlor v.
Buckner, supra. Moreover, since many of those policy formulations and enforcement
decisions would be part of the various agencies' ordinary tasks of administration,
judicial interference with these activities would be likely to be either uninformed or
unduly burdensome to the courts or both. Cf. State ex rel. Jones v. Nashville, 198 Tenn.
280, 279 S.W. 2d 267 (1955), which upholds a requirement of exhaustion of
administrative remedies citing inter alia the burden which would otherwise be imposed upon the courts. See also State v. Yoakum, 201 Tenn. 180, 297 S.W.2d 635
(1956).
198. The ability to seek immediate court determinations of rule applicability might
also promote administrative determinations of applicability where otherwise no administrative determination would be forthcoming.
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dispense with a requirement for an initial agency proceeding where
administrative determination would be expensive and time-consuming.1' Indeed, the allocation of functions between courts and agencies
is in part based upon notions of economical use of those institutions.

If court determinations of some cases of rule applicability would be
speedier and cheaper than agency determinations or if court determinations would save agency or agency staff time which would be

employed in more important tasks, court determinations might be

desirable. 20 0 One method for securing the advantages, when they
exist, of court determinations while preserving agency control over
basic policies would be to provide for court determinations of ruleapplicability when the agency certified approval of such a procedure.
IV.

ADJUDICATION

A. In General.-Adjudication,which is a term commonly applied to
the process in which an agency applies a policy to one or more persons
in a proceeding to which those persons are parties and which
terminates in an order directed to those persons, is commonly thought
to affect more seriously the individual treatment of the parties to that
process than other types of agency action; hence, the federal act and
the Model Acts have surrounded the adjudicatory process with special
procedural provisions which are designed to promote administrative
action that is both rational and fair. Some of these provisions are designed to control information upon which the decision is based by
subjecting at lease some of it to the scrutiny and challenge of the
parties; some are designed to promote familiarity by the decisionmakers with the issues in dispute; and some are designed to narrow
the issues in dispute. These acts also contain provisions providing
for judicial review and provisions facilitating that review.
B. Some Procedural Provisions. 1. Notice and Narrowing of Issues.-Because of the presentation of each party's side of a case to
the best of his ability is the means by which an adversary process
ferrets out the information required for an informed decision, it is
desirable that all of the arguments and evidence of each side be
known early in proceedings which are "adversary" in nature. 20 1 The
199. See note 195 supra.
200. Cf. JAFFE, op. cit. supra note 182, at 128; Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered-The Antitrust Laws, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 577, 587-88 (1954).
201. As is suggested by the discussion pp. 858-864, infra, the procedures used for
issue-narrowing are inseparably related to an assessment of the respective functions
of the agency head and his staff and their relations inter se. Here it should be noted
that in at least many types of cases and perhaps especially in connection with adjudi-
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earlier that knowledge is available to each side, the sooner will the
issues-"factual" and other-emerge with clarity. Knowledge of all the
issues in dispute facilitates effort in preparing and arguing issues
which are not in dispute, and thus, it permits permitting each party
to concentrate his efforts on the disputed issues. From the decisionmaker's point of view, concise issues and well-organized, unrepetitious
arguments and evidence are conducive to a proper disposition of cases.
2. Pleadings.-The need for parties to an administrative adjudication to learn of adverse -contentions of the agency at an early date in
order to prepare rebuttals or defenses is at least partially served by
the federal act's requirement that persons entitled to notice of an
agency hearing be "timely informed" of "the matters of fact and law"
asserted. 2°2 Both Model Acts seem to be directed at requiring
specificity in pleadings by agencies-a requirement that is emphasized
in the Revised Act. The original Model Act required "the issues" to
be stated in advance of the hearing, with a proviso that they might
be stated later if amendment of pleadings became necessary. 2 3 The
Revised Act requires a statement of "the matters in detail" in an initial
pleading, with a proviso that if such statement is impossible the initial
notice may be limited to a statement of "the issues involved."2 4 Note

the differentiation in the Revised Act between the "the matters in detail" and "the issues." The required statement of "matters in detail"
accordingly takes on a connotation resembling evidentiary pleading.
Unlike the original act, the Revised Act makes no mention of an
"amendment" to a pleading. It does require, however, that a "more
definite and detailed statement" be furnished "thereafter" if a notice
is limited to a statement of the issues. This statement seems intended
to be served before the hearing commences, but the act is ambiguous
in this respect. The federal act provides, 20 5 that in actions in which
cations involving complex or technical issues in which staff analysis may play a large
part in the final decision of the agency, the clarification and narrowing of issues may
be dependent upon participation by staff in the proceeding at an early date and their
playing an active role. Cf. subsection 2 of Recommendation No. 19 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, printed in Fuchs, The Administrative Conference of the United States, 15 AD. L. REv. 6, 34-35 (1963). Cf. Report of the Committee on Ratemaking, 15 AD. L. Rxv. 175, 177 (1963), recommending "early and
vigorous inquiry by the staff into all phases of the factual support for the rate at
issue." The more "active" the staff role becomes, however, perhaps the more acute
becomes the commingling of functions problem unless the staff members participating
in the hearing are different from the staff members who assist in deciding. See discussion in text accompanying notes 401-03 infra.
202. AI'A § 5(a).
203. MODEL Ac-r § 8.

204. REvIsED MoDEL Acr § 9 (a) (4).
205. APA § 5(a).
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an agency is not the moving party, the agency "may by rule require
responsive pleading;" the Model Act says nothing about a responsive
pleading. The Revised Act providese that opportunity shall be
afforded all parties "to respond" and present evidence and argument
on all issues involved. Whether the "to respond" language contemplates a responsive pleading is unclear.
One problem with which these acts are concerned is the desirability
of requiring more from an agency than a statement of charges in
statutory terms. Considering the generality of many statutes administered by agencies, such a statement would sometimes give a party
opposed to an agency little notice of the real issues in the case,2°7
however, statutes ought not to impose on the agencies impractical
pleading requirements. Moreover, in many proceedings detailed
pleadings may be impossible or may serve little useful purpose. Finally,
the detail which is necessary or desirable in pleading may be a function of the other available means for discovering the substance of an
agency's case.
In general, stringent pleading requirements are undersirable. Some
specificity in pleading may be desirable, however, in the simple cases
in which small sums or minor interests are involved and in which the
use of pretrial discovery devices would be prohibitively expensive and
unnecessary. Also, in the typical license revocation proceeding in
which the licensee is accused of having violated, willfully or negligently, the law or the rules of an agency, the licensee ought to
be given notice in some detail of the alleged factual occurrence
which is the basis for the proceeding being undertaken against him,
and his attention should be directed to the particular rule or section
of the statute involved.20 8
3. Hearing Officers.-Many Tennessee statutes 209 authorize the use
of a hearing officer who is required to make findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a proposed order.2 10 These statutes provide that
206. REVISED MODEL Acv § 9(c). A responsive pleading is required under CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 11506(b).
207. But compare the effect of the license revocation provisions of the federal act
and the Revised Model Act discussed in the text accompanying notes 478-80 infra.
See also text accompanying notes 165-166 supra.
208. Consider the effect of the license revocation provisions of the federal act and
the Revised Model Act, discussed in the text accompanying notes 478-80 infra.
See also, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.370 (1962); CaL. Gov'T CODE § 11503.
209. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 59-1716, 65-211, 67-3040, 67-3132, 67-3731 (1955 &
Supp. 1966).
210. Compare California which requires every case to be presided over by a
hearing officer. Although the agency may 'ear" the case with the hearing officer,
the hearing officer, nonetheless, rules on the admission and exclusion of evidence and
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the agency head may approve the hearing officer's conclusions and
order or may make his own findings and conclusions and issue his own
order. To the extent that the parties are given the opportunity to
argue before the agency head prior to his determination, 21' the initial
decision of the hearing officer will serve as a focal point for argument.
However, to the extent that the parties are not allowed to argue before
the agency head, the decision of the hearing officer will principally
serve to facilitate the delegation of work by the agency head. For the
hearing officer system to work effectively in narrowing and clarifying
issues for the parties, the system requires in effect a trial before the
hearing officer and appellate review by the agency head. Even when
such a two-tier system exists, however, the hearing officer and the
agency head may not agree on which factors are important. The
hearing officer may focus the parties' attention on issues which are
not the determinative issues in the mind of the agency head who
renders the final decision. Again, the issue-narrowing benefits to be
derived from a two-tier system of adjudication seem to be related to
the types of issues in dispute. Narrowing issues for a second round of
argument seems practical only for issues which do not turn on the
credibility of witnesses; issues tied to credibility can probably be
determined best by the person or persons who observed the presentation of the disputed testimony.212
4. Discovery.-Few administrative procedure acts have provided in
express terms for pretrial discovery.2 13 Discovery, however, may perform an issue-narrowing function which, especially in complex cases,
might result in better informed decisions. Pretrial discovery may also
eliminate some of the problems which arise from ex parte contact between the agency head and his staff by bringing into the
open the information and arguments which would form the subject of
such contact.214 In the federal court system widespread pretrial disadvises the agency on matters of law. The agency is given power over the other aspects
of the hearing but may delegate any of them to the hearing officer. CAL. COVT CODE
§ 11512. When the agency hears with the hearing officer, the hearing officer is required to "be present during the consideration of the case and, if requested, shall
assist and advise the agency." Where the hearing officer alone hears the case, he is
required to prepare a proposed decision which is served on the parties and which
may be adopted by the agency. Otherwise the agency may decide the case itself but
only after affording the parties opportunity to present written or oral arguments. CAL.
COV'T CODE § 11517.
211. Such argument is provided for in APA § 8(b); MODEL AcT § 10; REVISED
MODEL Acr § 11. See text accompanying notes 417-33 infra. But see CAL. Cov'T CODE
§ 11517, discussed in note 210 supra.
212. But see Blatt, He Saw the Witness, 38 J. Amr. JuD. Soc'Y 86 (1954).
213. But see Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-276.25(g) (Supp. 1965).
214. See subsection 2 of Recommendation No. 19 of the Administrative Conference
of the United States, supra note 201: "It is important . . . that the staff be required,
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covery has been utilized since the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 1938. In general, pretrial discovery has permitted
each side in a judicial proceeding to learn, prior to trial, the content of
the other side's case. By so doing, it has largely eliminated surprise
and has facilitated presentation of cases based upon their intrinsic
merit rather than upon advantages of strategy. It has been used at
times, however, to harass opponents with investigations which weie
not designed to be useful at trial and which were expensive to all
parties. Many forms of discovery are expensive;215 hence, discovery
has been more readily available to wealthy than to poorer litigants.
5. PretrialConferences.-Pretrialconferences have been used by the
federal judiciary for some time in an effort to clarify issues prior to
trial and/or to facilitate settlements. Many federal agencies 216 have
adopted the pretrial conference for use in their adjudications.2 17 The
extent to which a pretrial conference may be successful in narrowing
issues may be related to the degree to which each party is familiar
with the evidence, arguments, and analyses of his opponent. Accordingly, it would seem that a pretrial conference should be held after
each side has been exposed to the evidence, arguments, and analyses
of the other.2 , a In at least some rate proceedings, some such exposure
will occur in the initial procedures connected with a rate increase
application. The applicant will, normally submit his application together with supporting economic data and an analysis of that -data
which will tend to justify his application. The rejection of his application, which gives rise to the formal proceeding, will normally spell
out the reasons why his request was rejected. To that extent the
applicant and the involved members of the agency staff are aware of
each other's respective positions, but to the extent that they wil rely
upon other data and arguments and upon witnesses in the formal
adjudication, then provisions should be made for prior exposure to
as are other parties, to produce its evidence and state its positibn at an early point
and be treated in all respects as a party."
215. E.g., the taking of depositions is more expensive than the submission of written
interrogatories. Cf. Wright, Wegner, & Richardson, The Practicing Attorney's View of
the Utility of Discovery, 12 F.R.D. 97 (1952).
216. E.g., F. T. C. R.PR~c. § 3.8; I. C. C. GF. R. PR.c: § 1.68; S.E. C. R. PuAc.
8(c), (d); F. P. C. R. PRAc. & Pnoc. § 1.18. See also Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.08
(1957).
217. FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
218. Compare Report of the Committee on Ratemaking, 15 AD. L. Rnv." 175, 181
(1963); "Without adequate procedures, active staff participation, and the necessary
minimum of guidance through promulgation of agency standards, conference discussions
on substantive matters are likely to. prove a wasted effort and merely delay reaching an
issue in the particular case."
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such data, arguments, and testimony. 19
6. Adjournments.-When an issue which is a surprise to one party
arises during a hearing, an adjournment will permit the surprised
party to meet the new issues. Similarly, in extremely complex cases,
the most effective way of narrowing the issues may be through the
use of the adjournment device. 220 Thus, the presentation of the case
of a petitioner may be used itself to narrow the issues which a respondent (including agency staff) will be called upon to meet. After
the petitioner has presented his case, the adjudication may be adjourned for a length of time sufficient to permit the respondent to
meet the issues which have arisen in the petitioner's presentation. A
number of courts2' have followed this procedure in antitrust litigation
in which the complexity of the issues precluded their clarification
prior to trial.
7. Other Methods of Simplifying Proceedings: Documentary and
Oral Presentation.-Oneway of simplifying proceedings is to correlate
procedure to the types of issues in dispute. Procedure should be so
organized as to achieve the maximum benefit, respectively, from that
part of the proof or argument which is written and from that part
which is oral.m It should also be organized with a view toward
maximizing the potential contributions to the final decision of the
agency and the members of his staff.
The presentation of technical or complex issues can best be made in
writing since only in this way can data be presented in detail and
complicated statements, arguments, and analysis be made with precision and clarity.22 Moreover, since evaluation of those issues depends upon time-consuming analyses and not primarily upon the belief or disbelief in the credibility of witnesses, testimonial evidence
would often not seem to be of prime importance in the presentation of
the affirmative side of a case. Examination and cross-examination of
219. Exposure to the main arguments of the staff seems to be the intent of §§
9(g), 10(4) and 13 of the Revised Model Act. The lack of opportunity to know and
to contest certain kinds of technical computations prepared by agency employees was
the basis for the disapproval of agency procedure in Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util.
Conr'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
220. Cf. McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Anti-Trust Litigation,
64 HArv. L. REv. 27, 42-43, 55 (1962); Report of the Committee on Ratemaking, 15
AD. L. REv. 175, 180 (1963). But cf. Recommendation No. 19(e) of the Administrative Conference of the United States, supranote 201.
221. McAllister, supranote 220, at 55.
222. See subsection 4(d) of Recommendation No. 19 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, supra note 201.
223. Cf. Report of the Committee on Ratemaking, 15 AD. L. REv. 175, 180 (1963):
"The Committee agrees that increased use of written testimony should be encouraged,
since its proven advantages outweigh any experienced disadvantage in most rate
making proceedings."
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witnesses in connection with the litigation of such issues is useful pri-

marily as a device to discover the analyses underlying the conclusions

4

of an opposing party and to explore inconsistencies in those analyses.
Discovery and pretrial conferences provide alternate means for un-

covering the evaluations and analyses of opponents. Successful crossexamination for the purpose of exposing inconsistencies in the analyses
underlying the conclusions of an opposing party cannot occur unless
the person being cross-examined has completed his analyses, and unless the cross-examiner has a sufficient understanding of those analyses
to direct his questions toward the exposure of their weak points.

The foregoing considerations indicate that written data and arguments ought to be submitted and exchanged well in advance of the
testimonial part of a hearing.2 25 Such submissions and exchanges
would be consistent with the utilization of pretrial discovery and
would facilitate the operation of a pretrial conference. 226 Exchange
of written data and arguments well in advance of such a hearing
would also facilitate cross-examination of staff analysts on their analy-

ses and would provide the private party with the opportunity to
meet all staff objections to his presentation.
From the agency's point of view, testimonial hearings present it
with the opportunity to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and, by

questioning, to clarify points which have not been made with precision by the private parties in written submissions. The latter op-

portunity, by definition, will not arise unless the parties have made
224. Compare Report of the Committee on Ratemaking, 15 AD. L. Rnv. 175, 180
(1963): "[lIt may be impossible or impractical at present to require other parties to
submit direct or rebuttal cases until completion of cross-examination of the rate
proponent's case, or until the staff's position has been stated. It may not always be
possible to prepare responsive direct cases or rebuttal prior to cross-examination." Cf.
the Committee's further comment that "It is obviously desirable to limit . . . crossexamination which is merely intended to obtain factual information which could better
be placed in the record by other procedures."
225. Compare subsections 4(a) and (b) of Recommendation No. 19 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, supra note 201, at 35:
"4. In order to reduce the time required for completion of the hearing and to improve
the quality of the resulting record, federal rate agencies should, to the extent permitted
by law:
"(a) Require the direct case of the party having the burden of proof to be submitted
in writing with the rate filing or shortly after the case is designated for hearing.
"(b) Require the other parties, including the staff and intervenors, to prepare and
exchange their direct evidence in written form substantially in advance of the date
set for hearing. Rebuttal evidence should also be prepared and exchanged prior to
the hearing, subject to the possibility of limited supplemental rebuttal under special
circumstances." Cf. Kom, Law, Fact and Science in the Courts, 66 CoLum. L. REv.
1080, 1087 (1966).
226. A pretrial conference whose function was to clarify issues for trial would be more
apt to be successful if the respective contentions of the parties were known to each
other.
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their written submissions sufficiently in advance of the oral hearing
to permit the agency to familiarize itself with the arguments and
analyses of the parties and unless the agency has so familiarized
itself.
8. Elimination of Unnecessary Oral Presentation.-Furthersimplification and shortening of complex or technical proceedings can be
accomplished by restricting the scope of testimonial hearings whenever such restriction is thought desirable.227 It has already been suggested that testimonial hearings may be of limited usefulness in proceedings which involve technical or complex issues; hence, transposing the presentation of economic arguments from oral to written
form may promote desirable precision in presentation. Whenever the
agency feels that the testimonial part of the hearing would be unduly
time-consuming and would accomplish no proper purpose, it may be
appropriate for the agency to utilize an analogue to the ICC's modified
procedure.22 Under the so-called modified22 procedure, "facts"2m9 are
2 31
required to be set forth in some detail in the responsive pleadings.
Cross-examination must be specifically requested in those pleadings,
both as to particular witnesses and as to the subject-matter to be
covered,232 and cross-examination is permitted only when "material
facts are in dispute."233 Similarly, any other request4 for an oral hearing
must be contained in the responsive pleadings.23
C. Evidence. 1. In General.-Although some agencies23 have ob227. See subsection 4(d) of Recommendation No. 19 of the Administrative Conference of the United States, supra note 201, at 35:
"4. In order to reduce the time required for completion of the hearing and to improve
the quality of the resulting record, federal rate agencies should, to the extent permitted
by law:

"(d) Seek, wherever possible, to limit the evidentiary hearing, if one proves necessary,
to cross-examination, and require the hearing examiner to limit cross-examination to
those critical matters, not already disposed of through prior procedural steps, which
are of such character that a trial-type hearing involving interrogation of witnesses would
make a useful contribution."
228. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.45-1.54 (1963 & Supp. 1966).
229. See also the discussion of "shortened" procedure in Woll, The Development
of Shortened Procedure in American Administrative Law 45 ConN. L. REv. 56 (1959).
230. 49 C.F.R. §§ 1.49, 1.50 (1963 & Supp. 1966). Cf. the recognition given to
"arguments" in addition to "facts" in the amended § 149(a).
231. 49 C.F.R. § 1.49(a) (Supp. 1966).
232. 49 C.F.R. § 1.53(a) (Supp. 1966).
233. Ibid.
234. Ibid.
235. See 49 C.F.R. § 1.75 (1963) (ICC adoption generally of judicial rules of
evidence in nonjury trials). But Davis notes that "the ICC has a highly developed
practice which depends upon degrees of precision for different inquiries involving
statistical information." DAvis § 14.10.
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served, and do observe, in large measure the judicial rules of evidence,
many agencies are not bound by these rules.23 The so-called rules of
evidence are, for the most part, exclusionary rules; they provide for the
exclusion from court proceedings of proffered evidence upon the basis
of refined criteria. Basically the reasons for exclusion can be explained
on the ground that the rejected evidence is (1) irrelevant, (2) untrustworthy, (3) unduly prejudicial, or (4) privileged.
The agency exemption from the rules of evidence appears to have
been based upon a variety of factors, but principally upon the assumption that agencies generally are sufficiently sophisticated to be trusted
to evaluate correctly evidence which would be too untrustworthy or
prejudicial to be entrusted to the consideration of an inexperienced
jury.

Convenience and efficiency in adjudication often would indi-

cate that doubtful questions of admissibility be resolved in favor of
admission, rather than permitting substantial time to be consumed
during the course of trial in the argument and determination of points
of evidence. The practice of tentative admission subject to a later-determination of admissibility seems to be the practice of trial judges
sitting without juries; it is justified on the theory that judges are
sufficiently sophisticated to be trusted with that evidence. At least
some administrative bodies seem to possess, within their fields, a
degree of sophistication equal to that of trial judges; 238 accordingly
there seems to be ground for trusting at least some agencies with evidence which is determined to be technically inadmissible only at the
time of final decision on the merits.239 A further reason which has
been given for agency exemption from the rules of evidence is that
agencies are often staffed by non-lawyers and that holding nonlawyers to the evidence standards of courts would, by encouraging
disputes upon points upon which agencies were not equipped to rule,
seriously interfere with the smooth functioning of administrative
236. E.g., 1 BENjAmr

REP RT 171.

237. Cf. 1 BENjAmwN REPORT 175.
238. The sophistication of an administrative body would be most readily admitted
in its dealings with technical matters with which it has had prior experience. "Sophistication," however, may be synonymous with bias when specialization tends to promote strictness towards private parties or categorizations of them affecting the agency"
decision in situations where that decision ought to be based upon impartial evaluations
of witness credibility. Consider, e.g., the possible tendency of a licensing board to
import professional prejudices into disciplinary proceedings.
239. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.070(7) (Supp. 1966) provides that: "Evidence to,
which an objection is sustained shall, at the request of the party seeking to introduce
the same, or at the instance of the agency, nevertheless be heard and preserved in
the record, together with any cross-examination with xesiiect thereto and 6ny rebuttal thereof, unless it is wholly irrelevhnt,'repetitious,; privilegect, -or unduly long."
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proceedings.2 40 This latter difficulty, however, could be avoided in
large measure, if not completely, through the use by agencies of legal
assistants who would advise them on points of evidence law when
necessary.
Although trial judges in non-jury cases are generally permitted to
admit inadmissible evidence, this practice seems to have been countenanced largely on the theory that the judges have excluded that
evidence from their consideration when they made their findings.241
If trial judges are permitted to admit inadmissible evidence on the
ground that they lack the naivet6 of juries, it would seem that trial
judges ought to be permitted to consider that evidence in arriving at
their findings. Their sophistication should enable them to discount
the prejudicial elements of the evidence and to evaluate hearsay and
other evidence which would be excluded from juries on the ground
of untrustworthiness. At least those triers of fact who are vested
with technical decision making and who, by virtue of their specialty,
may be equipped to discount prejudicial factors and to evaluate for
trustworthiness should be permitted to consider relative and probative
evidence.
2. "Residuum" Rule.-Historically, a number of states have followed
the so called "residuum" rule, which in effect provides that, while an
agency will not be bound by judicial rules of evidence, an agency
determination will be reversed unless it is supported by evidence
which would be admissible in a court. 242 The basis for the residuum
rule seems to lie in judicial reluctance to allow agencies to depart altogether from traditional rules of evidence and seems to be related
to some extent to the appellate court practice of affirming trial court
determinations in nonjury cases when such determinations are supportable by substantial admissible evidence, although the trial court had
also received evidence which was technically "inadmissible." While
the residuum rule eliminates the possibility of agency reversal because it has admitted judicially "inadmissible" evidence, it seems unnecessary to inject the judicial evidence rules into administrative
processes at the review level.
3. Repetitious and Irrelevant Material.-There is a proper interest
in excluding from the record testimony and exhibits which are repetitious or irrelevant. Records filled with repetitous and irrelevant material tend to defeat the rationality of adjudicative proceeding by obscuring both to the parties and to the agency the points in issue in
240. 1 BENjAmI, REPoRT 174; Merrill, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure
Act, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 28 (1964).
241. DAviS § 14.04, at 266-69.
242. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N.Y. 435, 113 N.E. 507 (1916).
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a mass of verbiage. Such unnecessarily voluminous records increase
the difficulties which the parties face in meeting the real points of
dispute and in making a presentation on the issues which the agency
will consider determinative. They also increase the difficulty to the
agency of arriving at a rational decision on the basis of the record and
may even discourage an agency or hearing officer from reading or
finding the truly relevant parts of the record.A3 For these reasons,
agencies should have the power to exclude such repetitious and
irrelevant material. The power of exclusion, however, should not
be made mandatory; otherwise, agency determinations could be upset
if the reviewing court considered evidence which the agency had
admitted to be irrelevant or repetitious.
4. Material Within an Agency's Specialty.-An agency should be
permitted to use and to rely upon material used by experts and
technicians in the field in which the agency is a specialist. Although
the Revised Model Act refers to the agency's specialized knowledge
in its provision dealing with official notice, it fails to give sufficient
recognition to that specialized knowledge in its provisions dealing
with admissibility. Furthermore, it would seem that an agency
should be able to use and to rely upon learned treatises and similar
matter dealing with subjects outside the agency's special competence
which prudent and intelligent men would use and rely upon when
faced with questions of similar magnitude.
An agency should not be required to follow courtroom procedure
in admitting and qualifying presentations which involve policy arguments and predictions of future conduct. Such procedures are timeconsuming and wastefu1 245 and may, in some cases, keep highly relevant information from the agency. 246 If due regard is given to what243. Cf. Remarks of Judge Wyzanski quoted in McAllister, supra note 220, at 45r
"Counsel cannot dump into the lap of the Court an undigested mass of documents
comprising hundreds of thousands of pages and then expect the Court to read all of
them, even if they were all to some degree both relevant and persuasive."
244. REvIsan MODEL Acr § 10 (4).

245. DAvis § 6.06.
246. Mo. ANt. STAT. § 536.070(11) (Supp. 1963) attempts to deal with exhibits
involving statistical examinations, audits, surveys and the like. It provides that:
"The results of statistical examinations or studies, or of audits, compilations of
figures, or surveys, involving interviews with many persons, or examination of many"
records, or of long or complicated accounts, or of a large number of figures, or involving the ascertainment of many related facts, shall be admissible as evidence of
such results, if it shall appear that such examination, study, audit, compilation of
figures, or survey was made by or under the supervision of a witness, who is present
at the hearing, who testifies to the accuracy of such results, and who is subject to
cross-examination, and if it shall further appear by evidence adduced that the witness
making or under whose supervision such examination, study, audit, compilation of
figures, or survey was made was basically qualified to make it. All the circumstances
relating to the making of such an examination, study, audit, compilation of figures
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ever special competence or sophistication an agency may possess within its field, no relevant information should be excluded. The procedures for introducing it ought to be simple in recognition of the
fact that policy arguments, predictions, statistical evaluations, and
the like are not the types of "evidence" with which courts normally
deal but may be, or' ought to be, the normal sources of information
for some agencies. Furthermore, a statutory evidence provision ought
not to interfere with the limitation of proceedings to written presentations when practicable.2 7
5. "Accusatory" Proceedings.-Although an across-the-board imposition of judicial rules of evidence would appear to be unwise,
justification may exist for the use of those rules in some licenserevocation proceedings and other proceedings which are primarily accusatory in scope, involve nontechnical issues and involve a determination whether certain physical events have in fact occurred.248 The
adoption of the judicial rules of evidence in these situations would
perhaps weaken the agency's power to enforce compliance with
statutory policy, but it might strengthen the safeguards afforded a
licensee or other private person accused of a law violation. A judgment about the application of rules of evidence to license revocation
and similar proceedings would depend, therefore, upon the relative
values accorded the enforcement of the various statutory purposes
behind the several licensing statutes and to the protection of the
economic interests of license holders.
6. The FederalAct and the Model Acts.-The Federal Administrative Procedure Act contains no exclusionary rules of evidence, but it
provides that "every agency shall as a matter of policy provide for the
exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence" 24 9
and that no sanction should be imposed or rule or order issued unless
"in accordance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence."250 In contrast to the federal act's carte blanche admissibility,
or survey, including the nature and extent of the qualifications of the maker, may be
shown to affect the weight of such evidence but such showing shall not affect its
admissibility."
The Missouri provision would have its advantages in connection with locally made
surveys and audits; it would, however, hinder the use by agencies of studies made by
experts which constituted part of a specialized literature in a field.
247. See text accompanying notes 227-34 supra.

248. Although more restrictive rules of evidence may be desirable in such proceedings, rules of evidence designed for a jury may not be entirely satisfactory in an
agency hearing.
249. APA § 8(c); IND. STAT. ANN. § 63-3008 (1961).
250. APA § 8(c). The Hawaii administrative procedure act which in most respects
follows the Revised Model Act has substituted the second sentence of APA § 8(c) for
subsection (1) of § 10 of the Revised Model Act and added a requirement that the
rules of privilege be observed. HAwAr BREv. LAws § 6C-10(a) (Supp. 1965). Onr.
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the Model Act provides that "agencies may admit and give probative
effect to evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted
by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs." 25 ' The
Model Act, like the federal act, gives discretionary power to agen-

cies to exclude "incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence."25 2 However, it may have incorporated a "residuum"
rule through its judicial review provision which provides that an
agency decision in a contested case must be supported by "competent,"

material, and substantial evidence.25 3 The Revised Model Act adopts

as an exclusionary rule "the rules of evidence as applied in [nonjury] civil cases"2 4 in the courts of the state involved. However, it
then provides that "when necessary to ascertain facts not reasonably

susceptible of proof under those rules, evidence not admissible thereunder may be admitted (except where precluded by statute) if it is
of a type commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent men in the

conduct of their affairs." 255 The bracket enclosing the word "non-

REv. STAT. § 183.450 (1965) is similar except that it provides "that hearsay shall not
be admitted over an objection based on lack of opportunity to cross-examine."
251. MODEL ACT § 9(1).
252. ibid.
253. MODEL AT §12(7) (e); DAvs § 14.06, at 277.
254. RvisED MODEL AcT § 10(1).
255. The Revised Model Act's evidence provisions are followed in the Georgia,
Idaho, Rhode Island and West Virginia statutes which are based largely upon the
Revised Model Act in other respects as well. GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-116 (Supp. 1966);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5210 (Supp. 1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 42-35-10 (Supp.
1966); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-2 (1966). Other state statutes which either have
incorporated the Revised Model Act's evidence provisions or which have otherwise
provided for court rules of evidence and which provide for exceptions to those rules
when compliance with them would be impractical include: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.27
(Supp. 1966); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 2405 (1964); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560
(21.5) (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-06 (1960). See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 3-16-4(7) (1963) (conformity to court evidence rules "to extent practicar' required). Virginia permits the reception of "all relevant and material evidence" but
provides that hearsay and secondary evidence of the contents of a document shall
not be receivable if the witness whose statements are the subject of the hearsay or
the original document is available. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.11 (1964). See also OBE.
REV. STAT. § 183.450(1) (Supp. 1965). Compare Mo. STAT. ANN. § 536.070 (Supp.
1966). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 84A-16(3) (Supp. 1966).
The Hawaii, Oklahoma, and Wyoming statutes which in many other respects follow
the Revised Model Act do not follow its evidence provisions. HAwA I REv. LAws
§ 6C-10 (Supp. 1965); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 310 (1965); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-276.26 (Supp. 1965). The original Model Act's evidence provisions are followed
in Maryland, Minnesota, Nebraska and Washington, which in other respects have
followed that act. MD. CODE ANN. art. 41, § 252 (1957); MLNN. STAT. ANN. §
15.0419 (Supp. 1966); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 84-914 (Supp. 1965); WAsH. REv.
CODE § 34.04.100 (1965). The New Mexico Uniform Licensing Act's evidence provisions are also based on the original Model Act. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-26-11 (1961).
Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-209 (1955). Other state administrative evidence provisions which avoid using court evidence rules include Amx. STAT. ANN. § 5-710
(Supp. 1963); IND. STAT. ANN. § 63-3008 (1961); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 11(2)
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jury" is explained by the drafters of the Revised Model Act to have
been inserted "because in some states it is difficult to differentiate

between the rules followed in jury and non-jury cases." 256 This ap-

pears to be an understatement257 The strictness of the Revised Model
Act's adherence to judicial rules of evidence depends, of course, upon
the ease or lack of ease with which the excepting phrase "not reasonably susceptible of proof under those rules" may be satisfied and
whether that phrase will be interpreted in an absolute sense or in
light of the circumstances of each proceeding. The Revised Model
Act raises the danger that many technicalities and refinements in the
judicial rules of evidence, which have no place in adjudication before
a specialized tribunal, may be imported into administrative proceedings. The original Model Act's standard of acceptibility by reasonably
prudent men is better,218 although a supplementary standard phrased
in terms of the
specialized activities of each of the agencies might
25 9
be desirable.
By requiring agencies to give effect to "the rules of privilege recognized by law," the original Model Act 26 and the Revised Model
Act2 1 may be superior to the federal act, which is silent with respect to privilege. 62 The original Model Act, by providing that docu(1966); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710.32 (1962).

Cf. Orno REV. CODE ANN.

§§

119.09, 119.12 (Baldwin 1964). After authorizing agencies to admit all testimony
having reasonable probative value, the Wisconsin statute provides that "basic rules
of relevancy, materiality and probative force, as recognized in equitable proceedings,
shall govern the proof of all questions of fact." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.10(1) (1957).
Alaska and California provide for the admission of evidence "on which responsible
persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of serious affairs" but nonetheless
expressly adopt a version of the residuum rule in providing that hearsay evidence
may be used to supplant or explain other evidence but is not sufficient by itself to
support a finding unless it would be admissible over objection in a civil action. ALASKA
STAT. § 44.62.460(d) (1962); CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11513.
256. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF ComimnssIoNERS ON UNIFOrnm
STATE LAWS 216 (1961).
257. DAVIs § 14.04, at 267-68.
258. Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.11(a) (1964): "All relevant and material
evidence shall be received, except that: (1) the rules relating to privileged communications and privileged topics shall be observed; (2) hearsay evidence shall be received only if the declarant is not readily available as a witness; and (3) secondary
evidence of the contents of a document shall be received only if the original is not
readily available. In deciding whether a witness or document is readily available the
agency shall balance the importance of the evidence against the difficulty of obtaining
it, and the more important the evidence is the more effort should be made to produce
the eyewitness or the original document."
259. The Virginia statute, while good in other ways, does not recognize any expertise
in agencies. See note 258 supra.
260. MoDEL AcT § 9(1).
261. REVISED MODEL Act § 10(1).
262. Cf. H.LwAm REv. LAws § 6C-10(a) (Supp. 1965) which added the rules of
privilege to evidence provisions adopted from the federal act.
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mentary evidence may be received in the form of copies, 263 expressly
abolishes the best evidence rule. By providing that documentary evidence may be received in the form of excerpts or incorporation by reference, the Model Act facilitates holding of records to a minimum size.
The Revised Model Act adopts a modification of the best evidence
rule: "Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or
excerpts, if the original is not readily available."264 By applying the
unavailability standard both to copies and excerpts, the Revised Model
Act would apparently permit an excerpt to be introduced only if the
original is unavailable, but would require the record to contain an
entire document or book if the original document is available. Because the federal act contains no exclusionary rules, because it permits the reception of "any oral or documentary evidence," and because it permits reliance upon "reliable, probative, and substantial
evidence," provisions expressly dealing with copies and excerpts as
such were unnecessary.
7. Conclusions.-The type of evidence which should be admitted
and acted upon by agencies will probably vary with the agency and
the type of proceeding involved. For that reason, some discretion
should be given the agencies and reviewing courts to accomodate
evidence standards to particular proceedings. As suggested above, an
across-the-board imposition of the judicial rules of evidence on all
agencies would be unwise. An admonition to agencies to choose, when
possible, judicially admissible evidence over evidence not so admissible
for proof of those propositions for which judicial evidence is most
appropriate (such as direct testimony over hearsay when the speaker
is available) might be unobjectionable, provided: (1) that such
admonition would not impose upon an agency any obligation to deny
itself useful information, and (2) that a reviewing court would not
interpret such a provision as authorizing reversals of agency action
when an agency chose to make use of reliable, but judicially
inadmissible, evidence. While the Revised Model Act recognizes
agency need to act upon inadmissible evidence, its imposition of
a "necessary" standard regarding the use of that evidence may
stimulate litigation and may encourage court reversals of agency determinations which ought to be accepted as proper. In accusatorytype proceedings, however, the more stringent provisions of the Revised Act may be more desirable. 26 5 Other parts of the Revised Act's
263. MODEL AcT § 9(2): "[D]ocumentary evidence may be received in the form of

copies or excerpts, or by incorporation by reference."
264. REVsED MODEL ACT § 10(2).

265. In theory, evidence provisions designed for the function of the tribunal would
be desirable. But the practical difficulties which might be encountered in creating
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evidence provisions, such as the mandatory exclusion of "unduly
repetitious" evidence, seem unwise,266 as does the original Model
Act's possible incorporation of the "residuum" rule.
D. Internal Separation of Functions and Communications Within
the Agency Structure About Issues in Pending Adjudications. 1. In
General.-The problems suggested by the phrases "separation of
functions" and "ex parte communications" are separate but, to a
substantial extent, overlapping. Ex parte communications, as the
words suggest, involve communications between the decision maker
and others which are not routed through the record or otherwise made
known to, and made subject to challenge by, the parties to the
proceeding. 26 7 Separation of functions, or the lack of it, describes
the degree to which, within the agency structure, the officers who
perform a judging function perform no adversary role and are insulated from officers who perform adversary roles.2 8 The federal
act attempts to prevent officers engaged in "investigative or prosecuting functions" 269 from participating in the decision-making in adjudications. Professor Davis has suggested that officers who are "advocates,"
whether or not they are "prosecutors," ought to be barred from
participation in judging.270 In any event, one governing criterion suggesting a separation between those engaged in advocating and those
those provisions plus the disputes which would be engendered by unfamiliar language
might make the Revised Act's approach more realistic.
266. To the extent that the mandatory exclusion of unduly repetitious evidence
encourages disputes over substantively unimportant issues and creates a danger of reversal on judicial review, the provision is objectionable.
267. Ex parte communications are usually considered objectionable in a court proceeding when a judge learns facts from a source other than the record. The usual
objection to the communication of such extra-record factual information to a judge is
that the parties to the case do not have a chance to learn of such information or to
rebut it as they would have had if it had been offered as evidence or otherwise had
been communicated in the trial process. In short, judicial reliance upon information
communicated ex parte takes the determination of the issue to which it relates out
of the adversary process where factual determinations belong.
Different considerations govern ex parte communications of issues of law. Arguments addressed to the legal issues by the parties will be helpful to the judge, and
good judges will suggest legal issues to the parties for argument when those issues
may be important but have been missed by the parties. But relevant authorities used
by the judge need not be confined to those cited by the parties in their briefs or
arguments. The judge is deemed capable of ascertaining the "law" on his own, and
he properly researches the relevant legal sources himself.
268. See text accompanying notes 278-80 infra.
269. APA § 5(c).
270. DAvis § 13.07, at 218. Professor Davis would find that combination primarily
objectionable which combines advocacy and judging. He appears to admit, however,
that objection may still exist to a combination of impartial investigation with judging,
since the combination may permit facts to be interpolated which were not introduced
at a formal hearing. Id. at 217.
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engaged in judging seems to be the notion that a psychological
incompatibility 7l exists between the performance of the two functions
in the same case.2 72 The notion of separation overlaps the problem
of ex parte communications to the extent that it is thought necessary
or desirable to control communications between the decision-maker
and officers involved in adversary positions. 73
2. The FederalAdministrative ProcedureAct.-The dangers thought
to inhere in a commingling of functions have been substantially reduced at the federal level through the enactment of the federal Administrative Procedure Act.274 That act deals with the separation-offunctions problem in connection with the two-tier adjudication procedure used (or available for use) in the federal system to narrow
the issues among the parties and to allocate agency time efficiently. 75
Under the federal system, hearing officers normally preside at the
reception of evidence and issue an initial or recommended decision
which is, or may be, reviewed by the agency.27 6 The separation-offunctions provisions have their greatest application at the hearing officer level in adjudications required by statute to be determined on the
271. See the discussion of the psychological incompatibility of investigation or
advocacy with adjudication in the FINAL REPORT:
"Two characteristic tasks of a prosecutor are those of investigation and advocacy.
It is clear that when a controversy reaches the stage of hearing and formal adjudication the persons who did the actual work of investigating and building up the case
should play no part in the decision. This is because the investigators, if allowed to
participate, would be likely to interpolate facts and information discovered by them
ex parte and not adduced at the hearing, where the testimony is sworn and subject to
cross-examination and rebuttal. In addition, an investigator's function may in part be
that of a detective, whose purpose is to ferret out and establish a case. Of course, this
may produce a state of mind incompatible with the objective impartiality which must
be brought to bear in the process of deciding. For this same reason, the advocatethe agency's attorney who upheld a definite position adverse to the private parties
at the hearing-cannot be permitted to participate after the hearing in the making
of the decision. A man who has buried himself in one side on an issue is disabled
from bringing to its decision that dispassionate judgment which Anglo-American tradition demands of officials who decide questions. Clearly the advocate's view ought
to be presented publicly and not privately to those who decide.
"These types of commingling of functions of investigation or advocacy with the
function of deciding are thus plainly undesirable. But they are also avoidable and
should be avoided by appropriate internal division of labor. For the disqualifications
produced by investigation or advocacy are personal psychological ones which result
from engaging in those types of activity; and the problem is simply one of isolating
those who engage in the activity." FnAL REPoRT 56.
272. See text accompanying notes 396-405 inftra. See also notes 397, 400 infra.
273. See text accompanying notes 378-416 infra.
274. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
275. See text accompanying notes 99-102 supra for a description of the two-tier procedure used for rules required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity
for an agency hearing. Cf. text accompanying notes 415-19 infra.
276. APA § 8(a).
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record after opportunity for an agency hearing. In such a proceeding,
section 5(c) of the act forbids the hearing officer to consult any person or party on any "fact" 277 in issue and completely isolates him from
the prosecuting and investigative personnel of the agency: (1) he
cannot himself have engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions
in connection with the case before him or in a factually related
case;278 (2) he cannot receive advice from personnel who have been

so engaged about any aspect of the case, be it fact, law, policy, discretion, or anything else; 279 (3) he cannot be subject to or responsible
to any investigative or prosecuting personnel of the agency.2 8

Al-

though the act expressly exempts the agency from section 5(c) provisions,281 it nonetheless preserves282a substantial amount of separation
of functions at the agency level.

Except as section 5(c) might be read to prevent hearing officers
from consulting with impartial agency technical experts, 283 the provisions of that section appear to be adapted to the structure of most
federal agencies. Agencies which are large in terms of personnel
and work load require delegations of functions and allocations of authority for efficient operation. Allocations of prosecuting, investigating and decision-making functions among different groups of agency
personnel were made in large measure even before the passage of the
act, partially for reasons of efficiency. The two-tier system of adjudication was also used prior to the enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act as a device for efficient allocation of agency time.
The agency and agency-member exemption from the provisions of
section 5(c) is designed in part 284 to permit the agency to coordinate

277. APA § 5(c): "[N]o such officer shall consult any person or party on any fact

in issue unless upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate."
278. This follows from the prohibition of anyone engaged in the performance of

such investigative or prosecuting functions in a case from participating in decisionmaking in that or a factually related case: "No officer, employee, or agent engaged
in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency in any

case shall, in that or a factually related case, participate or advise in the decision,
recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to section 8 except as witness or

counsel in public proceedings." APA § 5(c).
279. Advice from such sources is effectively cut off by the provision of APA § 5(c)
quoted in note 278 supra.
280. APA § 5(c): "EN]or shall such officer be responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of any officer, employee, or agent engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecuting functions for any agency."
281. APA § 5(c): "[Nlor shall it [subsection 5(c)] be applicable in any manner to
the agency or any member or members of the body comprising the agency."
282. See text accompanying notes 292-93 infra.
283. See DAvis § 11.17.
284. Exemptions from the ex parte consultation provisions may be necessary if the
agency is to use staff help in deciding.
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enforcement and adjudicatory policies. Such coordination would sometimes require an agency to participate both in adjudication and in
decisions to institute investigations, to issue complaints, or to bring
cases to the stage of formal adjudication. Thus, although enforcement officers could, without consulting the agency, 5 order investigations, issue complaints, and bring cases to the formal adjudication
stage in routine situations which are well within agency-established
guidelines, coordination of enforcement and adjudicatory activities at
the fringes of established policy would involve the agency in several
types of these activities.2 8 Insofar as decision-making regarding the
institution of investigations, complaint issuance, and proceeding to
the formal adjudication stage are deemed to constitute the performance
of "investigative or prosecuting functions" as that phrase is used in
section 5(c), the need for the agency exemption is apparent.
The agency exemption in section 5(c) follows generally the conclusions expressed by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure,2 87 which endorsed a limited fusion of functions at
the agency level to permit coordination of enforcement and adjudicatory policies. In its endorsement, however, the Committee limited
itselF 88 to agency involvement in complaint-issuance decisions in
which the agency acted upon information presented to it by others.
In the words of the Committee: "Assuming that the agency heads
simply pass on the sufficiency of material developed and presented to
them by others, the Committee is satisfied that no such unfairness
results."28 9 In adopting the federal Administrative Procedure Act,
Congress took a similarly limited view about the degree to which
agency involvement in investigation or prosecution is compatible with
adjudicative duties. Although Congress exempted agency members
from the provisions of section 5(c), it apparently did this to
facilitate coordination between enforcement and adjudicatory policies
rather than to indicate approval of active agency involvement in other
aspects of prosecution or investigation. Thus, the Senate Report states
that the agency exemption "is not to be taken as meaning that the top
authority must reserve to itself both the prosecuting and deciding
functions ....[Ilt may and should confine itself to determining policy
and should delegate the actual supervision of investigations and
initiation of cases to responsible subordinates."2 0 The House Report
285. FiNAL REPORT 56.
286. FiNAL REPoRT 57.

287. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 44-45 (1950).
288. FnjAL REPoRT 57.

289. Ibid.

290.

The Senate Report deals with the agency exemption as follows:

"A further word may be said as to the last exemption-of the agency itself or the
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contains substantially the same statement. 9 ' Moreover, the agency
exemption from the separation-of-functions provisions is not so broad
292
as the literal language of the act might indicate. Professors Jaffe
and Davis293 have pointed out that, despite the exemption, agency

consultation with prosecuting and investigating officers is effectively
prevented by section 5(c). This is so because the agency exemption
leaves intact the prohibition directed to every "officer, employee, or
agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting
functions" against participating or advising "in the decision, recommended decision or agency review." The agency exemption does,
however, facilitate agency use of both technical experts 294 and nontechnical assistants in summarizing and analyzing the record,29 as
long as they have not engaged in prosecuting or investigating the
case. 296
members of the board who comprise it. Such a provision is required by the very
nature of administrative agencies, where the same authority is responsible for both
the investigation-prosecution and the hearing and decision of cases. There, too, the
exemption is not to be taken as meaning that the top authority must reserve to itself
both the prosecuting and deciding functions. To be sure it is ultimately responsible
for all functions committed to it, but it may and should confine itself to determining
policy and should delegate the actual supervision of investigations and initiation of
cases to responsible subordinates." S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945),
LEIsLATrvE HISTORY OF THE ADmISTsRATvE PROCEDuRE AcT 204 (1946).
291. The House Report contains the following discussion of the agency exemption:
"The last exemption-of the agency itself or the members of the board who comprise
it-is required by the very nature of the administrative agencies, where the same
authority is responsible for both the investigation-prosecution and the hearing and
decision of cases. There, too, the exemption is not to be taken as meaning that the
top authority must reserve to itself both the prosecuting and deciding functions. It is
ultimately responsible for all functions committed to it, but it may and should confine
itself to determining policy and delegate the actual supervision of investigations and
initiation of cases to responsible subordinate officers. Agencies, such heads of bureaus
or departments, performing mainly executive functions should delegate to examiners
or boards of examiners at least the initial decision of cases and should confine their
own review to important issues of law or policy." H. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1946), LEG]SLATIVE Isrony OF THE ADNINIsmATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 262-63
(1946).
292. Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis in Symposium-Hoover Commission and Task
Force Reports on Legal Services and Procedures, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273, 1280 (1955):
"It is true that the agency can continue to exercise initiating as well as judging functions: It can judge a case which it started (though normally the agency members
do not participate in the initiation of specific cases, however much they may lay
down general enforcement policies). But the APA very explicitly states that the
investigating and prosecuting officers in a particular case shall not 'participate or advise in the decision,' and, as I interpret this provision, they can no more advise the
agency than they can the trial examiner."
293. DAVIs § 11.08, at 71, § 11.21, at 128.
294. DAvis § 11.08, at 84. See text accompanying note 331 infra.
295. Cf. DAvIs § 11.10, at 87, § 11.09, at 74. Compare United States v. Morgan,
298 U.S. 468 (1936).
296. Officers performing prosecuting and investigative functions in a case are barred
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3. The Model State Administrative Procedure Acts.-The original
Model State Administrative Procedure Act, whether intentionally or
not, 29 may have dealt with separation of functions problems as well

as with ex parte communication problems in its provision making the
298
record the exclusive basis for "factual information or evidence"
and in its provision requiring that parties be afforded an opportunity
to contest material officially noticed99 Although the Model Act does
not expressly forbid a prosecuting or investigative officer to perform an adjudicative function, 30 it may effectively prevent such
an officer from performing a judicial function in the same case in
which he had been a prosecutor by the requirement that only factual
information or evidence contained in the record may be considered in
deciding a case. 301 The Model Act does, however, permit the decisionmaker to engage in consultation (including consultation with officials
engaged in prosecuting the case) about "nonfactual" information or
arguments.3 02
The Revised Model Act's section 13 303 follows the federal act's section 5 in forbidding discussion by the decision-maker with any
person about an issue of fact. 304 It is stronger than the federal
from communicating with the decision-maker, including the agency or agency member.
See text accompanying notes 281-82 supra.
297. Compare Stason, The Model State Administrative Procedure Act, 33 IowA L.
REV. 196, 205-06 (1948).
298. MODEL AcT § 9(2).
299. MODELAcT § 9(4).
300. Compare IND. ANa. STAT. § 63-3020 (1961) which provides that: "No agent
or representative conducting a hearing shall perform any of the investigative or prosecuting functions of said agency in the case heard or to be heard by him or in a factually
related case."
The statute exempts the agency and the agency members plus initial license applications and proceedings involving the validity or application of rates, facilities or
practices of public utilities or carriers.
301. See text accompanying note 310 infra.
302. See text accompanying notes 324-41 infra.
303. REvISED MODEL ACT § 13: "Unless required for the disposition of ex parte
matters authorized by law, members or employees of an agency assigned to render
a decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested case shall
not communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact, with any
person or party, nor, in connection with any issue of law, with any party or his
representative, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate.
An agency member (1) may communicate with other members of the agency, and
(2) may have the aid and advice of one or more personal assistants."
304. Some limits on ex parte communications of factual information are impliedly
contained in many administrative procedure statutes in provisions requiring that decisions in contested cases be based exclusively on the record. See text accompanying
notes 267, 297-98 supra. Among the statutes which specifically deal with ex parte
consultations are ALASKA STAT. § 44.62.630 (1962); HAwAII REV. LAws § 6C-13
(Supp. 1965); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5213 (Supp. 1965); IND. STAT. ANN. § 63-3020
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act in that its prohibition extends to agency members (consulting
with persons other than personal assistants and other agency members) as well as to agency employees. 0 5 The agency exemptions in
the numbered clauses of section 13306 are narrower in form than the
blanket exemption accorded agency members from the separationof-functions provisions of the federal act.
The Revised Model Act's provision (subject to limited exceptions
in the case of agency members)30 7 that any agency member or employee assigned to render a decision or to make findings of fact in a
contested case may not communicate with any person about an issue
of fact, may prevent such agency member or employee from participating actively 308 in the investigation or prosecution of that case.
Such provisions would inhibit and might effectively prevent an agency
employee or (despite the agency exemptions)309 an agency member
who was assigned to render a decision from closely supervising the
prosecution or investigation of that case because his communications
about that case with other agency personnel would be restricted to
"lega" issues. They would also prevent such agency member or
employee from performing prosecuting or investigative tasks himself
by preventing him from communicating with witnesses about factual
issues.310 Despite the omission in the Revised Model Act of an
analogue to the federal act's express prohibition of a commingling of
functions in one person, it may effect a similar prohibition-and one
which applies to agency members as well as agency employeesthrough its ex parte consultation provisions. The requirements of
sections 9(e)(2) and 9(g), that all evidence considered be in the
record and that findings of fact be based exclusively on the evidence
(1961); OKLA. STAT. A'r. tit. 75, § 313 (1965); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 42-35-13
(Supp. 1966); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 9-276.29 (Supp. 1965). See also FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 120.28 (Supp. 1966). The Georgia statute, which closely follows the Revised Model
Act in many other respects, omits the Revised Model Act's ex parte consultation provisions. GA. CODE ANN. tit. 3A (Supp. 1966). Cf. note 314 infra.
305. Consider the effect of this provision on agency use of technical experts. See
text accompanying notes 331-38 infra.
306. See note 303 supra.
307. The exemptions are in the numbered clauses of § 13. See note 303 supra.
308. "Active" participation as used in text means participation beyond simply passig upon the sufficiency of material presented by others. The line between "active"
and "passive" participation, however, is at best a hazy one.
309. The agency exceptions do not appear broad enough to permit active participation in investigation or prosecution unless "personal assistants" participate in those
functions; and the act probably does not contemplate "personal assistants" so acting.
310. A "witness" would normally be thought of as presenting testimony relevant to
a "factual" issue. Whether an expert witness testifying about "value" would be considered to be testifying about a "factual" issue, a "policy" issue, or a "legal" issue is
not clear.
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and on matters officially noticed, might similarly impede an officer
from engaging in prosecuting or investigative activities in connection
with a case which he is adjudicating.
Since the prohibition of ex parte communication is directed to "members or employees of an agency assigned to render a decision or to
make findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested case'
(emphasis supplied), it is unclear what effect that prohibition would
have upon communications made during an investigatory or other
preliminary prosecution stage of a case prior to the assignment of an
adjudicator. Literally, section 13 would permit an agency member or
employee to engage in communication with anyone about any issue
and then to decide the case as an adjudicator, so long as those communications were made prior to his assignment to adjudicate. 31 1 It is
not unrealistic to suggest that substantial investigation may often
precede the assignment of an adjudicator. However, ex parte communication concerning those "fact" issues resembling evidentiary fact
issues may be effectively precluded at all times by sections 9(e) (2)312
313
and 9(g).
The scope of the act's prohibition of ex parte discussion of issues
of law 314 as they apply to discussions and exchanges within the agency
structure is not clear. Instead of dealing with the problem by forbidding involvement in decision-making by officers performing prosecuting or investigative functions as does the federal act, 315 the Revised Model Act forbids ex parte discussion of issues of law with
"any party or his representative." The effect of this prohibition on
discussions of issues of law among agency personnel depends upon
the definition of "party." The act defines "party" as "each person or
agency named or admitted as a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party."316 If the agency is
311. This conclusion follows from the use of the present tense in the word "as-

signed." But cf. the present tense phrase "engaged in" in § 5(c) of the federal act.
Such a reading of the section would permit active participation in investigation and
in compiling the prosecution's case by an adjudicator whose assignment to the ad-

judicatory task was delayed until after he had completed his investigative and prosecutory duties. Compare FnA,. REPORT 56.
312. REVISED MODEL AcT § 9 (e): "The record in a contested case shall include:

(2) evidence received or considered."
313. REvisED MODEL AcT § 9(g): "Findings of fact shall be based exclusively on
the evidence and on matters officially noticed."
314. The Hawaii version of the Revised Model Act omits the prohibition on ex
parte communications about law issues with parties or their representatives. HAwAu:
REv. LA.ws § 6C-13 (Supp. 1965).

315. APA § 5(c).
316. REvisED MODEL AcT § 1(5).

That definition was taken almost verbatim from

§ 2(b) of the federal act. The context makes clear that "party" includes the agency
in § 11. In § 12 the context suggests that "party" does not include the agency.
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"named" as a party (which it usually would not be)317 or if it is
"admitted" as a party (which it usually would not be since the
agency might see no need to admit itself), the prohibition on ex parte
communication of issues of law would be directed toward the
agency or any "representative of" the agency. The meaning of a
"representative of" the agency in the context of intra-agency-structure
discussion of issues involved in a pending adjudication is not clear.
If the agency is not "named or admitted as a party," however, then
the act seems to permit free discussion of issues of "law" within the
agency structure. An interpretation of "party" would still be available
which would treat agency officials who acted as investigators, prosecutors, or as "advocates" as "parties." Under that approach, the
separation between the final decision-maker and those officials performing an investigative or prosecuting function would approximate
that imposed by section 5(c) of the federal act, except that the
Revised Act's separation might preclude contact prior to the institution
of formal proceedings. 318
Section 9(e) (7)319 requires the inclusion in the record of all staff
memoranda or data submitted in connection with the consideration
of a case. By itself that section would not require that the parties to
a case have the opportunity to challenge the memoranda or data prior
to appeal, since the provision does not clearly require that the staff
memoranda or data be made known to the parties in time for them to
contest the contents. 320 Section 10(4)321 eliminates this defect with
respect to "noticed" staff memoranda or data, but the provision is
ambiguous as to the staff memoranda which it covers. It is not clear
317. Most agency proceedings do not carry the name of the agency as part of the
name of proceedings before it.

E.g., Application

of Chance-Way Transp. Co. of

Ducktown, Tenn., for Authority to Haul Feed and Newsprint from Ducktown, Tenn.,
to Memphis and Knoxville, Tenn. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Rep. 92 (1956). Professor
Cooper believes that "an agency is normally a party to the proceeding it is conducting .
1..."
I CooPER, STATE ADNINISTRATIVE LAW 131 (1965).
318. The federal act's separation of agency members from prosecuting and investigating officials is limited to prohibiting the latter from participating in decision-making.

APA § 5(c).
319. RE-VsED MODEL ACT § 9(e): "The record in a contested case shall include:
(7) all staff memoranda or data submitted to the hearing officer or members of
the agency in connection with their consideration of the case."
320. See comment to REvIsED MODEL AT § 9, HANDnBooK OF TnE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMNiUSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 214 (1961) indicating that

"staff memoranda" which are required to be included in the record can be placed in
the record too late to permit "evidence" to be offered in reply to them. Professor
Bloomenthal thinks that this provision may contemplate making those memoranda
part of the record only after the agency decision is rendered. See Bloomenthal, The
Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Reform or Regression? 1963 DuxE
L.J. 593, 617. But see REVISED MODEL ACT § 10(4).
321. See note 350 infra.
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whether staff memoranda which deal with questions of "law" would

come within the requirements of notice to the parties since such
staff memoranda might not need the "official notice" exception to

the rules of evidence in order to be considered by the agency de-

cision-maker.322 It is also unclear whether staff evaluations of so-called
"basic" facts would fall in a "fact" category and thus be subject to the
official notice provisions requiring that parties have opportunity to

contest them, or whether they would fall in a "law" category where
32 3

the restrictions of the official notice provisions might not apply.
4. The Fact-Law Distinctionof the FederalAct and the Model Acts.
-The distinction made in the federal act and in the original Model Act
between factual and nonfactual issues 324 and the distinction in the
Revised Model Act between factual and legal issues325 may create
some difficulties in their application. Issues in an adjudication may

not be easily separated into issues of "fact" and issues of "law" as
those acts assume. 326 Furthermore, a distinction between "fact" ques-

tions and "law" questions has certain judicial overtones that are
not
32 7
easily adaptable to some aspects of administrative activity.

If

322. See Note, 17 VAND. L. BEv. 638, 645 (1964). Judicial cognizance of 'laws"
has traditionaly been described in terms of judicial notice. See, e.g., 9 WimoRE, EviDENCE § 2572 (1940). Cf. Thornton v. Carrier, 43 Tenn. App. 615, 311 S.W.2d 208
(1957).
323. See text accompanying notes 368-70 infra.
324. The federal act prohibits consultation by a deciding officer (other than a
member of the agency) in an adjudication to which § 5(c) applies on "any fact in
issue" with any person or party. By implication such consultation except with prosecuting and investigating officers is permitted on nonfactual issues. The Model Act's exclusiveness of the record provision relates to "factual information or evidence" and
its official notice provision related to general, technical, or scientific "facts." MODEL
AcT §§ 9(2), (4).
325. The Revised Model Act forbids communications between the officer assigned
to render a decision "in connection with any issue of fact, with any person or party"
and "in connection with any issue of law, with any party or his representative." The
Revised Model Act thus opposes issues of fact to issues of law. The extent to which
ex parte communication in connection with a policy evaluation of factual data is proper
under the Revised Act is unclear. The Revised Act contains analogues to the Model
Act's exclusiveness-of-the-record provisions and official notice provisions. BEvisED
MODEL AT §§ 9(e)(2), 10(4). Like the Model Act, these provisions relate only to
"evidence" and to "facts."
326. Cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc. 340 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1951).
327. Fact and law are terms that are frequently used to describe the respective
questions that are decided by judges and juries. Determining the allocation of decision-making functions between judge and jury in an analogous context will not always indicate accurately the issues as to which extra-record consultation by an agency
would be proper and those as to which such consultation would be improper. Again,
the various meanings of fact and law are shown by observing that issues that might
be deemed nonfactual in the sense that extra-record consultation on them by the
agency would be proper nevertheless might not be issues of "law" in the sense that
those issues would be reviewed by a court.
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describable in "fact" and "law" terms at all, some issues in an administrative adjudication might be "mixed" questions, 3 8 or questions of both fact and law.329 The federal act and the original Model
Act330
impliedly recognize the unrealistic nature of a fact-law distinction in administrative processes by refraining from opposing "law"
issues to "factuar' issues; nevertheless they require the identification
of "factual" issues.
In discussing the federal act, Professors Nathanson and Davis have
emphasized the need for administrative decision-makers to have access
to technical assistance within their organizations; 331 in order to facili328. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U.S. 106, 110 (1904).
329. Cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
330. The distinctions made in the federal and two Model Acts would be justiflable
analytically if it could be assumed that the "fact" category of issues is meant to include
those issues with which parties would be well equipped to deal, and the nonfactual
or '"aw" category of issues is meant to include those issues with which the parties
would not be well equipped to deal. This distinction underlies the allocation of decision-making between judge and jury. Davis also distinguishes between "adjudicative
facts" and "legislative facts." Davis' contention is that adjudicative facts are facts
which pertain principally to the parties and consequently about which the parties are
experts.
"Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities, businesses,
and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of who did what,
where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent; adjudicative facts are roughly the
kind of facts that go to a jury in a jury case. Legislative facts do not usually concern
the immediate parties but are general facts which help the tribunal decide questions
of law and policy and discretion.
"Facts pertaining to the parties and their businesses and activities, that is, adjudicative
facts, are intrinsically the kind of facts that ordinarily ought not to be determined
without giving the parties a chance to know and to meet any evidence that may be
unfavorable to them, that is, without providing the parties an opportunity for trial.
The reason is that the parties know more about the facts concerning themselves and
their activities than anyone else is likely to know, and the parties are therefore in an
especially good position to rebut or explain evidence that bears upon adjudicative facts.
Yet people who are not necessarily parties, frequently the agencies and their staffs,
may often be the masters of legislative facts. Because the parties may often have little
or nothing to contribute to the development of legislative facts, the method of trial
often is not required for the determination of disputed issues about legislative facts."
DAvis § 7.02, at 413.
The parties may have much to contribute with respect to the application of a general
policy to particularized activities which they perform. In Davis' language such application could be described as involving facts about "the parties and their businesses
and activities" although they might not necessarily answer the questions of "who did
what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent." Consider, e.g., questions
pertaining to the determination of a rate base. The parties might be capable of making
arguments addressed to the standard of valuation applicable to their particular assets,
in addition to or apart from the "who, what, where, when, how, why, etc." of the
physical events involving purchase and use of assets. Cf. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v, Public
Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
331. DAvis § 11.10. See also Bloomenthal, supra note 320, at 617; Fuchs, The
Model Act's Division of Administrative Proceedings Into Rule-Making and Contested
Cases, 33 IowA L. REv. 210, 217 (1948).
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tate that assistance, they have urged that section 5(c) of the federal
act be interpreted to permit hearing officers to have access to technical
experts employed by the agency who have not participated as advocatesm in the cases in which their advice is sought. In rate-making
and many other proceedings involving technical issues, this need is
met by provisions of the federal act which make section 5(c) inapplicable to those proceedings; 3 the exclusiveness-of-the-record provisions of section 7(d) would probably not interfere with the decisionmaker's ability to solicit and to receive most forms of technical
advice. "1 A similar need of decision-makers to consult with technical
experts probably exists in some types of proceedings on the state level,
and that need can be accommodated within the terms of the Model
Acts' "contested case" provisions only if the advice given by technical
experts is deemed to be nonfactual. The exclusiveness-of-the-record
provisions of the two acts should create no more impediment to that
kind of advice than does section 7(d) of the federal act; but the
ex parte consultations prohibitions of section 13 of the Revised Model
Act are less easy to interpret in the same way. The exclusiveness-ofthe-record provisions can be construed to refer only to "litigation
facts"= or to Davis' "adjudicative facts," 6 and not to bar the use of
extra-record "non-litigation facts" or "legislative facts" by the decision
maker; but section 13 prohibition opposes "facts" to "law," and
implies that what is not a matter of "face' is a matter of "law." Some
types of technical advice could be correctly described as not involving
litigation or adjudicative facts and perhaps as not involving "factual"
matters at all, but they might not be easily describable as matters of
law. A major defect of section 13, therefore, is its implication that no
middle ground exists between matters of "fact" and matters of "law."
Its drafters seem to have intended that the prohibition on factual communications be limited to those concerning "litigious" facts;3 7 accordingly, they may have contemplated that most "technical advice"
332. DAVIS § 11.17, at 108-09; Nathanson, Some Comments on the Administrative
Procedure Act, 41 ILL. L. Ry. 368, 390 (1946).
333. Thus "rule making" proceedings are not subject to § 5(c), and rule making
under the federal act includes proceedings approving or prescribing for the future
of "rates, wages, corporate or financial structures or reorganizations thereof or of
valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices bearing upon any of the foregoing."
APA § 2(c). Also excluded from the application of § 5(c) are adjudications determining "applications for initial licenses" and "proceedings involving the validity or
application of rates, facilities, or practices of publc utilities or carriers." APA § 5(c).
334. See DAvIs § 11.09, at 80.
335. FINAL REPoRT 72. Cf. 1 CoopER, op. cit. supra note 317, at 418.
336. DAVIS § 15.03.
337. See Comment to REVISED MODEL ACT § 13, HANDBOOic OF THE NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF COTnMUSSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAws 219 (1961).
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communications would be allowed. Since the "litigious facts" phrase
suggests .that it comprehends only those facts which are properly
subject to determination though a "litigious" or adversary process,
it is possible that the Revised Model Act's drafters contemplated
that the determination of which matters were properly the subject
of ex parte consultation within the agency structure, and which matters
were not, would be gradually worked out by the agencies and the
courts. In this process, criteria relevant to reconciling felt needs of.
internal agency discussion about issues and the need to expose issues
to adversary challenge could be drawn from administrative experience in the several agencies. But because section 13 is open to a
more rigid interpretation, its enactment and application to technical
proceedings might interfere with proper decision-making.
The free approach of the original Model Act to ex parte discussion
of nonfactual issues between an agency decision-maker and investigating and prosecuting officersm may reflect the conclusions of its drafters
about the relative sizes of many state agencies, especially in the smaller
states. They may have concluded that the smaller size of those agencies makes the internal separation imposed upon federal agencies
generally impractical on the state level. Thus, the smaller an agency's
size, the more practical becomes the involvement by the agency head
in routine and everyday decision-making; it shrinks the extent of possible delegation and projects the power of the agency head closer to
the daily tasks of subordinates, including subordinates involved in
prosecution and investigation. In such circumstances, the exemption
afforded by the federal act which permits agency members to coordinate investigative, enforcement and adjudicatory policies may have
been thought insufficient. Prohibition of discussion of "nonfactual" or
"legal" issues between agencies and their prosecuting and investigative
staffs may have been thought to interfere unduly with free exchange
within a small group-an exchange would be conducive to administrative efficiency. Or, the drafters may have thought it beyond
their capacity to deal with the difficulties inherent in defining adequately the types of investigators, prosecutors, or advocates which
should be separated from the decision-makers.3 9 Even the Revised
Act, which is much more restrictive of administrative actions than
338. Cf. Stason, supranote 297.

339. Various types of staff involvement in rate-making and licensing issues have
often given rise to different views as to how to treat the relations between the staff
members involved and the agency decision-makers. Compare, e.g., 1 BENJAMIN REPORT
67-70, with REVISED MODEL AcT § 1(2). Compare Wilson & Co. v. United States, 335
F.2d 788, 789 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 951 (1965), with DAVIs § 13.02
(Supp. 1965). See also, Selected Reports of the Administrative Conference of the
United States, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 409-12 (1963).
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the original act, does not clearly forbid ex parte contact between the
final decision-maker and the agency's investigative, prosecuting, or
advocating staff members. ° It does, however, limit ex parte contact
between the final decision-maker and those officials when that contact
1
takes the form of memoranda.3
5. Relevancy of "Accusatory" and "Technical" Nature of the Proceedings To Separationof Functions.-Althoughsection 5(c) of the federal
act prohibits ex parte discussion of "factuar' issues between hearing
officers and others and although it prohibits any officers engaged in
prosecuting or investigative functions in a particular case from participating in the decision-making or from advising the decision-maker
in that case, many proceedings likely to involve technical issues are
exempted from the application of those prohibitions, either because
they are defined as rule-making or because they are specifically
excluded from coverage of section 5(c).34 These exemptions may be
grounded on the assumption that consultation between hearing officers
and staff experts is more necessary as the issues become more technical.3 3 But the exemptions not only permit discussions between
hearing officers and "impartiar' technical experts; they also remove
statutory restrictions upon prosecuting and investigative officers
participating in decision-making. 344 It is possible that the latter exemption is designed in part to relieve agencies from maintaining double
staffs, each duplicating, in large measure, the other's work-a situation
which would occur if the prosecuting and investigative work in an
agency-instituted proceeding would have to be performed by different
staff members from those who advise the agency on its final disposition.345 The same considerations may in part underlie an exemption
from 5(c) for initial licenses. Technical considerations may be involved in some license awards, and freeing administrative decisionmaking from the section's restrictions may facilitate both efficient
disposition of cases and the close decision-maker staff consultation
340. But see text accompanying note 307 supra for an interpretation of the Revised Model Act which would insulate deciding officers from prosecuting or investigative officers.
341. REVISED MODEL ACT §§ 9(e)(7), 10(4).
342. See note 333 supra.
343. See Jaffe, Basic Issues: An Analysis in Symposium-Hoover Commission and
Task Force Reports on Legal Services and Procedures, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1273, 1281
(1955).
344. E.g., Wilson & Co. v. United States, supra note 339. Professor Davis would
find some constitutional restrictions upon that procedure. DAvis § 13.02 (Supp. 1965).
345. The cogency of an objection to duplication of staff work, of course, depends
upon the amount of analysis and evaluation which various types of proceedings involve. The issues involved in a utility rate proceeding, for example, might involve
a substantial amount of staff analysis and evaluation whereas the issues involved in
the revocation of a liquor license might not involve a comparable amount of staff work.
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appropriate to resolving some technical issues.
It will be noted, however, that proceedings involving license revocations and renewals of existing licenses fall within the provisions of
section 5 (c).346 The differing treatments of license grants and license
revocations or renewals is probably due in large measure to the belief
that a license revocation or a refusal to renew an existing license is
likely to create a more substantial hardship to the licensee than is the
denial of an initial license to an applicant. Accordingly, it was felt
that the situations involving the greater hardship should be surrounded
with procedural safeguards that might not be necessary when the
hardship resulting from administrative action was less severe. Although
generalizations are hazardous, it may be suggested that licenses often
are revoked for violations of the law or for other unprofessional or unbecoming conduct on the part of licensees. In such instances, technical considerations may not be predominant; rather, the proceedings
may be strongly accusatory 347 in character, may involve the imposition
of a substantial penalty, and may involve a moral condemnation of
the licensee by the agency. In such accustory proceedings (in many
ways resembling criminal proceedings in a court of law), the desirability of insulating the decision-maker from the agency employees who
have prepared the case against the licensee would be increased and
would not be offset by the decision-maker's need for such advice
on technical matters.
6. Official Notice. (a) Scope.-The concept of official notice is
348
generally conceded to be broader in scope than judicial notice.
349
The federal act gives agencies permission to engage in official notice
but does not attempt to define the proper extent of the notice power.
The Model Acts, however, after expressly granting permission to
agencies to notice all facts which are judicially noticeable, make some
effort to define the scope of the official notice power. 350 The difference
346. APA §§ 2(d), 5(c).

The licensing exemption of § 5(c)

applies only to

"determining applications for initial licenses."
347. See Jaffe, supra note 343, at 1281. Cf. 1 BENJA~MN REPORT 68-69.

348. This seems to follow from the statement in both model acts that permission
is given by them to notice material "in addition" to "judicially cognizable facts."
349. APA § 7(d).
350. MODEL ACT § 9(4): "Agencies may take notice of judicially cognizable facts

and in addition may take notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within their
specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either before or during hearing, or
by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the material so noticed, and they
shall be afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Agencies may utilize
their experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation
of the evidence presented to them."
R-visED MODEL AcT § 10(4): "[N]otice may be taken of judicially cognizable facts.
In addition, notice may be taken of generally recognized technical or scientific facts
within the agency's specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either before or
during the hearing, or by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the ma-
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in wording between the original Model Act and the Revised Model
Act is interesting. The original Model Act permitted agencies to
notice "general, technical, or scientific facts within their specialized
knowledge."35 ' The Revised Model Act permits agencies to notice
"generally recognized technical or scientific facts within the agency's
specialized knowledge." 3 2 The Revised Act, by changing the word
"general" from an adjective modifying "facts" to a component of the
adverbial phrase "generally recognized" which modifies the adjectives
"technical" and "scientific," may contain an implication that the scope
for official notice is limited to those technical and scientific facts which
are generally recognized. Whether this inference was intended is not
clear." 3 The somewhat loose drafting of this provision of the Revised
Model Act is evidenced by the fact that the act contemplates that
"staff memoranda or data" may constitute "material noticed,"5 yet it
is difficult to conceive of a staff memorandum as constituting a "generally recognized" fact. Although it may also have been the intention
of the drafters of the original Model Act to limit official notice to facts
which are generally recognized, their phrasing was poorly chosen to
accomplish that result. Of the three categories in which notice is
permissible under the act, only one such category consists of "generar' facts. While judicial notice has been limited at times to notice
of facts that are generally recognized, there seems less occasion to
require specialized agencies acting within their areas of competence to refrain from officially noticing facts whose existence is
terial noticed, including any staff memoranda or data, and they shall be afforded an
opportunity to contest the material so noticed. The agency's experience, technical
competence, and specialized knowledge may be utilized in the evaluation of the
evidence."
Several state administrative procedure statutes lack official notice provisions.
Among them are: Anic. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, ch. 7 (Supp. 1963); IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 63,
eh. 30 (1961); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit 5, § 2405(5) (1964); Omo REV. CODE ANN.

§ tit. 1, ch. 119 (Baldwin 1964); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1710 (1962); VA. CODE §
9-6.11(d) (1964); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-2(d) (1966).
351. MODEL ACT § 9(4).
352. REVISED MODEL ACT § 10 (4).

353. The change in wording seems to have escaped the Kentucky Legislative Research Commission which stated that "section 9(4) of the Model Act (1946) . . . is
exactly like subsection (4) except that the Model Act provision combines the first

two sentences in subsection (4)." Ky. REP. No. 12, 83.
354. REVISED MODEL ACT § 10(4). The original Model Act provides for opportunity to contest "facts" noticed. The change in wording of this provision in the Revised Model Act which provides for opportunity to contest "material" noticed seems
to be designed to permit challenge to staff memoranda. Thus a preliminary draft of
the Revised Model Act made no mention of "staff memoranda" (or "data") in § 10(4)
and provided for opportunity to challenge noticed "facts."

See 13 AD. L. REv. 333

(1961). As pointed out in text, however, staff memoranda would not normally constitute either judicially cognizable facts or "generally recognized" technical or scientific

facts to which notice is limited by the act.
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less than generally recognized. Competence developed by an agency
in a specialized field ought to enable it to make judgments about the
existence of technical or scientific facts within that field, regardless
of whether the facts are "generally recognized," when that judgment
is subject to contest by the parties to the adjudications in which
5
that notice is taken.
(b) Limitation of Notice to "Facts."-The official notice provisions
of all three acts concern notice of "facts." Reference to nonfactual
elements is omitted, perhaps on the ground that only "facts" need the
official notice exception to the rules of evidence. 356 The meaning of
"facts" in the context of administrative decision-making, however, is
varied. Several types of "facts" can be identified and it is not clear
where the "fact" category ends and the "law" category begins. This
ambiguity of meaning affects the application of the requirement
found in all three acts that the parties be afforded an opportunity
to challenge noticed "facts." Professor Davis would permit official
notice of any facts "except adjudicative facts that are specifically
in dispute,"35 7 and would permit the parties to challenge some of the
facts noticed. There is no reason why every "legislative fact" noticed
should be subject to challenge-some may be too ephemeral or too
indisputable to be profitably challenged. Accordingly, despite the
express requirements of the federal act and the Model Acts that opportunity be afforded to challenge noticed facts, power to prohibit challenge where challenge would obviously be fruitless and wasteful ought
to be read into those provisions.
The chameleonic meanings of the terms "fact" and "factual" are
again revealed by the notion that "legislative facts" are a principal
subject of official notice.3 8 For the term "fact" in the official notice
provisions 359 of the Model Acts thus is disclosed to carry a different
meaning from the term "factual information or evidence" in the original Model Act's exclusiveness-of-the-record provision36°-a provision,
which, in the Davis
terminology, probably refers principally to
"adjudicative facts."3 61 Moreover, as suggested in the preceding para355. Compare text accompanying notes 368-76 infra.
356. See note 322 supra.
357. DAvs § 15.08, at 389. Although Professor Davis goes on to say that the
parties should be then afforded an appropriate opportunity to meet the facts thus
noticed, he later qualifies that statement by urging that "any request that seems
completely futile or seems to be motivated by desire for delay or obstruction should
be denied ... ."Id. § 15.09, at 396.
358. See, e.g., DAvis § 15.10, at 402 discussing methods appropriate for contesting
noticed "legislative facts."
359. MoDEL AcT § 9(4); R muED MoDEL AcT § 10(4).
360. MoDEL AcT § 9(2).
361. See text accompanying notes 335-36 supra.
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graph, even among "legislative facts" which are used in decisionmaking, distinctions have to be made between those which are
suitable for challenge by the parties and those which are not. Note
also that the Revised Model Act's ex parte consultation provisions
which are stated in terms of a dichotomy between "fact" and "law"
probably should be construed to refer to a dichotomy between "adjudicative facts" and other information.362 In the Davis terminology
again, if that provision permits ex parte consultation about "legislative
facts," must the official notice provisions requiring opportunity for
challenge be applied to them? They probably ought to be applied
whenever opportunity for challenge appears to possess a substantial
potential for educating the decision-maker about his task. 3 In this
connection, the Revised Act's exclusiveness-of-the-record provision
that "findings of fact shall be based exclusively on the evidence and
on matters officially noticed"3 ought to be read as referring to findings of "adjudicative facts" and of those "legislative facts" which
would be decided appropriately with the help of an adversary procedure.
(c) "Evaluation" of Evidence.-Both of the Model Acts give agen-

cies permission to utilize their "experience, technical competence, and
specialized knowledge" in the "evaluation" of evidence.36 5 To the
extent that "evaluation" of evidence is opposed to "notice" of facts,
the requirement that the parties be afforded an opportunity to contest
noticed material may not apply to the "experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge" used in that "evaluation." Evaluation of evidence would seem to be performed normally through the
use of policy judgments based on factors which could be aptly described as "legislative facts" and through the use of "legislative facts"
themselves.3 66 The use of "experience" comprehends drawing upon
knowledge of "legislative facts" derived from that experience. Spe362. See text accompanying notes 336-37 supra.

363. Cf. Cohen, Some Aspects of Maryland Administrative Law, 24
(1964).

MD.

L. REV. 1, 13

364. REVISED MODEL AcT § 9(g).

365. MODEL AcT § 9(4); REVISED MODEL AcT § 10(4). Of interest are the following statutes which are largely based on the original or Revised Model Acts and which
conspicuously omit the provision found in those acts authorizing agencies to use their
"experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge in the evaluation of
the evidence": HAwAr REv. LAws § 6C-10(d) (Supp. 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 29A-5-2(d) (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § ,227.10(3) (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
9-276.26(d) (Supp. 1965). These statutes, with the exception of the West Virginia
statute, do contain official notice provisions. Other state administrative procedure
statutes which contain official notice provisions but which do not include evaluationof-evidence provisions analogous to those of the Model Acts include ArAsK. STAT.
§ 44.62.480 (1962) and CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11515. Cf. N.D. CzuT. CODE § 28-32-07
(1960).
366. Cf. DAVIS § 15.03, at 355; Bloomenthal, supra note 320, at 617.
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cialized knowledge" suggests specialized knowledge of "legislative
facts." But why the additional permission of the last sentence of
the Model Acts' official-notice provisions to use "specialized knowledge" when the first sentence
has already permitted the use of
"specialized knowledge"? 367 Perhaps because the last sentence is
focused on the techniques of evaluation rather than on "fact" knowledge. Knowledge which can be described in terms of "legislative
facts" shades imperceptibly into techniques, analytical devices, attitudes, and predispositions, so that at some point it cannot properly
be described as factual, however much it continues to be a "knowledge" which is "legislative" in character. 368 If, however, the first and
last sentences of the notice provisions are dealing with different aspects of a decisional process, the positioning of the provision providing for opportunity to contest material noticed between the two
sentences suggests its inapplicability to the process described in the
last sentence.
The distinction which the Model Acts seek to make seems to be the
practical one between, on the one hand, requiring opportunity to
contest agency information which is, or may be, a substantial factor
in the agency's determination and which is sufficiently crystallized
into an identifiable form so that challenge to it is possible; and, on
the other hand, refraining, in the interest of effective administrative
decision-making, from permitting challenges every time an agency
avails itself of information or techniques which are not in themselves
substantial factors in the outcome of the case before it, which would
not be likely to be challenged successfully were challenge allowed,
or which can be better subjected to challenge at another point in
the decisional process. This may be the import of the express provision in the Revised Model Act for opportunity by the parties to contest staff memoranda. 369 Staff positions which are potentially substantial factors in an agency decision would very likely be embodied
in memoranda. Because those memoranda are likely to present staff
367. MODEL AcT § 9(4); REVISED MODEL Acr § 10(4). Both are quoted in note 350
supra.
368. The use of "technical competence" suggests a lesser use of "fact" knowledge
than either of the other two phrases.
369. REVISED MODEL AcT § 10(4). A literal reading of § 10(4) may suggest that
the phrase authorizing the use of "experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge" does not permit agencies to use the "experience, technical competence,
and specialized knowledge" of their staffs except to the extent that written staff communications are routed through the record. This appears to be Professor Davis' reading
of § 10(4). DAVIS § 1.04, at 28 (Supp. 1965). But if most of an agency's "experience,
technical competence, and specialized knowledge" lies in the agency's staff, warrant
may exist for interpreting § 10(4) to permit use of that agency resource without
subjecting every incidence of that use to exposure to adversary challenge or even,
possibly, to exposure on the record. See Bloomenthal, supra note 320, at 618.
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views in their most coherently reasoned form, challenge of those views
will be facilitated. In short, the Model Acts' official notice and evaluation provisions ought to be construed, not in an overly literal way,
but in accordance with their probable purpose. The evaluation provisions, whether or not they call into play a type of "factual" knowledge, ought not to constitute an exception to the general obligation of
the agencies to afford an opportunity to the parties to challenge information obtained from extra-record sources whenever that challenge appears likely to educate the decision-makers and whenever
affording that challenge will not impede reasonably efficient decision3 70

making.

(d) Effect of the Official Notice Provisionon Agency-Staff Relations.
-The official notice provisions in the Model Acts are intended to cover
not only material noticed by the agency head or other adjudicating
officer on his own initiative or at the suggestion of a party, but also
material supplied to them by staff members. As discussed in the
preceding paragraphs, the acts are designed to ensure that the official
notice device is not used by staff members to circumvent adversary
challenge of material brought to the attention of the agency head or
adjudicating officer when adversary challenge would be appropriate.
A proper interpretation of these provisions, however, suggests that
some types of staff advice should not be subject to an opportunity
to contest, while other types of staff help and advice should be subjected to challenge but not necessarily at the time that it is first given
or in the form in which it is first given. Still other types of staff advice
should be subjected to immediate adversary challenge. The substance
of staff memoranda which deal with the merits of a particular case and
which have been prepared in advance of hearing should normally be
subjected to adversary challenge; staff members should not be allowed to conceal policy positions which they have formulated until
after the conclusion of the hearing and then raise them for the first
time ex parte to the decision-maker.37' On the other hand, "nonadvocating" staff members should be allowed to render appropriate
forms of advice, especially technical advice, after the conclusion of
the hearing without necessarily creating a need for a new hearing.372
The Revised Act does make allowance for the submission of
memoranda of advice to the decision-maker by "personal assistants,"
and, by implication, such memoranda are not required to be subject
370. See text accompanying note 371 infra.
371. See text accompanying note 414 infra. Cf. Selected Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 410
(1963).
372. See text accompanying notes 331-33 supra.
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to challenge by the parties.3 73 It thus imposes a form of separation of
functions on the agency staff by prohibiting staff other than "personal
assistants" from submitting memoranda to the decision-maker without
routing them through the record. The act seems to be drawn on the
assumption that the major arguments which ought to be adjudicated
at an administrative hearing would be formulated by "regular" staff
members (as distinct from the "personal assistants" staff) and that
an evaluation of arguments and analyses formulated by regular staff
members and subjected to adversary challenge would be performed
by agency members with the help of their "personal assistants." This
procedure would partially obviate any real or imagined problem of
staff members withholding arguments in the administrative hearing to
await ex parte presentation after the hearing terminates, since all
37 4
memoranda from the "regular" staff are required to be in the record.
Its major defect, however, is the unnecessary isolation of the decisionmaker from impartial technical advice of agency-employed experts.
The extent to which that objection is real depends upon whether
section 13 is interpreted to permit the presentation of that type of
advice to the agency or other decision-maker despite the prohibition
phrased in terms of "fact" questions.3 7 5 It also depends upon whether
permission to use that kind of advice may be implied from the
express permission to use "experience, technical competence and
specialized knowledge" in the evaluation of evidence. 3 6
7. Reflections on Some Aspects of Internal Separation of Functions
and Communications Within the Agency Structure About Issues in
Pending Cases.-7
(a) Investigations.-The primary basis378 for the federal act's
imposition of a separation-of-functions structure 379 on federal agencies
is the supposed incompatibility of "investigative and prosecuting"
functions with a "judging" function. 380 But an "investigative" function
is an ambiguous description. Professor Davis has suggested that some
types of investigation are not incompatible with impartiality. 381 Thus,
373. REVISED MODEL ACT § 13(2).
374. REVISED MODEL ACT § 9 (e) (7).

375. See text accompanying notes 335-38 supra.
376. See text accompanying notes 365-70 supra.
377. The material in the present section, text accompanying notes 377-416 infra,
is a highly tentative expression of my present views for whatever light it may shed
on statements that I have made elsewhere in the report.
378. Efficient allocation of agency manpower would itself impose a form of separation-of-functions upon many federal agencies. 'See text accompanying notes 283-84
supra.
379. See APA § 5(c). Cf. APA §§ 7-8.
380. See FINAL REPORT 56.
381. DAVIs § 13.07, at 217.
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to delegate to an officer the task of ascertaining or developing all the
relevant facts connected with an issue is to delegate to him an "investigative" task; if he is conscientious, however, he will not necessarily
be predisposed to decide an issue adversely to a private party. As a
result of his investigation, he may have a view as to the merits of
the question which he was investigating. It is possible, therefore, that
an independent "investigation" may be compatible with original
impartiality and also compatible with a view of the merits obtainable
only as a result of impartial evaluation of the information and factors
uncovered. As a sole method for arriving at a decision, it may be
objectionable to the extent that the check of adversary challenge is
absent, and to that extent ex parte investigation may involve a greater
3 2
chance of error than a procedure involving an adversary process. 8
If a hearing is held after an ex parte factual investigation, the
original investigator theoretically could be open-minded about new
evidence and issues which were developed at the hearing. But he
probably would not be open-minded about those.points of evidence
and other factors which would be developed at the hearing which
he had uncovered in his prior investigation and had previously considered and evalutaed.- To the extent that we are prepared, therefore, to insist that a decision be made on the record at a hearing,
an investigator who has previously developed the facts on his own
is not likely to be an impartial adjudicator. 38 Because he is likley
to have made up his mind about the issues which are to be litigated
at the hearing, he will tend to read into his evaluation of the
evidence of record the conclusions and the information which he has
previously uncovered on his own. But if we were to view the
hearing, not as the sole basis for decision, but merely as a component of a total decisional process in which an opportunity is offered
to rebut or explain evidence or information impartially uncovered by
an investigator, then we would not necessarily say that a decision by
an investigator-adjudicator lacked impartiality. This latter procedure
might be considered objectionable, however, because not everything
that was uncovered in the original investigation would have been
subject to challenge in the hearing; therefore, some information may
have been used in the decision which was not fully trustworthy.
Accordingly, a procedure which combines investigation with a hearing
in the manner described above may be objectionable to the extent
382. That is, if the conclusions of the investigator would be corrected by subjecting
them to challenge, then the absence of that challenge would permit defective conclusions to be retained.
383. FiNAL REPORT 56.
384. That is, his "partiality" will be determined by what he has learned from his
investigation which has not been refuted at the hearing.
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that information obtained in the investigation which is not exposed
to challenge in the hearing is the type of information which could
best be evaluated with the check of a hearing. To that extent
the investigative process should be separated from the decisional
process in such a way that the decision-maker learns about the
information uncovered in an investigation by means of a hearing
where it is exposed to challenge. Our society generally has taken
the view that a hearing as a sole basis for decision is the best way
of deciding issues that turn on the credibility of witnesses testifying
as to the truth or falsity of the occurrence of physical events. 3a
For other types of issues, however, a hearing as the sole basis for
decision may not constitute the best means of decision, and in these
instances less need may exist to separate the investigative from the
decisional function. Indeed, for some issues, a combination of an investigation and a hearing may constitute the best type of decisionmaking process. This is generally conceded to be the case in various
types of rule making 6 and in connection with "law" issues even in
adjudications. 38 7 On some "mixed" questions of fact and law, policy
questions, and evaluations of evidence and other data, an ex parte
investigation or analysis combined with a check by hearing on the
results of such investigations or analysis 38 may be the most appropriate procedure. A hearing should, of course, resolve the "adjudicative
facts" which may be in dispute.8 9 Again, an adjudicative hearing
which is followed 390 by an ex parte process in which the decisionmaker and his staff develop and analyze the issues may be objectionable because the post-hearing development raised and determined
critical factors, concerning which the parties would have had much
to contribute. The type of issues developed apart from the hearing
process and the likelihood that the parties could contribute to their
resolution probably should determine the propriety of reopening a
hearing when subsequent extra-record development of new issues has
1
occurred.

39

The extent to which an investigative process should be separated
385. Cf. DAvis § 7.05.

386. See, e.g., APA § 4.
387. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL AcT § 13, and Comment thereto, HANDDOOX Or TIM
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
388. Cf. text accompanying note 84 supra.

219 (1961).

389. DAvis § 13.07, at 217.
390. The development and analyses of issues by staff members ought, as far as
possible, to be done prior to the hearing, so that that development and those analyses
could be exposed to challenge by the parties.

391. Compare DAvis § 15.10, at 403 recommending reopening a hearing for crossexamination and rebuttal evidence when "critical" disputed adjudicative facts have
been uncovered by the decision-maker subsequent to the hearing.
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from a decisional process by a hearing to examine the results of an
investigation would also depend upon the ability of the hearing
process to convey the information which was uncovered by the
investigation. Thus, for example, a decision-maker less competent
than his investigators in technical matters would not be capable of
understanding the issues in a proceeding from a hearing. He would
probably need either extensive study on his own or the assistance of
technical experts. Whether it would be feasible in a rate proceeding,
for example, to have different technical experts advise such a decisionmaker about issues developed at the hearing from those experts who
prepared the pre-hearing administrative position might depend upon
the number of experts required and the total amount of their time
which would be consumed in the pre- and post-hearing phases of the
rate proceeding. 39 It might also depend in part upon the consistency
of approach and viewpoint of pre- and post-hearing advisers. 93 Finally,
the degree to which an adjudication is an integral part of a continuing
control exercised by an administrative body (consider, for example,
rate-making) as opposed to the degree to which an adjudication may
be a relatively unusual intervention by an administrative body to
punish deviations from expected patterns of behavior (consider, for
example, professional license revocation) may also influence the
degree to which the investigational stage of an agency proceeding
should be separated from a decisional phase. 39 If the information uncovered in an investigation is needed to evaluate correctly the evidence and issues developed at a hearing-especially where the
investigational results could not profitably be challenged-the most
practical arrangement may be for the hearing to be conducted and
the decision to be made by the original investigator. If, however,
the information uncovered in the investigation can be effectively
communicated to the decision-maker by the investigators in a hearing
procedure, then no substantial loss in the information available to
the decision-maker may result from his insulation from the investigator. In fact, the insulation might possibly be an improvement
because information which is conveyed to the decision-maker through
the hearing process is necessarily exposed to challenge by the parties.
If the information is of a type which could not profitably be challenged, however, running it through the hearing may merely be wasteful. For example, general principles of rate-making and the results
of general studies normally could not be challenged in a hearing
392. Cf. FniNA REPORT 57.
393. Cf. FJNA.

REPORT 58; Report by the Advisory Panel on Labor-Management

Relations Law to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, S. Doc. No. 81,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1960).
394. 1 BENjAmN REPORT 67-68.
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with any chance of success. There may, however, be some benefit
in exposing parties to those general principles, values, or conclusions
which are important in an agency determination and of which the
parties may be unaware. Thus, the parties' attention may be focused
on those matters with the result that, although they cannot challenge

the general principles or values or conclusions involved, they will be
better prepared to challenge the particular application of those matters
to themselves. 395
Finally, note that an agency may have a planning function and a
duty to develop policies and principles. And in some cases it may
be difficult to distinguish between policies and principles which are
developed prior to a particular adjudicative proceeding and those

that are developed in connection with the adjudication itself. If it
is appropriate for an agency head and members of his staff to develop

policies and principles, apart from adjudications, through close consultation with each other, why is it not appropriate for the agency
head and members of his staff to act in the same manner in conjunc-

tion with an adjudication?

96

A fair answer would seem to suggest that

it is altogether appropriate for those policies and principles to be
developed in close agency head-staff consultation in conjunction with
a pending adjudication, except to the extent that the particular staff

members with whom the agency head consults have had their viewpoints distorted by an adversary mentality engendered by the role
that they see themselves playing in a pending hearing. 397 Just as in
formalized rule-making, however, the results of the agency head-staff

conclusions should normally be presented to the parties concerned
so that those results can be challenged or criticized or so that differen-

tiations can be pointed out.398 If the agency head and his staff can

395. Cf. Southern Ry. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933).
396. Most people would agree that an agency head should be able to properly
work out principles and policies with his staff in connection with deciding an adjudication. Cf. note 377 supra. Difficulties arise when the new policies are worked
out with staff members who are thought to be "advocates." See, e.g., DAvIs § 13.05, at
201-02, commenting on Jaffe, The Report of the Attorney General's Commfttee on
Administrative Procedure, 8 U. Cm. L. REv. 401, 420-21 (1941). Moreover, even
when the staff members involved are not "advocates," it may be desirable, as is suggested in text, for important approaches to be subjected to criticism by the parties when
the parties would be likely to have meaningful criticism to offer; and an important
indication of when the parties may have something meaningful to offer to an approach or a policy may be the degree to which the approach or policy has a
particularized application to those parties.
- 397. FiNAL REPORT 56: "A man who has buried himself in one side of an issue is
disabled from bringing to its decision that dispassionate judgment which AngloAmerican tradition demands of officials who decide questions." A staff member who
buried himself in "both sides" of a case obviously would not be barred from
participating in decision-making on the grounds contained in the quoted sentence.
398. See, e.g., APA § 4.
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maintain a non-adversary mentality, the results of such a process
should be both correct and fair.
(b) Problems Posed by an Adversary Mentality.-Note that when
the views of staff members have crystallized in memoranda, 399 although
those staff members were originally impartial, their analyses may have
led them to conclusions which they view as correct and which they
desire to see implemented. In such instances, those staff members
cannot be expected to approach a subsequent hearing on those issues
impartially; they might approach the general subject of regulation
impartially in the sense that they are not precommitted on issues
except as their own analyses may have suggested a proper resolution
of them.400 In theory, staff members could be impartial with
respect to the whole decisional process, including their own original
investigation and analyses as well as the hearing in which those
investigations and analyses were challenged. An open-minded staff
member could approach a hearing with the intent to learn from the
hearing and to make corrections or modifications of his prior conclusions in light of the material brought out rather than to support his
own prior conclusions at all costs.
The very process of reducing conclusions previously arrived at to
writing, however, may have a tendency to produce a commitment to
a defense of those conclusions-a commitment which would interfere
with the desire to achieve an impartial determination. To the extent
that such a tendency exists, a staff analyst who has undertaken an
investigation or analysis becomes something of a partisan. While
there is merit in the suggestion of the Administrative Conference 401
to bring members of an agency's staff into rate proceedings at an
early date so that staff thinking will be exposed to challenge by the
parties, the countervailing factor exists of creating an adversary mentality in those staff members which will make them less amenable to
persuasion by arguments and analyses developed at the hearing. Moreover, forcing a crystallization of a "staff position" early in the
proceeding may have a tendency to mold the staff's thinking beyond
its clear conviction. Again, making "the staff" a party seems to force
the staff members involved into an adversary role where they will
take advocates' positions rather than positions of complete impartial399. Cf.REViSEDMODEL ACT §§ 9(e)(7), 10(4).
400. See text accompanying note 371-75 supra. This is a difficulty with Professor
Davis' statement that "the identifying badge" of an advocate "is the will to win."
DAvis § 13.07, at 218. To be used properly as an "identifying badge" the will to
win must be in relation to an issue which can properly be decided only from an
adversary procedure. But then the analysis becomes circular.
401. Recommendation No. 19, ff 2 of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, in Fuchs, The Administrative Conference of the United States, 15 An. L. REv.
6, 34-35 (1963).
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ity, grounded on the overall responsibility of the agency to both the
public and the subject of regulation.40 2 Staff members can be used
in the preparation of an adversary position which is publicly presented
to the agency, or they can be used to insure full development of the
issues. While the latter activity may not necessarily be inconsistent
with participation in the decisional process, 40 3 it would probably be
unwise for staff members engaged in the former activity to participate
in making the final decision.
In summary, it seems that especially in technical proceedings the
agency head should not be prevented from using staff assistance in
analyzing and evaluating the record, 40 4 but to the extent possible, the
major conclusions which staff members have developed for application
in the proceeding should be exposed to challenge by the parties. A
desirable objective would be to discourage the development of an
adversary mentality on the part of those staff members who participate
in rendering a decision. When one or more members of the staff have
developed such a mentality, the agency head should, to the extent
possible, avoid ex parte consultation with them on issues involved
in the adjudication; if such discussion is necessary, he should be
aware of, and attempt to discount, the distorting effect of an adversary
45
mentality on their judgment.
The provisions of the Revised Model Act requiring exposure of staff
memoranda to the parties4 6 would, for the most part, constitute desirable features if they were limited to staff memoranda prepared
prior to a hearing for the purpose of advising the decision-maker on
the resolution of the merits of that case. Memoranda dealing with
strategy and perhaps memoranda concerned with policy in other cases
should not be subject to mandatory disclosure requirements. Moreover, statutory disclosure requirements could avoid many perplexing
problems of application as well as a hostile agency reception by requiring disclosure of the principal recommendations contained in
the staff memoranda, together with supporting reasons and analyses,
rather than the actual staff memoranda themselves. Such a provision
would avoid the forced disclosure of strategy recommendations which
were embodied in a memorandum containing recommendations for
decisions on substantive issues. The Revised Model Act's insulation
of the decision-maker from "every person or party" in connection with
402. Cf. Selected Reports of the Administrative Conference of the United States,
S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 409-10 (1963).
403. Ibid.
404. See text accompanying notes 331-47 supra. Cf. text accompanying note 05
supra.
405. Cf. text accompanying notes 401-03 supra.
406. REVSED MODEL Acr §§ 9(e)(7), 10(4).
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the discussion of factual issues 407 seems unwarranted, especially in
technical proceedings. In technical proceedings, the decision-maker
would need the assistance of experts,408 and the basic dangers resulting from the use of that assistance would seem to be (1) the possible
insulation from challenge by the affected parties of the advice given
by such experts and (2) the danger that such advice was colored
by an adversary bias. The first point is ameliorated to some extent by
the provision that all staff memoranda be included in the record and be
subject to challenge by the parties; the second point could be met
in part by discouraging an adversary mentality in the staff members.
Further attempts to meet these dangers could consist in attempts by
the agency to bring to the attention of the parties to an adjudication
the substance of and basis for staff advice which might be determinative of the outcome of the proceeding, and in a wariness of accepting
advice from staff members who may, as a result of their activities in
conjunction with a pending adjudication, have developed adversary
biases.
8. Recommendations.-The provisions of the Revised Model Act
should not be applied to any technical-type agency proceedings involving rates, carrier licenses, and the like unless, as a result of the
experienced judgment of the agency concerned, those provisions could
be adopted without substantially and adversely affecting its work.
Even were such a judgment to be made, a period of experimentation
should precede statutory enactment of those provisions. I would generally favor disclosure to parties who stand to be adversely affected by
them of substance of staff memoranda prepared prior to an adjudicatory hearing, provided that the memoranda pertain to issues in that
hearing, that they have been or will be submitted to the final decisionmaker in that adjudication, and that the parties appear capable of
making meaningful criticisms or suggestions about the substance of the
memoranda. 4 9 A blanket requirement of disclosure to the parties
of all agency staff memoranda, however, as is provided by the Revised
Model Act,410 presents the danger that memoranda involving strategy
or evidence questions will be subject to disclosure, 41' when actually
only memoranda bearing upon the substantive issues in dispute (such
as economic surveys and analyses) ought to be subjected to adversary
scrutiny.412 Finally, post-hearing staff memoranda evaluating and
407. REVISED MODFL AcT § 13.
408. See text accompanying notes 331-47 supra.
409. Cf. text accompanying notes 223-26 supra.
410. REvisED MoDEL ACT §§ 9(e) (7), 10(4).
411. Compare Freedom of Information Act §§ 3(e) (5),(7), 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
412. Even economic surveys and analyses which have application to cases 'other
than the one in which discovery is sought have a claim to secrecy. See, e.g., Sperry
& Hutchinson Co., FTC Okt. No. 8671, April 15, 1966.
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analyzing evidence and arguments made at an adversary hearing
should not be subjected to exposure to the parties. 1 3 Only if new
and important arguments or approaches are developed after the hearing should. post-hearing staff analyses be exposed to the parties for
criticism and challenge. 414 I would favor insulation of prosecutors and
investigators from decision-makers in "accusatory" type 15 proceedings
involving alleged violation of statutes or agency rules, but I would
not impose such insulation upon initial license denials involving drug
or product certification 16 or in other proceedings where compliance
involves technical or scientific analyses of a product.
E. Decision-Maker'sFamiliaritywith the Evidence and Issues.-One
of the supposed dangers of so-called "institutional decisions" is that
no one person or sub-group within the agency structure may feel a
responsibility for rendering the final agency decision; consequently,
the final decision may not be the considered opinion of any particular
individual in the agency structure. 417 On the other hand, decisionmaking may be thought to be so dispersed that no one decisionmaker would have a grasp of all factors relevant to the final decision
issued in the agency's name. These situations would be aggravated
whenever the persons who in effect decide cases or whose opinions
influence the decisions of cases have not read the appropriate parts
or are not adequately familiar with the arguments of
of the records
418
the parties.
The federal act-attempts to deal with this problem in connection
with adjudications and with "rule-making" procedures which are "required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an
agency hearing." In effect the act commands familiarity with the
record by providing in section 7 that "no sanction shall be imposed
413. Cf. Dakin, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Critique
and Commentanj, 25 LA. L. REv. 799, 808-09 (1965).
414. See text accompanying notes 390-91 supra.
415. See text accompanying note 341 supra.
416. Cf. text accompanying notes 621-56 infra.
417. Another objection often raised against so-called institutional methods of decision-making is the inability to present arguments, on a face-to-face basis, to the
person or persons whose determinations may be decisive in the ultimate administrative
decision.
418. Certainly, the determination of issues in an adjudication ought to be made by
persons who are familiar with the arguments of the parties. Whether the agency
head or other official who makes the final decision ought to be required himself to
read the cited portions of the record instead of relying on summaries prepared by
subordinates or using his own judgment as to how much of the record must be read
for an informed decision ought to depend, in large measure, upon the type of issues
involved, the relevance of record material to the proper decision of those issues,
whether a prior decision or recommendation has been made, whether the final decision
is being made with or without arguments on an earlier decision, whether the final
decision is favorable or unfavorable to the private parties involved, and whether the
final decision mitigates the decision of a subordinate. See also note 433 infra.
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or rule or order issued except upon consideration of the whole record
or such portions thereof as may be cited by any party." The ambiguity
of this command has previously been referred to.419 Section 8 attempts
to facilitate the final decision-maker's familiarity with the principal
issues in dispute by narrowing those issues through a two-tier system
of decision-making. 420 Similarly, both Model Acts have utilized a
two-tier system for decision-making in contested cases whenever a
majority of the officials of the agency who are to render the final
decision have not heard or read the evidence.4 1 In such a case, the
original Model Act providesm that a decision adverse to a party
cannot be rendered until a "proposal for decision, including findings
of fact and conclusions of law," is served on the parties and an
opportunity is given to each party adversely affected to file exceptions
and present arguments to a "majority of the officials who are to
render the decision, who shall personally consider the whole record
or such portions thereof as may be cited by the parties." 423 It appears
that the comma in the last quotation indicates that the adjective
clause requiring consideration of the record modifies "majority" rather
than "officials." The Model Act further requires that every decision
in a contested case adverse to a party be in writing and "accompanied
by findings of fact and conclusions of law" and that findings of fact
"consist of a concise statement of the conclusions upon each contested
issue of fact." The Model Act is less strict than the federal act by its
failure to require that the "proposal for decision" be prepared by a
person who is familiar with the record, 42 and by its failure to require
419. The implication of language would be that the "consideration" is to be performed by the person imposing the sanction or issuing the rule or order. Compare
APA § 4(b); "after consideration of all relevant matter presented, the agency shall ...."
The § 8(c) language quoted in text is incorporated in ORE. REv. STAT. § 183.450(1)
(1965) and HAwAu REv. LAws § 6C-10(a) (Supp. 1965).
420. In rule-making or initial license proceedings where the agency makes the
initial decision without having presided at the reception of evidence, a recommended
decision by an independent hearing officer who has presided at the reception of evidence may be replaced either by a tentative decision issued by the agency or a
recommended decision by any of the agency's "responsible officers." In such proceedings, the recommended or tentative decision may be omitted if "the agency finds
upon the record that due and timely execution of its functions imperatively and unavoidably so requires." APA § 8(a).
421. MODEL AcT § 10; REVISED MODEL ACT § 11. The Revised Model Act refers

to a reading of the "record" rather than to a reading of the "evidence."
422. MODEL ACT § 10.
423. Compare WAsH. REv. CODE: § 34.04.110 (1965) which limits such argument

to written argument unless the agency, in its discretion, permits oral argument. Opportunity for both oral and written argument is specifically required by Wis. STAT. AqN.
§ 227.12 (Supp. 1967).
424. But see note 420 supra for exceptions to the federal act's requirement that the
initial or recommended decision be prepared by a. person who has presided at the
reception of evidence.
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opportunity for the presentation of argument to the person who
is to prepare the proposal for decision.4 25 The Model Act does not
require "reasons"
to be included in either the proposal for
decision or in the final decision; nor does it require that the
person preparing the proposal for decision possess any degree of
independence or be one who has not been engaged in prosecuting
or investigative functions.
Such a requirement, however, while

perhaps desirable in most license revocation proceedings, would not
necessarily be the optimum procedure for proceedings of a less
accusatory nature or for proceedings in which policy issues are the
critical determinants of the ultimate decision.
The Revised Model Act has modified somewhat the provisions of
the original Model Act. The Revised Act requires that an opportu-

nity be afforded to present briefs and oral arguments not merely to
a majority of the officials who are to render the decision, but to
"the officials" 428 who are to render that decision. The Revised Act
requires that the proposal for decision be "prepared by the person
who conducted the hearing or one who has read the record,"4 29 and
it requires that the proposal for decision include "reasons" as well as
findings of fact and conclusions of law. It does not require "reasons"
in the final decision, however.43 ° The Revised Act omits the Model
Act's command that agency officials "personally consider the whole

record or such portions thereof as may be cited by the parties. 43 '

425. APA §8(b).
426. APA § 8(b) provides that all initial, recommended and tentative decisions shall
include a statement of findings and conclusions "as well as the reasons or basis therefor," upon all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.
427. The structure of the federal act is such that in adjudications required by
statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, the
initial or recommended decision would be prepared by an official who was not engaged
in investigative or prosecuting functions in the case in which he made the decision.
That restriction would not apply in rule-making proceedings. See note 420 supra.
428. The Michigan version of the original Model Act sets the proposal-for-decision
mechanism into operation if "the officials" who are to decide have not heard or read
the evidence but provides for argument only to "a majority" of those officials. Mic.
STAT. ANN. § 3.560(21.6) (1961). Cf. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.12 (Supp. 1967). The
phrases are reversed in the Revised Model Act § 11. In accord with the Revised
Model Act's ordering of the phrases is the Oregon statute which predates the Revised
Act. ORE. REv. STAT. § 183.460 (1965).
429. This provision is omitted from the version of the Revised Model Act adopted
in Hawaii. HAWAII REv. LAWS § 6C-11 (Supp. 1965). The older Wisconsin statute
contains such a provision, however. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.12 (1957) with
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.12 (Supp. 1967).
430. Compare APA § 8(b).
431. Accord, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 30A, § 11(7) (1966); MINN. STrAT. ANN.
§ 15.0421 (Supp. 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 227.12 (Supp. 1967). The Hawaii version
of the Revised Model Act contains such a provision however. HAwAI REv. LAWS §
6C-11 (Supp. 1965).
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To the extent that this omission reflects a judgment that enforcing the
Model Act's command by subjecting the agency head to crossexamination on his thought processes-as, incidentally, may be provided for in the Michigan Act 4 32 -that judgment is probably wise.
Decision-making officers ought to recognize their responsibility to be
familiar with the arguments and contentions of the parties affected;
hence, a legal command to perform that responsibility may not be
very useful.433
F. Agency Opinions.-In addition to facilitating judicial review of
administrative action, 43 4 the careful and conscientious preparation of
opinions may assist administrative decision-makers in giving full
consideration to all relevant issues before them and in relating their
decisions to current agency policies and affected social values currently
being. Accordingly, it is desirable-both for the latter reasons and
for review purposes-that agencies not only state so-called findings of
fact and conclusions of law, but also disclose how they reached those
findings and conclusions; 435 in other words, the agencies should demonstrate "rational bases" for their actions. Thus, the Revised Model Act
requires that "findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall
be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying
facts supporting the findings." 436 The federal act goes somewhat
further in this regard, and requires "the reasons or basis" for both findings and conclusions. 437 The Tennessee statute 438 which requires all
"state boards and commissions" to support their rulings by "findings
on all questions of law, fact or mixed questions of law and fact"
seems to require findings both of ultimate facts and of underlying or
432. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 3.560(21.8) (5)

(1961) (depositions addressed to members

of the agency to determine whether they followed the procedures required by law).
433. A provision commanding consideration of the record probably should be merely

precatory, and its focus should be addressed more to familiarity with the arguments
and contentions of the parties rather than to a reading of specific portions of the record.
434. See text accompanying note 490 infra.

435. A requirement of a "rational basis" for administrative action was approved in
Tennessee Cartage Co. v. Pharr, 184 Tenn. 414, 418, 199 S.W.2d 119, 120 (1947),
and in Blue Ridge Transp. Co. v. Pentecost, 208 Tenn. 94, 100-01, 343 S.W.2d 903,

906 (1961).
436.

REVISED MODEL AcT

§ 12. Compare

REVISED MODEL ACT

§ 11.

437. APA § 8(b).
438. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-506 (1955): "All state boards and commissions, upon
written request by any party to the hearing, shall be required to support their rulings
by written opinion or decision adjudicating the issues presented, supported by their
findings on all questions of law, fact or mixed questions of law and fact."
Some other Tennessee statutes make provision for "findings": TENN. CODE ANN,
§ 43-519 (1964) (Plant Pest Act); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-2307 (1964) (Livestock
Sales Law). Cf. the similar requirements for "findings of fact" and "conclusions of
law" in a now repealed provision of the Commercial Feed Law of 1963. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 44-1107 (1964), repealed, TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-1107 (Supp. 1966).
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basic facts supporting the ultimate facts. A liberal construction of that

statute would require agencies to disclose the reasons supporting their
findings or conclusions. In a few cases, however, the Tennessee courts
have not required sufficient disclosures from agencies of the reasons
supporting their decisions.43 9 To the extent that a court would itself
supply the reasons supporting the rationality of agency action, which
439. State ex rel. Morris v. Nashville, 207 Tenn. 672, 343 S.W.2d 847 (1961) (refusing mandamus of city officials on the grounds that in denying a trailer permit they
did not act "arbitrarily, unreasonably or capriciously"):
"[ilf there are reasons under the existing laws whereby they [the city of Nashville, its Superintendent of the Bureau of Building and Inspections and the Chief
Building Inspector of Nashville] could refuse to grant this permit then even though
they gave the wrong reason why they didn't do it, they must still be upheld in their
refusal to grant the permit if there is a lawful regulation on which their refusal could
be based." Id. at 677, 343 S.W.2d at 849.
"We have shown, clearly to our satisfaction, by what has been said heretofore that
there is a very reasonable basis wherein the officers might and should to their satisfaction deny this permit. There being a satisfactory reason, as shown by what we
have pointed out that various courts have held under related situations of why this
permit should not be granted, then the court should not lend its power to compel
these officers to grant these permits. There has been absolutely no showing of any
unreasonable or arbitrary or capricious action on their part in doing so. The fact is
by reading their statements made before the zoning board (their reasons were wrong,
we think) they clearly show that they were not denying these things arbitrarily or
capriciously but out of a feeling somewhere back in their minds that they knew
under the circumstances here this was a violation of some regulation and was wrong
and should not be permitted and they were not going to lend their official act to
permitting such action. Id. at 681-82, 343 S.W.2d at 851. (Emphasis added.)
Compare Louisville & N.R.R. v. Fowler, 197 Tenn. 266, 271 S.W.2d 188 (1954):
"The Commission did not undertake to assign all of its reasons for its action nor
did this Court make any such attempt. . . .It is clear that the Commission's statement
about the matter is correct. Be that as it may, however, the Commission did not
assign this as the sole reason and very clearly indicated that there may be other good
reasons appearing from the record and this Court attempted to point out that the
evidence does show other reasons." Id. at 277-78, 271 S.W.2d at 194.
Cf. Dunlap v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 178 Tenn. 532, 545, 160 S.W.2d 413, 417
(1942), and Tennessee Cartage Co. v. Pharr, 184 Tenn. 414, 421, 199 S.W.2d 119,
122 (1947), where the court "assumed" that the then Railroad and Public Utilities
Commission gave "reasonable consideration" to certain factors required to be considered although, the Commission had not stated that it had so considered them.
In a case involving review of a Public Service Commission action, the Tennessee
Supreme Court has stated that every sworn state officer is presumed to be following
the applicable statutes "regularly and correctly in good faith" and that "such presumption will stand until overcome by satisfactory evidence to the contrary." Blue
Ridge Transp. Co. v. Pentecost, 208 Tenn. 94, 98, 343 S.W.2d 903, 905 (1961).
Some danger exists, however, that in indulging in a presumption of the validity of
administrative action, the court may itself be engaged in trying to find the justification
or rational basis of agency action which the agency itself should have supplied.
Action without justifying reasons will not be less arbitrary, however, if a person other
than the actor supplies reasons that would justify the action only if the actor had
acted on the basis of those reasons. Compare, in this regard, the opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, in FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627
(1944), in which he condemned judicial affirmation of agency rate-setting action on
the basis of its "end result" rather than by reasoned statement of its action from the
agency.
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the agency itself failed to supply, the court would normally be performing an agency function. When the reasons supplied would have
supported, but would not have compelled, agency action, only the
agency should supply them. Thus, some agency action might be
rational, that is, not arbitrary, or within the scope of an agency's
authority, if performed for some reasons; yet it might be irrational,
arbitrary, or without the scope of an agency's authority if it were
performed for other reasons.4" 0
The volume of cases with which any given decision-maker must
deal may affect his ability to prepare extensive discussions of the
reasons for his decision." Moreover, it is possible that a requirement
of extensive written opinions would use time which decision-makers
could employ more profitably in other agency tasks. In such cases, it
seems appropriate to gauge the depth to which a given decision ought
to disclose underlying reasoning by the "obviousness" of the decision
felt by the decision-maker and by the hardship which the affected
private party will feel as a result of that decision. In addition, the
depth of an administrative opinion might properly be affected by the
likelihood of judicial review and the general importance of the
question being decided. Taking account of all of these factors, I would
favor a general statutory directive requiring agencies to disclose
underlying and rational bases for their decisions in adjudications on
the assumption that such a directive would be regarded as a flexible
440. See Frankfurter, dissenting in FP v. Hope Natural Gas Co., supra note 439.
441. Section 12 of the Revised Model Act requires the separate statement of findings
of fact and of conclusions of law, and both that act and the federal act require a
ruling upon each proposed finding submitted to the agency. R Vszr MODEL AcT
§ 12; APA § 8(b). The federal act also requires a ruling upon each proposed conclusion and exception to administrative decisions prior to the final agency decision.
Although the required separate statement and required rulings may be in part designed
to promote thoughtful agency action and to facilitate court review, conscientious agency
determination and exposition cannot be legislated. To the extent that these acts focus
an agency's attention upon responsibility for its action and for a reasoned explanation
of that action without imposing an undue burden upon it they are unobjectionable;
but to the extent that those acts would interfere with efficient administration by any
agency, they ought not to be imposed upon it. The agency head himself, however,
might escape some of that additional burden through a greater use of hearing officers
or through the utilization of "personal assistants." Cf. RLVIsED MODEL ACT § 13(2).
(Attempts to shift substantial amounts of decision-making from the agency head to
hearing officers should be approached with caution, however, since such attempts
might result in decisions which are less considered and fair than under present arrangements, where, for example, the commissioner of agriculture attempts to be involved in all proceedings in which a license revocation will be involved. Interview with
Tennessee Commissioner of Agriculture, June 24, 1964.)
Separate statements of fact and law determinations by agencies, however, might
encourage greater judicial review of those determinations labelled as 'law" conclusions,
and perhaps ultimately would encourage the development of verbally more sophisticated
approaches to allocations of functions between courts and agencies than exist at the
present time.
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standard and that the agencies would feel an obligation to disclose
their bases for decisions in as much depth as would be warranted by
the factors discussed above. I would further provide that a written
opinion could be waived by the parties to an adjudication.
G. Miscellaneous Matters. 1. Notice of Procedural Protections.Besides notifying parties of the commencement of a proceeding and
of the issues in dispute, notice of the commencement of proceedings
may also inform parties of their procedural rights. Imposing such a
function on the notice may serve a useful purpose with respect to
parties who may not be fully conscious of their rights in agency
proceedings. In this connection, for example, Hawaii requires 442 that
the notice of the commencement of proceedings inform the party
upon whom the notice is served of his right to retain counsel. The
Georgia statute" 3 and the recommendations of the Kentucky Legis-

lative Research Commission 4 4 require that the notice inform the
party upon whom it is served of his right to subpoena witness and
documents. The Kentucky recommendations would also require
the notice of proceedings to disclose the existence of "any relevant
or data which is not made confidential or privileged
staff memoranda
5
by statute."

44

2. Right to Counsel.-The federal act confers 446 a right to counsel
upon parties and witnesses appearing before an agency under compulsion. Although a right to counsel is not expressly granted in either
of the Model Acts, a number of the state acts grant some rights to
counsel." 7
3. Subpoenas. (a) In General.-Although it is not uncommon for
Tennessee statutes to vest a subpoena power in agencies, some statutes
do not give private parties the right to use the agency subpoena
power. 448 To the extent that an agency will not use its subpoena
power for the benefit of a private party opposing the agency in an
adjudication, there is an imbalance in the procedural rights of the
parties to the proceeding-an imbalance which might not be con442. I-IwArn REv. LAws § 6C-9(b) (5) (Supp. 1965).

443. GA. CODE A . § 3A-114(a)(2)(E) (Supp. 1966).
444. Ky. REP. No. 12, 68.
445. Ibid.
446. APA § 6(a).
447. E.g., INn. ANat. STAT. § 63-3022 (1961). In Hawaii the notice issued in
connection with the commencement of a contested case must inform the person upon
whom notice is served of his right to retain counsel. HAWIA REv. LAws § 6C-9(b) (5)
(Supp. 1965).
448. See TENN. CODE AN.
(Supp. 1966).

§ 56-1207(d)

(1955); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-5501
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ducive to fair adjudication."9 Although some of the more recent
Tennessee statutes450 which establish procedures for particular proceedings give private parties the benefit, of. the agency subpoena
power, other Tennessee statutes 451 do not. The Model Acts lack
provisions dealing with subpoenas; however, the federal act 4 52 and
many state acts45 3 contain subpoena provisions and confer upon
private parties the right to use the agency's subpoena powers. The
subpoena provisions of the new Oklahoma Act, which provide for
the mandatory issuance of such subpoenas at the request of a private
party4 have been described by Professor Merril 455 as precluding:
the sometimes employed procedure of requiring the applicant for subpoena
to make a showing of relevance.... The possibility of oppressive exercise
of this privilege, not likely to be of frequent occasion in practice, may be
dealt with on the basis of the general grant of power to conduct a hearing,
which means a hearing free from abusive tactics.

Despite the implication read into the Oklahoma statute by Professor
Merrill, however, it might be wise expressly to vest the agency with
the power to control subpoena requests in order to prevent abuse.
(b) Subpoenas Against the Agency.-To the extent that the Revised
449. Bloomenthal, The Revised Model State Administrative Procedure Act-Reform
or RegressionP, 1963 DuKE L.J. 593, at 608-09.
450. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-519, 43-614 (1964).
451. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-1207(d) (1955); TENN. CODE ANNmz.§ 67-5501
(Supp. 1966).
452. APA § 6(c).
453. Although neither of the Model Acts contain subpoena provisions, a substantial
number of state administrative procedure statutes include such provisions. These
statutes usually grant agencies power to subpoena both witnesses and documents and
provide that such power shall be exercisable for the benefit of private parties as well
as for the benefit of the agencies. Such statutes include ALAsKA STAT. § 44.62.430
(1962); Anx. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-707(d), 5-708(b), 5-710 (1962); CAL. GOV'T CODE
§ 11510 (1961); COLO. IEv. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-4(5) (1963); GA. CODE ANN. § 3A114(a) (7), (8) (Supp. 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 63-3007, 63-3021 (1961); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 2401(4), 2406 (1964); MAss. ANN. LAWs ch. 30A, §§ 12(1)-(5)
(1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 536.077 (Supp. 1966); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-914(2)
(Supp. 1965); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 67-26-8 (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 28-32-09,
28-32-10 (1960); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 119.09 (Baldwin 1964); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 75, § 315 (1965); OnE. REv. STAT. § 183.440 (1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.10(d)
(1964); WAsH. REv. CODE § 34.04.09(2) (1964); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-276.25(c),
(d), (e) (Supp. 1965). See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.25(2) (Supp. 1966). See also
text accompanying notes 443-44 supra; N.Y. Crv. PRAc. ACT § 2302 (Supp. 1966).
While most of such statutes provide for enforcement of subpoenas by a court upon
application of the agency, a few such statutes provided that the party for whose
benefit the subpoena was issued may itself seek court enforcement of the subpoena.
GA. CODE ANN. § 3A-114(a)(7) (Supp. 1966); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 12(5)
(1966); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 2406(1) (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-10
(1960).
454. ORLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 315 (1965). See note 453 supra.
455. Merrill, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure Act, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 1,
31 (1964).
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Model Act requires that intra-agency memoranda be made available
for public inspection,456 those memoranda probably would be subject
to the subpoena power. Assuming that the subpoena power would be
available for such purposes, 457 the Kentucky Legislative Research
Commission recommended that notice of "any relevant staff memoranda or data which is not made confidential or privileged by statute"
be contained in the notice of the institution of proceedings. 4 8 The
extent to which a "work product" exemption 4 9 from the subpoena or
other disclosure requirements would be read into versions of the
Revised Model Act which vest subpoena powers in private parties is
not clear. Strategy papers and some types of internal communications
ought to be protected from disclosure, but major investigational reports, economic evaluations, and analyses which have been prepared
for a particular adjudication and which are going to be used in the
decision of that case should be exposed to the scrutiny of the parties
prior to the formal hearing.480
(c) Enforcement of Subpoenas.-Some doubt was expressed 461 at one

time about the enforceability of subpoenas issued by Tennessee
agencies which had been given the power to "compel" 462 the attendance of witnesses, but had not been told by the Tennessee Legislature of the procedures by which that compulsion could be effected. To
the extent that this doubt continues to exist, the legislature obviously
has the power to remove it. It has been suggested 6 3 that the enforcement of a subpoena should require a court proceeding; the federal
and many state acts so provide. I am not prepared to say whether in
any instances enforcement power in the agencies is desirable.
The most effective grant to private parties of the right to subpoena
power would include the right to seek enforcement of a subpoena
order in court and the right to take an interlocutory appeal of an
agency denial of a request for the issuance of a subpoena. Illustrative
of the different approaches taken by the states are the Kentucky
Legislative Research Commission draft statute, which vested private
parties with the power to seek court enforcement of agency subpoena
456. REVISED MODEL AcT § 2(a) (3).
457. Ky. REP. No. 12, 68.

458.
459.
460.
461.

Ibid.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Bloomenthal, supra note 449, at 609.
See text accompanying notes 225-26 supra.
Samuels, Power of Administrative Agencies to Compel Testimony in Tennessee,

16 TENN. L. REv. 928, 931 (1941).

462. According to Samuels, ibid, the Board of Accountancy doubted its power to enforce a subpoena, although it was given the power to "compel" the attendance of
witnesses, a power which it retains under substantially the same statutory language.
TENN. CODE A N,. § 62-138 (Supp. 1966).

463. Bloomenthal, supra note 449, at 609.
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orders, and the new Oklahoma statute which provides that court
enforcement of a subpoena issued for the benefit of a private party
"may" be sought by the agency involved.464 Whether an appeal may
be taken from an Oklahoma agency's refusal to seek court enforcement
of a mandatorily-issued agency subpoena is not clear.
H. Disqualification for Bias.-The federal act contains provisions
dealing with the disqualification of a presiding officer for "personal
bias." 465 It does not, however, provide that the agency itself may be
disqualified for bias; and the so-called "rule of necessity" has been
invoked to help defeat an attempt to disqualify an agency on such
grounds. 466 Neither the Model Act nor the Revised Model Act advert
to the problem of bias. A few of the state statutes contain bias
provisions; 467 for the most part, however, they are poorly drafted and
may lend themselves to constructions under which an agency or
presiding8 officer may be disqualified for innocuous prejudgments of
46
policy.

V. INVESTIGATIONS

Neither of the Model Acts expressly adverts to investigations.

Although some of the legislative history of section 6(b) 469 of the

federal act indicates that that section was "designed to preclude
464. See note 453 supra.
465. The federal act provides: "Any such [presiding] officer may at any time
withdraw if he deems himself disqualified; and, upon the filing in good faith of a
timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualification of any such officer,
the agency shall determine the matter as a part of the record and decision in the
case." APA § 7(a).
The phrase "or disqualification" describing the affidavit to be filed in connection
with a disqualification motion seems to indicate that personal bias is not the sole
ground upon which a presiding officer's removal can be based.
466. The "rule of necessity" would provide that a partial adjudicator could properly
adjudicate when no available substitute exists. Cf. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
147 F.2d 589 (7th Cir. 1945), aff'd, 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
467. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-16-4(3) (1963); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.09 (Supp.
1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 316 (1965). Cf. the following stautes requiring
hearings to be conducted in an "impartial" manner: ALAsx. STAT. § 44.62.630 (1962);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11512; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-1(d) (1966). The Colorado
provision is modeled upon APA § 7(a) and, accordingly, limits disqualification
principally to personal bias. See note 465 supra.
468. The types of policy prejudgment which would be objectionable include those
in which an adjudicator, for reasons which are insufficient, closes his mind to the
potentially persuasive arguments of a private party.
469. Section 6(b) of the federal act provides: "No process, requirements of a
report, inspection, or other investigative act or demand shall be issued, made, or
enforced in any manner or for any purpose except as authorized by law. Every person
compelled to submit data or evidence shall be entitled to retain, or, on payment of
lawfuly prescribed costs, procure a copy or transcript thereof, except that in a nonpublic investigatory proceeding the witness may for good cause be limited to inspection of the official transcript of his testimony."
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'fishing expeditions' and investigations beyond the jurisdiction or
authority of an agency,"470 section 6(b) merely limits agency processes,
report requirements, inspections, and other investigative acts or
demands to those "authorized by law" and provides for the retention
or procurement of copies or transcripts of data and evidence submitted under compulsion in an investigation. A modification of section
6(b) proposed by the American Bar Association 471 would have tightened some of the section's language and would have added a provision
authorizing an injunction to restrain the investigatory power of an
agency which was exercised "clearly beyond the constitutional or
statutory jurisdiction or authority of the agency." The failure of that
Association to propose a more restrictive provision may indicate the
difficulty involved in containing an investigatory power without hindering its proper use. A few statutes472 have attempted to provide some
safeguards for persons who are investigated by agencies. The North
Dakota statute,47 3 for example, requires that before an agency may
make a "decision" (presumably a disposition adversely affecting those
rights or privileges whose administration falls under the North Dakota
licensing act) upon the basis of an investigation of a person, the
agency must specify the issues pertinent to its decision and must afford
a hearing upon those issues. The federal act and both Model Acts
would require the same procedure.
It will be noted that certain types of "investigations" may psychologically disqualify the investigating officers from conducting impartial adjudicatory hearings concerned with the results of those investigations. Consequently, it may be desirable that those investigations which engender a prosecutor mentality in investigators-especially those involving issues of disputed "adjudicative facts"-be conwho
ducted, to the extent possible, by persons other than the officers 474
investigations.
the
upon
based
proceedings
may later adjudicate
470. S.

REP.

No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945),

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIE

ADmINsTRArvE PROCEDuRE AcT 205 (1946).

471. S. 1070, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); S. 1887, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
472. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3005 (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-08
(1960). Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 63-3025 (1961).
473. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-08 (1960):

"Specifications of any issues to be furnished by agency.-Whenever an administrative
agency, pursuant to authority conferred upon it by law, shall institute an investigation
upon its own motion or without the filing of a specified complaint, or shall hold any
hearing or make any independent investigation upon the claim or request of any
person, no decision shall be made by the agency until all parties in interest shall
have been furnished with a written specification of the issues which are to be considered and determined, nor until an opportunity shall have been afforded to such
persons to present evidence and to be heard upon the practices so specified. Provided,
however, that the commissioners of the workmen's compensation bureau may make
awards without the giving of the notice herein provided for."
474. See text accompanying notes 339-408 supra.

1967]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
VI. SETTLEMENTS AND INFORmAL NEGOTIATIONS

Both the federal act and the two Model Acts recognize the advantages of negotiated settlements. 475 Settlement negotiations may appropriately be described in some circumstances as a form of informal
adjudication 7 6 and may sometimes serve as an inexpensive and
efficient means for determining questions arising in connection with
an agency's enforcement of statutes committed to its charge. Although
basic policy determinations may rarely be properly negotiable, the
means of implementing agency policy as applied to particular factual
situations may frequently be subject to negotiation. Furthermore,
negotiation may be the most efficient means of achieving compliance
with an agency's basic policies. While negotiations may also serve
a useful purpose in connection with the disposition of a case whose
outcome would depend upon a determination of "basic facts" or
"adjudicative facts," the question arises as to whether an officer
who has been involved to a substantial degree in negotiations about
such factual issues can, if negotiations reach an impasse, become
an impartial adjudicator of those issues. The agency head whoespecially in the smaller agencies 477 and in connection with important
cases-may find it easy to become involved in both settlement negotiations and adjudication ought to avoid involvement in both types of
activity when that avoidance would be consonant with his responsibility to further the statutory purposes committed to his charge.
VII. LIcENsEs

Both the federal act and the Revised Model Act contain sections
which deal specifically with licenses. 4 8 Both acts contain provisions
which may in effect provide that a license shall not be withdrawn until
the licensee has had a chance to comply with all lawful requirements
for its retention. Such a provision may be useful when the standards
for maintaining a license have changed or when the licensee, through
inadvertence or excusable ignorance, has failed to comply with existing
requirements. However, preventing withdrawal of a license until the
licensee is given a second chance may encourage noncompliance with
the requirements for maintaining the license. The federal act adverts to
this problem and excepts cases of "willfulness." Also, were Tennessee
to enact a statute similar in any respect to the second-chance provisions
of the Revised Act, the statute should probably clarify whether, and
475. APA § 5(b); MODEL AcT § 8; REVISED MODEL ACT § 9(d).
476. 1 BENJAMwN REPoT 56.
477. Compare text accompanying notes 338-41 supra.
478. APA § 9(b); REVISED MODEL AcT § 14.
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the extent to which, the issuance of a license to a competitor of a preexisting licensee constitutes a partial withdrawal of a preexisting
license, which would bring such statutory provisions into play so that
the pre-existing licensee would be given a chance to forestall a second
license by providing himself the service potential of his prospective
competitor. A Tennessee statutory provision embodying the secondchance approach with respect to most 479 public utilities failing to meet
the "reasonable needs" of the public is contained in section 65-417.48o
VIII. JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADnmisvAiW ACrION IN TEwSSEE

A. In General.-Judicialcontrol of administrative action can take
many forms, including actions for declaratory judgments,481 injunction
suits,482 mandamus proceedings, 483 and petitions for writs of cer479. Although TmrN. CoDE ANN. § 65-417 (1955) by its terms is applicable to
every "public utility" and "public utility" is defined to include all "common carriers,"
TsEN. CODE ANN. § 65-40 (1955), § 65-417 has been construed not to apply to motor
carriers because of the inconsistent licensing provisions governing the latter. TennesseeCarolina Transp., Inc. v. Pentecost, 211 Tenn. 72, 362 S.W.2d 461 (1962). The litigation which occurred in the cited case would have been unnecessary if the legislature
had amended TrN. CODE AN-. § 65-417 (1955) at the time it bad enacted TENN.
CODE ANN. § 65-1507 (Supp. 1966); and the occurrence of the litigation indicates
the care which probably ought to be exercised in enacting licensing or other procedural provisions which have a general application.
480. Tm. CODE ANN. § 65-417 (1955).
481. See notes 192, 198 supra.
482. An injunction seems to be available, at least in some instances, to correct administrative action which is so procedurally defective as to be considered "void."
Smoky Mountain Co. v. Lattimore, 119 Tenn. 620, 105 S.W. 1028 (1907). And in
those instances, an administrative proceeding can be attacked collaterally. State Bd, of
Medical Examiners v. Friedman, 150 Tenn. 152, 263 S.W. 75 (1923). Because some
injunctions might involve courts in matters which are intended for the initial determinations of administrative officials, however, an injunction may be unavailable when an
administrator appears to have authority, in the first instance, to develop policy, decide
facts, or even to construe the statute under which the challenged action is made or
may occur. North British & Mercantile Co. v. Craig, 106 Tenn. 621, 638-44, 62 S.W.
155, 159-60 (1901). A fortiori, an injunction may be denied when the administrative
construction of the statute has not yet been made, and it is unclear whether the action
feared by the plaintiff has yet been decided upon by the administrative officials in
whose bands the administration of the statute involved has been placed. Cf. General
Sec. Co. v. Williams, 161 Tenn. 50, 29 S.W.2d 662 (1930) (declaratory judgment
refused). When an administrative body charged with the enforcement of a statute
threatens action against a person, the administrative construction of the statute is at
least at that point partially clarified, but even so, a court may refuse to grant an
injunction when an administrative forum is available in which the issue may be litigated. Cf. Georgia Indus. Realty Co. v. Chattanooga, 163 Tenn. 435, 441, 43 S.W.2d
490, 492 (1931). If the administrative proceeding is presently pending or being tried
before an administrative tribunal, a court would probably be even more reluctant to
grant an injunction. Cf. note 197 supra.
483. State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Friedman, 150 Tenn. 152, 166-67, 263 S.W.
75, 79 (1924) (dictum).
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tiorari. 484 Whether or not certiorari is the most important form of
judicial control over administrative activity, it is one of the most
commonly used forms of judicial review. The most interesting and

obvious judicial developments have occurred on certiorari, and it is,
accordingly, primarily upon certiorari that the discussion of the following pages centers.
Two types of review by certiorari are used by the Tennessee courts:

the so-called "common law" certiorari, 485 which supposedly brings up
for review only that agency action in "excess" of jurisdiction, fraud484. Besides the "common law" and statutory certiorari provisions contained in TENN.
§§ 27-801, 27-802 (1955), § 27-901 provides that: "Anyone who may be
aggrieved by any final order or judgment of any board or commission functioning under
the laws of this state may have said order or judgment reviewed by the courts, where
not otherwise specifically provided, in the manner provided by this chapter."
Chapter 9 of title 27, of which § 27-901 is a part, outlines the procedural steps
involved in obtaining review and provides for the grant of a supersedeas to stay the
action of the board or commission pending review. TENr. CoDE ANN. § 27-906 (1955).
Section 27-911 governs the court hearing on review of the board or commission action,
and provides:
"At the expiration of ninety (90) days from the filing of said transcript, the cause
shall stand for trial, and shall be heard and determined at the earliest practical date,
as one having precedence over other litigation, except suits involving state, county or
municipal revenue. The hearing shall be on the proof introduced before the board or
commission contained in the transcript, and upon such other evidence as either party
may desire to introduce; provided, that all proof shall be taken and filed within
seventy-five (75) days from the date upon which the transcript was filed, and said
period for taking depositions shall not be extended by the court without application
made in writing, under oath, showing good cause for the extension or continuance.
The chancellor shall reduce his findings of fact and conclusions of law to writing and
make them parts of the record. In making such findings of fact the chancellor shall
weigh the evidence and determine the facts by the preponderance of the proof."
The last sentence of § 27-911 was added in 1951. Even without that last sentence,
however, it would appear that the section contemplated de novo court review. Lacey,
Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Tennessee-Scope of Review, 23 TENN.
L. REv. 349, 350 (1954). However, shortly after the adoption of the provisions which
are now in chapter 9 of title 27, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that those provisions
did not abolish the distinction between common law and statutory certiorari, but
specified the procedures for review only. W. J. Savage Co. v. Knoxville, 167 Tenn.
642, 72 S.W.2d 1057 (1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 623 (1934); Anderson v. Memphis,
167 Tenn. 648, 72 S.W.2d 1059 (1934). Although the 1951 amendment to § 27-901
seems to indicate a legislative determination that in some classes of proceedings before
"boards and commissions," the courts should inquire into the judgment of the board
or commission to a greater extent that under the common law writ, the Tennessee
Supreme Court has held that the amendment cannot constitutionally be applied to an
"administrative" or 'legislative" agency decision. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad
& Pub. Util. Comm'n, 195 Tenn. 593, 261 S.W.2d 233 (1953).
485. Strictly speaking "common-law" certiorari does not exist. All certiorari is based
on constitutional or statutory provisions. The so-called common law certiorari authorized
by § 27-801, however, can only with difficulty be applied to a tribunal or board exercising non-judicial functions since it expressly applies only to a tribunal, board or
officer exercising "judicial" functions. "Common-law" certiorari review of nonjudicial
action must be based on the constitution only.
CODE ANN.
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ulent action and "illegal" action; 486 and the so-called "statutory"
certiorari, 487 which brings up the entire agency action for "de novo"
review in court.48 8 Although the latter form is described as a statutory
writ, in the past the courts have found the availability of the "statu48 9
tory" writ to be constitutionally required in some circumstances.
By a similar incongruity of language, the "common law" writ is provided for by statute, and its availability to review most
types of
490
agency action appears to be a constitutional requirement.
B. Constitutional Aspects of Statutory Certiorari Review.-In 1904,
the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled 491 that the provisions of article I,
section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution4 92 required that all "judicial"
or "quasi-judicial" action performed by bodies other than courts must
be subject to de novo review in court.493 The scope of the present

constitutional requirement of trial de novo, however, appears to be
more restricted. 494 The court has indicated that rights which are
subject to legislative modification (as most "rights" are) can be
subjected by the legislature to the regulatory powers of administrative agencies and that these agencies can modify or abolish those
rights in proceedings which are not subject to judicial trial de novo.495
486. E.g., Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n, supra note
484.
487. The writ authorized in TENN. CODE ANN. § 27-802 (1955) is generally referred
to as "statutory' certiorari.
488. E.g., Mayor of Jackson v. Thomas, 44 Tenn. App. 176, 313 S.W.2d 468 (1957).
489. Staples v. Brown, 113 Tenn. 639, 85 S.W. 254 (1904). See text accompanying
notes 491-95 infra.
490. Staples v. Brown, supra note 489; Mayor of Jackson v. Thomas, supra note 488.
See also note 485 supra.
491. Staples v. Brown, supranote 489.
492. "§ 17. Open courts-Redress of injuries-Suits against the State.-That all courts
shall be open; and every man, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered
without sale, denial, or delay. Suits may be brought against the State in such manner
and in such courts as the Legislature may by law direct." TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17.
493. Staples v. Brown, supranote 489 at 643-44, 85 S.W. at 2.55.
494. Compare Lacey, supra note 484, at 358.
4)5. Compare Nashville v. Martin, 156 Tenn. 443, 3 S.W.2d 164 (1928) where
the court ruled that a policeman who was discharged for cause by the Nashville Civil
Service Commission was not entitled to de novo review of the discharge action because
the policeman had suffered no legally cognizable "injury." The court reasoned that
the discharge authority of the Civil Service Commission had been made a part of
the policeman's terms of employment, or in other words, that the non-reviewability
of discharge action by the commission surrounded the bundle of rights that the plaintiff
obtained when he accepted the position of a policeman. Compare McKee v. Board of
Elections, 173 Tenn. 276, 116 S.W.2d 1033 (1938) where the court held that a
Commissioner of Elections who had taken office prior to the enactment of a 1937
statute which vested "final" removal power in the Board of Elections had a "property
right" in his office including, apparently, the type of removal procedure attached to
it at the time he assumed office. The court reasoned that he could not retrospectively
be deprived of de novo review in removal proceedings during that term, but as to those
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It appears, therefore, that when agencies exercise "judicial" functions
over "rights" which are not constitutionally granted their proceedings
can be made subject to de novo court review or to review by the
common law writ only as the legislature chooses.
C. ConstitutionalAspects of Common-Law CertiorariReview.-The
Tennessee courts have held that the separation-of-powers provisions
contained in sections 1 and 2 of article II of the Tennessee Constitution4! would be violated if they became involved, in proceedings
which were 'legislative" or "administrative," to a greater degree than
is entailed in review by common-law certiorari. 497 On that basis
Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad& Public Service Commission,49
decided by the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1953, held that a 1951
statute authorizing review of actions of "boards and commissions" 499
on a "preponderance of the proof"500 standard could not be applied to
review of a Public Service Commission action granting a certificate
of convenience and necessity to a motor truck freight carrier. The
court stated that to construe the statute to allow review of such
action would render it unconstitutional. In 1961 the Tennessee
Supreme Court, after making an unnecessarily broad characterization
persons who succeeded to such office after the 1937 statute took effect, the court indicated that the Board of Elections' removal power would be "final" and not subject
to de novo review. The utilization by the court of the word "injury" in art. 1, § 17,
of the Tennessee Constitution to circumscribe the reviewability of "judicial" type action
would appear to have broad implications. To the extent that the court would be willing
to pursue this pattern of analysis generally, the legislature would be free to prohibit
de novo review of "judicial" agency action affecting any substantive right to the extent
that such right is subject to legislative modification. Compare Boone, An Examination
of the Tennessee Law of Administrative Procedure, 1 VAND. L. Rlv. 339, 371-74
(1948); Lacey, supra note 484, at 358. Lacey's statement that "logically, if the doctrine
of Staples is correct, the legislature could not constitutionally so limit review where the
agency was exercising a judicial function ...." would appear correct only in situations
in which agency action affected substantive rights which were constitutionally guaranteed. Since the number of rights that are not subject to legislative modification are
minimal, the legislature would appear to have wide discretion to limit de novo review
of agency action.
496. "§ 1. Division of powers.-The powers of the Government shall be divided into
three distinct departments: the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial.
"§ 2. Limitation of powers.-No person or persons belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others,
except in the cases herein directed or permitted." TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 2.
497. City of Whitwell v. Fowler, 208 Tenn. 80, 343 S.W.2d 897 (1961); Hoover
Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n, supranote 484.
498. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n, supra note 484.
499. Chapter 9 of title 27 of TENN. CODE ANN. contains provisions dealing with
judicial review of actions of "boards and commissions." See the criticism of the
restricted coverage of that phrase in another context in text accompanying notes
113-14 supra.
500. The statute involved in Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Railroad & Pub. Util.
Comm'n, supra note 484, was the 1951 amendment to the provision which is now TENN.
CODE ANN.§ 27-911 (1955). See note 484 supra.
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of all functions of the Public Service Commission as being "solely administrative or legislative," held unconstitutional 01 a 1953 statute 02
which provided for judicial reversal of Public Service Commission decisions when those decisions were "unsupported by the preponderance
of the proof in view of the entire record before the commission."
Within thirteen months of this invalidation, the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Fentress County Beer Board v. Cravens03 upheld a statute
which made beer-licensing-board decisions (including decisions on
initial licenses) reviewable by statutory certiorari. In Fentress the
board's concessions enabled the court to dispose of the case in a
relatively simple context. The board conceded that the applicant's
character was unobjectionable and that the permit had been denied
solely because the board was "opposed to the sale of beer and would
not issue a permit to anyone."5 4 In the initial review, the chancellor
had found that the application "complied with all the requirements of
the law." The court construed the statute as requiring the issuance 05 of
a beer permit upon compliance with the statutory conditions governing the issuance of permits to sell beer, and accordingly, affirmed the
chancellor's direction to the board to issue the permit. The court did
not discuss the question of whether the issuance of the permit would
offend the statutory conditions,5°6 including non-interference "with
the public health, safety and morals," beyond a cursory mentioning
of the chancellor's finding that the application met "the requirements
of the law." In a more recent decision 07 involving the same provision
for statutory certiorari, the court addressed itself to the satisfaction
of those conditions and ordered the chancellor to determine compli501. City of Whitwell v. Fowler, supra note 497. It would appear that some functions
of the Public Service Commission might appropriately be accorded a broader review
than under the common law writ, such as a license or permit revocation for cause,
and that even under the judicial-nonjudicial labeling approach of the courts, some such
functions might appropriately be deemed to be "judicial."
502. TENN. CODE ANN. § 65-229(d) (1955).

503. 209 Tenn. 679, 356 S.W.2d 260 (1962).
504. 209 Tenn. at 681, 356 S.W.2d at 261.
505. Accord, Ewin v. Richardson, 399 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn. 1966). Compare De Caro
v. City of Collierville, 213 Tenn. 254, 257-58, 373 S.W.2d 466, 468 (1963) where
the Court applied TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-208 (Supp. 1966). See note 507 infra.
506. TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-205 (Supp. 1966).

507. Case v. Carney, 213 Tenn. 597, 376 S.W.2d 492 (1964). The permit in question
in Case v. Carney was regulated by TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-208 (1955 & Supp. 1966)
(governing incorporated cities and towns) rather than by TENr. CODE ANN. § 57-205
(1955 & Supp. 1966) which applied to the county government involved in the Fentress
case. Section 57-208, however, incorporates by reference the statutory standards contained in § 57-205, and further authorizes cities and towns to adopt additional restrictions upon the issuance of beer permits. A Nashville ordinance adopted pursuant to the
permission contained in § 57-208 contained the conditions of non-interference with
"public health, safety and morals" also contained in § 57-205.
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ance with the statutory conditions, including non-interference with
"the public health, safety and morals."
Because both the decisions involving review of Public Service Commission orders and the decisions of beer licensing boards involve the
courts in review of licensing bodies, suggestions have been made that
the court's actions were inconsistent.50 8 Certainly license issuance
activity would not normally be considered "judicial" or "quasi-judicial"
action generally considered prerequisite for court review by statutory certiorari. But the decisions prohibiting review of Public Service
Commission actions appear to be justified on the ground that the
courts are not equipped to examine the types of economically-based
determinations made by the Public Service Commission. The decision
involving the beer boards, although similarly involving a licensing
body, may be reconciled with the decisions reviewing Public Service
Commission licensing determinations on the ground that the beer
board actions do not involve the types of technical factors with which
courts are not equipped to deal and may involve judgments closer to
those based on traditional values with which courts are generally
familiar. Apart from the dislocation that might be engendered, a move
by the supreme court away from rigid adherence to the legislativejudicial or administrative-judicial dichotomy towards a more flexible
approach to court-agency relations based on function and relative
competence would be desirable.
D. Constitutional Requirements for Judicial "Independent Judgment" upon Certain "Legislative" Agency Action.-Shortly after the
Hoover case had apparently narrowed the scope of judicial review constitutionally permitted over the 'legislative" action of an administrative
body, the Tennessee Supreme Court, on rehearing, in Southern Continental Telephone Co. v. Railroad & Public Service Commission,0 9
held that a court, in reviewing a rate order of a public utility challenged as confiscatory, is required by the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution to exercise its "indpendent judgment" as to
the facts upon which the confiscation issue turn. This holding was
reaffirmed in Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Tennessee
Public Service Commission 10 where the court grounded the judicial
duty to exercise independent judgment not only upon the United
States Constitution but also upon article I, section 8 of the Tennessee
508. Sanford, Administrative Law-1962 Tennessee Survey, 16 V~mx. L. Rnv. 623,
624 (1963). See also Stason, Administrative Law-1964 Tennessee Survey, 18 V.ND.
L. REv. 1047, 1050-51 (1965).
509. 199 Tenn. 122, 285 S.W.2d 115 (1955).
510. 202 Tenn. 465, 304 S.W.2d 640 (1957).
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Constitution. 1 ' In requiring an independent judicial judgment on

facts related to a confiscation issue, however, the court in the Southern
Continental case restricted review to the evidence introduced before
the Commission and indicated that a utility attacking the Commission's
rate order would bear the burden of overcoming "a strong presumption" in favor of the Commission's ruling.5 12 In the Southern Bell case,

although the court approved the chancellor's order for additional
evidence to be taken before the Commission, it reiterated, in dictum,
based upon the
that a rate order carried a "presumption of validity"
13
judgment."
"expert
supposedly
Commission's
E. Scope of Review of Agency Factual Determinationsin CommonLaw Certiorari Proceedings.-Inthe 1947 case of Tennessee Cartage
Co. v. Pharr,14 the Tennessee Supreme Court reaffirmed earlier judicial

pronouncements that agency factual determinations would be upheld
if supported by "any material evidence;" and it further equated the
"material evidence" test applied by Tennessee courts to the "sub-

stantial evidence" test applied by the federal courts in reviewing

federal administrative action. 515 The federal decisions 16 which were
cited in the Tennessee Cartage Co. case as illustrative of the "substantial evidence" test were decided prior to the enactment of the
federal Administrative Procedure Act 17 and prior to the amplification

by the United States Supreme Court of that act's requirement for
judicial review upon the "whole record" in Universal Camera Corp. v.

NLRB.

18

Therefore, it appears that the "substantial evidence" test

endorsed in Tennessee Cartage Co. was the pre-Administrative Proce-

dure Act review conducted by the federal courts. Although the review
conducted by the federal courts during the pre-Administrative Proce-

dure Act period was probably not uniform, 519 it appears likely that the
federal test was understood by the Tennessee Cartage Co. court as
511. "§ 8. No man to be disturbed but by law. That no man shall be taken or
imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled,
or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty, or property, but by the
judgment of his peers or the law of the land." TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8.
512. 199 Tenn. at 126, 285 S.W.2d at 117.
513. 202 Tenn. at 486, 304 S.W.2d at 649.
514. 184 Tenn. 414, 199 S.W.2d 119 (1947).
515. 184 Tenn. at 419, 199 S.W.2d at 121.
516. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Railroad Comm'n v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling &
Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939); Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States, 307 U.S.
125 (1939); Washington, Va. & Md. Coach v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1938); Mississippi Valley Barge L. Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282 (1934).
517. 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1964).
518. 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Under the federal act, the Court said, "The substantiality
of the evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its
weight." Id. at 488.
519. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951).
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requiring that an agency's factual determinations be upheld whenever
there existed any evidence to support them, regardless of the kind or
amount of evidence supporting the other side .21 The court of appeals
opinion in Tennessee Central Ry. v. Pharrexpressly stated that it had
examined only evidence in support of the agency determination under
review.521 The Supreme Court suggested this in Tennessee Cartage
Co. and in other opinions.52 Moreover, Tennessee CartageCo. equated
the test applicable in reviewing an agency's factual determinations
to the test used by an appellate court in reviewing both a jury verdict
and factual findings by a trial judge in a non-jury case.52 3 It ap-

pears that an appellate court, in reviewing jury verdicts, would look

only to evidence in support of the jury determination. 524
In addition to the question of whether the reviewing court will look
to only one side of the record in assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence before an agency, there is the further question of how much

evidence, whether viewed in isolation or upon the "whole record," is
sufficient to sustain agency action on court review. The Tennessee
Cartage Co. court furnished some basis for evaluating the scope of
review of an agency's factual determinations by indicating that the
520. Justice Frankfurter felt that the belief was justified that the review requirement
under the Wagner Act had been so interpreted by the United States Supreme Court.
340 U.S. at 477-78.
521. Tennessee Cent. Ry. v. Pharr, 29 Tenn. App. 531, 198 S.W.2d 289 (1946).
522. Thus in Tennessee Cartage Co., in upholding a determination of the Railroad
and Public Utilities Commission because it was supported by "substantial or material
evidence" the court described only the evidence in support of the Commission determinaton although contrary evidence was in the record. Compare Hoover Motor Express
Co. v. Taylor, 185 Tenn. 88, 94-95, 203 S.W.2d 366, 369 (1947).
"We think there is evidence of a material and convincing character to support the
Chancellor's decree [dismissing petition for certiorari from the Railroad and Public
Utilities Commission]....
"It is only fair to say that there is considerable evidence in the transcript which
supports the contention of the protestants that the present service is adequate, competent, and satisfactory.
"... The Chancellor, after giving full consideration to the evidence, said, 'Unquestionably, there is material evidence in the record to support the finding of the Commission.' He cited the case of Dunlap et al. v. Dixie Greyhound Lines . . .holding
that 'the Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commission.' In
following this decision, he was eminently correct."
See Evers v. Hollman, 196 Tenn. 364, 372, 268 S.W.2d 97, 101 (1954): "It [the
Circuit Court under a writ of common law certiorari] may review the evidence solely,
for the purpose, and to the extent, of determining whether any of it that is material
supports the action of the Beer Board." Cf. Gulf, M. & O.R.R. v. Railroad & Pub. Util.
Comm'n, 38 Tenn. App. 212, 219, 271 S.W.2d 23, 26 (1954) stating that a court was
not authorized to effect "a cancellation of the [Railroad and Public Utilities] Commission's order on the ground that, although there was material substantial evidence to
support the Commission's findings, the evidence strongly preponderated against it."
523. 184 Tenn. at 418-19, 199 S.W.2d at 121.
524. Anderson-Gregory Co. v. Lea, 370 S.W.2d, 934, 945 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1963);
Methodist Hosp. v. Ball, 362 S.W.2d 475, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961).
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evidence required was that amount which would support a jury

verdict or a factual finding by a trial judge in a non-jury case. In
this connection the court quoted from an earlier Tennessee Supreme

Court opinion2 5 to the effect that "more than a 'scintilla' [of evidence]

is required." Subsequent decisions have adverted to the "scintilla"
phrase in ruling that the evidence before an agency was sufficient to
support its findings.5 26 The "more-than-a-scintilla" language had been

used earlier to describe the scope of review over administrative findings exercised by the federal courts during the pre-Administrative
Procedure Act period,5 27 a scope of review that, as evidenced in

some federal Supreme Court and lower court decisions, was enlarged

in emphasis by that act52 even when considered apart from the act's
whole-record approach. During the 1950's one commentator upon
Tennessee administrative procedure gave some attention to the qualifying word "any" in the "any material evidence" phrase.52 He felt,
perhaps incorrectly, that the Tennessee Supreme Court was narrowing the scope of review. Certainly, to the extent that the word "any"
is given a literal meaning by the courts, the Tennessee test would not

be a quantum-type test. 530
In summary, it appears that the Tennessee Cartage Co. equation of

the scope of review over agency action used by the Tennessee courts
with that used by the federal courts has not been true since at least
1951 when the review provisions of the federal Administrative Proce525. Brenizer v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 156 Tenn. 479, 484, 3 S.W.2d 1053, 1054,
8 S.W.2d 1099 (1928).
526. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Taylor, supra note 522, at 93-94, 203 S.W.2d at
368 reaffirmed Tennessee Cartage Co. both in its adoption of a "substantial evidence"
test and in its statement that more than a scintilla of evidence was required to sustain
the validity of an agency factual determination. In Blue Ridge Transp. Co. v. Pentecost,
208 Tenn. 94, 99, 343 S.W.2d 903, 906 (1961) the court, in upholding an action of
the Public Service Commission, stated that the evidence before that agency was "far
more than a mere scintilla of evidence."
527. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
528. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supranote 519, at 490.
529. See Seligman, Administrative Law-1959 Tennessee Survey, 12 VAND. L, R v.
1057, 1060 (1959) who contrasts "any material evidence" with "substantial and material
evidence." The inference contained in the Seligman article seems to be that "substantial and material evidence" was the Tennessee Cartage Co. test and that the court
in recent opinions has weakened that test by using the "any material evidence" phrase.
Seligman was also troubled by the court's giving "every reasonable presumption in
favor of the lawfulness" of an order of the Tennessee Public Service Commission in
Blue Ridge Transp. Co. v. Hammer, 203 Tenn. 393, 396, 313 S.W.2d, 431, 433 (1958).
530. Compare Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Taylor, supra note 522, at 92, 203
S.W.2d at 368 where the court stated that the question for decision was whether there
was "in the record that quantum of evidence necessary to base a finding by the Chancellor that there was material or substantial evidence in the cause to warrant the
Commission granting the certificates applied for." See also Putnam County Beer Bd. v.
Speck, 184 Tenn. 616, 621, 201 S.W.2d 991, 993 (1947) (contrasting "no evidence"
with "any material evidence").
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531
dure Act were construed by the United States Supreme Court.
Since the Tennessee courts have continued to cite Tennessee Cartage
Co. without adverting to the effect of the changed scope of federal
review, 532 and since the commentators have failed to point out the
relevancy of the new scope of federal review to a proper understanding
of Tennessee Cartage Co., some confusion about a reviewing court's
function may exist in Tennessee. This confusion concerns the reviewing court's use of a one-sided-record approach and the degree to which
it scrutinizes the evidence supporting agency action. Whether the
scope of review exercised by Tennessee courts over administrative
actions has narrowed since the Tennessee Cartage Co. case, the
broadened scope of federal review may magnify whatever narrowing
may have occurred.
F. Statutory Interpretation as a "Fact" Question.-An agency is
called upon to apply statutory terms to given factual situations. In so
doing, it is giving meaning to statutory terms which previously may
have been vague or ambiguous; consequently, the agency is in effect
5 33
"interpreting" the statute in its application to the problem at hand.
This action has at times been described as a decision of a question of
fact to which the any-material-evidence rule applies.5 34 Utilization
of the question-of-fact terminology would appear to be a shorthand
method of saying -that the decision concerning the application of a
broad statutory term to a given factual situation properly belongs to
the agency rather than to the courts. 535 To the extent that a broad
application is not thereby imparted to the statutory term, the questionof-fact terminology suggests that the decision is of major significance
only to the immediate parties, and that in the colloquial sense no
"legal rule" applicable to third persons has emerged from the decision.
A number of Tennessee cases have properly allocated policy decisionmaking in routine cases to the agencies concerned through the use of
"fact" terminology. 536 It may be relevant to point out, however, that a

531. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, supranote 519.
532. In none of the following cases which reviewed agency action and which have
cited Tennessee Cartage Co. has the changed scope of federal review been adverted to:
Blue Ridge Transp. Co. v. Pentecost, supra note 526; Continental Tenn. Lines, Inc. v.
Fowler, 199 Tenn. 365, 287 S.W.2d 22 (1956); Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Taylor,
supra note 522; Roberts v. Brown, 43 Tenn. App. 567, 310 S.W.2d 197 (1957); Gulf,
M. & O.R.R. v. Railroad & Pub. Util. Comm'n, supra note 522.
533. Cf. Sanders, Administrative Law-1955 Tennessee Survey, 8 Vm. L. REv. 940,
948-49 (1955).
534. See note 536 infra.
535. Cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1951); Unemployment Compensation Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946); NLRB v.
Hearst Publications, Inc., supranote 516, at 130-31.
536. Miller v. Wiley, 190 Tenn. 498, 230 S.W.2d 979 (1950); Ezell v. Hake, 184
Tenn. 319, 198 S.W.2d 809 (1947); Reese v. Hake, 184 Tenn. 423, 199 S.W.2d 569
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limited review is more appropriate in connection with those agencies
in which policy development occurs in non-accusatory contexts.
IX. SELEcrE TENNEssEE AGENCMES

A. The Regulatory Boards.-The several regulatory boards" 7 which
exercise general supervision over certain trades and professions and
which possess powers over licensing,' license revocation, and license

suspension are governed by diverse procedures. That diversity may
be intentional, but in some instances it appears not to be planned.
Some of these statutes contemplate license revocation or suspension

hearings on complaints made to a board by private parties,5 35 while
(1947). But see Adams v. American Lava Corp., 188 Tenn. 69, 216 S.W.2d 728
(1948); Clinton v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 476, 206 S.W.2d 889 (1947). Cf. Milne Chair
Co. v. Hake, 190 Tenn. 395, 230 S.W.2d 393 (1950). In the Clinton and Adams
cases the question of whether the then unemployment compensation statute specifically
provided for coverage of strikers (after a four-week waiting period) was presented to
the Tennessee Supreme Court. Although those decisions did decide the broad question
as to whether the statute specifically included strikers in its coverage, the court evaded
some of its responsibility for deciding a major policy question by holding that the
Board of Review for unemployment compensation cases could decide each case on
its "facts" as to whether the strikers involved were or were not available for work
and hence whether they were or were not eligible for compensation. Cf. Sanders, supra
note 533, at 950, commenting on Louisville & N.R.R. v. Fowler, 197 Tenn. 266, 271
S.W.2d 188 (1954).
537. The regulatory boards here considered are the state board of accountancy,
TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 62, ch. 1; the state board of examiners for architects and engi-

neers, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 62, ch. 2; the board of barber examiners, TENrN. CODE ANN.
tit. 62, ch. 3; the state board of cosmetology, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 62, ch. 4; the
board of funeral directors and embalmers of Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 62, ch.
5; the state board for licensing general contractors, TENN. CODE ANN. fit. 62, ch. 6;
the Tennessee real estate commission, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 62, cl. 13; the state
board of examiners for registered professional sanitarians, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 62,
ch. 17; the state licensing board for the healing arts, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 63, clh. 1;
the board of registration in chiropody, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 63, cb. 3; the state
board of chiropractic examiners, TEN. CODE ANN. tit. 63, ch. 4; the state board of
dental examiners, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 63, ch. 5; the state board of medical examiners,
TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 63, ch. 6; the Tennessee board of nursing, TEN. CODE ANN. fit.
63, ch. 7; the state board of optometry, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 63, ch. 8; the state
board of osteopathic examination and registration, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 63, ch. 9; the
state board of pharmacy, TEN. CODE: ANN. tit. 63, ch. 10; the state board of examiners
in psychology, TENN. CODE ANNs. tit. 63, cl. 11; the state board of veterinary medical
examiners, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 63, ch. 12; the Tennessee board of dispensing
opticians, TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 63, cli. 14.
538. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-215 (1955) (state board of examiners for architects
and engineers), 62-618 (1955) (state board for licensing general contractors), 62-1324
(1955) (real estate commission), 63-417 (1955) (state board of chiropractic examiners), 63-724 (1955) (Tennessee board of nursing), 63-1020 (Supp. 1966) (state
board of pharmacy), 63-1220 (Supp. 1966) (state board of veterinary medical examiners). TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1705 (Supp. 1966) contemplates a complaint by the
state board of examiners for registered sanitarians upon a sworn accusation of a
private party.
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others contemplate hearings only when the board itself is the complainant 39 (although the board may be prompted to act at the
request of a private party). Some of the statutes which contemplate
proceedings upon private party complaints have embodied procedures designed to safeguard the rights of the accused. Thus, provisions
are made in some statutes for sworn complaints,54 for action on a
complaint within three months,54' and for the suppression
of a com5
plaint without a hearing if the board finds it frivolous. 4
Notice provisions, as might be expected, vary a great deal with
various boards, 543 but no great harm would seem to result from this
diversity. Additional examples of diversity can be illustrated through
other statutory provisions. For example, some statutes require that
witnesses at a hearing be swom, 54 and others do not. Some of the
statutes 545 give private parties the right to appear by counsel in
539. TE'N. CODE ANN. §§ 62-323 (1955) (board of barber examiners), 62-429
(1955) (board of cosmetology), 62-525 (1955) (board of funeral directors and
embalmers), 63-124 (1955) (state licensing board for the healing arts), 63-323 (1955)
(board of registration in chiropody), 63-555 (Supp. 1966) (state board of dental
examiners), 63-620 (state board of medical examiners), 63-1119 (Supp. 1966)
(state board of examiners in psychology), 63-823 (1955) (Tennessee board of optometry), 63-912 (Supp. 1966) (state board of osteopathic examination), 63-1410
(Supp. 1966) (Tennessee board of dispensing opticians). The statutory provisions
which pertain to accountants seem to contemplate complaints to the administrative
committee of the board of accountancy, TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-125 (Supp. 1966),
with formal revocation proceedings conducted by the board, apparently on the complaint of the board upon the recommendation of the administrative committee. TEN.
CODE ANN. §§ 62-125, 62-138 (Supp. 1966).
540. TNN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-215 (1955) (state board of examiners for architects
and engineers), 62-1324 (1955) (real estate commission), 62-1705 (Supp. 1966)
(state board of examiners for registered professional sanitarians), 63-724 (1955)
(Tennessee board of nursing), 63-1220 (Supp. 1966) (state board of veterinary medical
examiners).
541. T
. CODE ANN. §§ 62-215 (1955) (state board of examiners for architects and
engineers), 63-724 (1955) (Tennessee board of nursing), 63-1220 (Supp. 1966) (state
board of veterinary medical examiners) (3 month period may be extended to one year
by board). Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-417 (1955) which requires a hearing before
the board of registration in chiropody within 20 days from a preliminary license suspension.
542. TENN. CODE AN. §§ 62-215 (1955) (state board of examiners for architects and
engineers), 62-1324 (1955) (real estate commission) (complaint suppression authorized
if complaint fails to "make out a prima facie case"), 63-724 (1955) (Tennessee board
of nursing), 63-1220 (Supp. 1966) (state board of veterinary medical examiners).
543. The variation is principally in terms of the period of time required for notice.
It would be desirable to give notice of procedural rights in a notice and to state the
charges with some degree of specificity. See text accompanying note 442 supra. See
also text accompanying notes 201-08, supra.
544. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1705 (Supp. 1966) (state board of examiners for
registered professional sanitarians).
545. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-138 (Supp. 1966) (board of accountancy), 62-215
(1955) (state board of examiners for architects and engineers), 62-618 (1955) (state
board for licensing general contractors), 62-1326 (1955) (real estate commission),
62-1705 (Supp. 1966) (state board of examiners for registered professional sanitarians),
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license revocation proceedings, but others4 6 do not. Some5 7 statutes
expressly give private parties the right to cross-examine witnesses
while others5 48 do not. Only a few5 49 statutes expressly confer upon

private parties the right to introduce evidence, and only a few statutes
expressly require a record to be made of license revocation proceedings. 550
63-124 (1955) (state licensing board for the healing arts), 63-417 (1955) (state board
of chiropratic examiners), 63-555 (Supp. 1966) (state board of dental examiners),
63-620 (1955) (state board of medical examiners), 63-724 (1955) (Tennessee board
of nursing), 63-823 (1955) (Tennessee board of optometry), 63-912 (Supp. 1966)
(state board of osteopathic examination), 63-1220 (Supp. 1966) (state board of
veterinary medical examiners), 63-1410 (Supp. 1966) (Tennessee board of dispensing
opticians).
546. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-323 (1955) (board of barber examiners), 62-429
(1955) (board of cosmetology), 62-525 (1955) (board of funeral directors and
embalmers), 63-323 (1955) (board of registration in chiropody), 63-1020 (Supp. 1966)
(state board of examiners in psychology).
547. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-215 (1955) (state board of examiners for architects
and engineers), 62-1705 (Supp. 1966) (state board of examiners for registered
professional sanitarians), 63-417 (1955) (state board of chiropractic examiners), 63-724
(1955) (Tennessee board of nursing), 63-1220 (Supp. 1966) (state board of veterinary
medical examiners). In hearings before the board of accountancy, an accused is given
the right to "make such defense as may be proper." TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-138 (Supp.
1966). It is not dear whether such a right would include a right to cross examine.
548. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-429 (1955) (board of cosmetology), 62-525 (1955)
(board of funeral directors and embalmers), 62-618 (1955) (state board for licensing
general contractors), 62-1326 (1955) (real estate commission), 63-124 (1955) (state
licensing board for the healing arts), 63-321 (1955) (board of registration in chiropody),
63-555 (Supp. 1966) (state board of dental examiners), 63-620 (1955) (state board
of medical examiners), 63-823 (1955) (Tennessee state board of optometry), 63-912
(Supp. 1966), (state board of osteopathic examination), 63-1020 (Supp. 1966) (state
board of pharmacy), 63-1119 (Supp. 1966) (state board of examiners in psychology),
63-1410 (Supp. 1966) (Tennessee board of dispensing opticians).
549. TEax. CODE ANx. §§ 62-215 (1955) (state board of examiners for architects
and engineers), 62-618 (1955) (state board for licensing general contractors), 62-1326
(1955) (real estate commission). 63-724 (1955) (Tennessee board of nursing),
63-1220 (Supp. 1966) (state board of veterinary medical examiners), 62-1705 (Supp.
1966) (state board of examiners for registered professional sanitarians) (witnesses
only; no express provision for non-testimonial evidence), 63-417 (1955) (state board
of chiropractic examiners) (witnesses only; no express provision for non-testimonial
evidence). The provision for court enforcement of subpoenas issued at the request
of a private party to a license revocation hearing before the board of barber examiners,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-323 (1955), seems to contemplate that a private party may
introduce evidence before that board in such a hearing. What is contemplated by the
provision that an accused may "make such defense as may be proper" in a license
revocation hearing before the board of accountancy is unclear. TENN. CODE ANN. §
62-138 (Supp. 1966).
550. TNN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-525 (1955) (board of funeral directors and embalmers)
(stenographic record), 62-1705 (Supp. 1966) (state board of examiners for registered
sanitarians) (record), 63-417 (1955) (state board of chiropractic examiners). Cf.
TENN. CODE ANx. § 63-533 (Supp. 1966) ("The proceedings of the board of dental
examiners shall be recorded and shall constitute a public record.")
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Although most 55 1 of the regulatory boards have subpoena power, 55 2
only in hearings before the board of barber examiners55 3 and the state
board of examiners for registered professional sanitarians 5514 is aprivate party expressly given the benefit of the, subpoena power as a
matter of right. The reason for treating these particular hearings
differently from hearings before other boards (such as the board of
cosmetology 555 ) is not immediately apparent. While the subpoena
power granted to such boards often varies in scope, the variations
are apparently not always intentional. Thus, for example, while most
regulatory boards55 6 have the power to subpoena both witnesses and
documents, the board of examiners for architects and engineers, the
Tennessee Real Estate Commission, and the state board of examiners
for registered professional sanitarians are expressly granted only the
power to subpoena witnesses 5 7 The 'statutes which vest subpoena
power in the boards do not always expressly provide a method for
551. The following boards apparently have no subpoena power: the board of
funeral directors and embalmers, cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-525 (1955); the state
board for licensing general contractors, cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-618 (1955); the
board of registration in chiropody, cf. Tm-N. CODE ANN. § 03-323 (1955); the state
board of chiropratic examiners, cf. TENN. CODE ANt. §§ 63-417, 63-420 (1955); the
Tennessee board of nursing, cf. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-724, 63-726, 63-727 (1955);
the state board of psychologists, cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1119 (Sup. 1966); the
state board of veterinary medical examiners, cf. TENN. CODE A'N. § 63-1220 (Supp.
1966); and the Tennessee board of dispensing opticians, cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1410
(Supp. 1966). The state board of osteopathic examiners which formerly did not have
the subpoena power now possesses that power. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-912 (Supp.
1966).
552. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-138 (Supp. 1966) (board of accountancy), 62-204
(1955) (board of examiners for architects and engineers), 62-323 (1955) (board of
barber examiners), 62-429 (1955) (board of cosmetology), 62-1326 (1955) (real
estate commission), 62-1705 (Supp. 1966) (state board of examiners for registered
professional sanitarians), 63-124 (1955) (state licensing board for the healing arts),
63-555 (Supp. 1966) (state board of dental examiners), 63-620 (1955) (state board of
medical examiners), 63-823 (1955) (Tennessee state board of optometry), 63-912
(Supp. 1966) (state board of pharmacy). The state board of osteopathic examiners
appears to have been given the subpoena power in 1963.,
553. TE.. CODE ANN. § 62-323 (1955). The provisions vesting the real estate
commission with the subpoena power seem to contemplate the issuance of subpoenas for
parties other than the commission, but the statute does not appear to make the issuance
of such subpoenas mandatory. TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-1326 (1955).
554. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 62-1705 (Supp. 1966).
555. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 62-429 (1955).
556. TENw. CODE AN. §§ 62-323 (1955) (board of barber examiners) ("relevant
books and papers"), 62-429 (1955) (board of cosmetology) -("books, records and
papers"). Those statutes which refer to a power to "issue subpoenas, and enforce the
attendance of witnesses" are unclear as to whether the subpoena power, is limited
to witnesses only. See TmqN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-124 (1955) (state licensing board for
the healing arts), 63-555 (Supp. 1966) (state board of dental examiners), 63-620
(1955) (state board of medical examiners), 63-823 (1955) (Tennessee state board
of optometry), 63-912 (Supp. 1966) (state board of osteopathic examination).
557. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-204 (1955), 62-1326 (1955), 62-1705 (Supp. 1966).
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the enforcement of the supoenas; s58 some of them provide for court

enforcement;s 9 others vest the boards with attachment powers to enforce subpoenas;60 and still others give the boards themselves the
contempt power. 1r It will be observed that an enforcement power
vested in the courts may be more consonant with the purpose6 2 of
power with private litigants.

sharing the benefit of the subpoena

All of these boards pose the question of whether a commingling of
the functions of investigation and adjudication, which is permitted to

occur by statute, is either necessary or desirable.53 Apparently, alone
among the regulatory boards, the board of accountancy is given,

by statute, an executive committee which is vested with at least some
investigative functions.564 To the extent that the committee is used
to perform the principal investigative tasks, the commingling of investigative and adjudicating functions in the board of accountancy

may be alleviated.5 65 Proper administration of the other boards would
558. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-1020 (state board of pharmacy).
559. TENN. CoDE ANN. §§ 62-323 (1955) (board of barber

examiners), 62-555
(Supp. 1966) (state board of dental examiners), 63-912 (Supp. 1966) (state board of
osteopathic examination). The state board of dental examiners previously possessed
the contempt power. See note 561 infra.
560. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-124 (1955) (state licensing board for the healing
arts), 63-620 (1955) (state board of medical examiners), 63-823 (1955) (Tennessee
state board of optometry), 63-912 (1955 & Supp. 1966) (state board of osteopathic
examination).
561. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-124 (1955) (state licensing board for the healing
arts), 63-620 (1955) (state board of medical examiners), 63-823 (1955) (Tennessee
state board of optometry). The state board of dental examiners formerly possessed the
contempt power to enforce obedience to its subpoenas, Acts 1935, ch. 126 § 9, but the
subpoena enforcement power has since been vested in the courts. TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 63-555 (Supp. 1966).
562. See text accompanying notes 463-64 supra. Compare the Massachusetts procedure which vests every party with the right to the issuance in the name of the
'agency of subpoenas which may be issued by a notary public, a justice of the peace,
or the agency. The agency may modify or revoke such subpoenas upon petition of
the persons subpoenaed. Enforcement of an unrevoked subpoena is done by a court
upon application of the agency or the person upon whose request the subpoena was
issued. MAss. ANN.LAws ch. 30A, § 12 (1966).
563. See text accompanying notes 377-416 supra.
564. TENN.CODE ANN.§ 62-125 (Supp. 1966).
565. The administrative committee itself is authorized to "receive and investigate
complaints and to initiate and conduct investigations or hearings" concerning the
conduct of public accountants and violations of chapter 1 of title 62 of TENN. CODE
ANN. In any such case the committee is then required to "make recommendations and
forward its report to the board" which is required to "review the findings of the committee" and "may accept, modify or reject the recommendations of the committee." The
statute provides that any license applicant or any public accountant "who is aggrieved
by any action taken by an administrative committee . . .may appeal to the board in
accordance with rules and regulations to be prescribed by the board." The procedure
may contemplate a de novo proceeding before the board with respect to the results
of the administrative committee proceeding; on such assumption, the commingling of
investigative and adjudicatory powers in the committee would be alleviated and the
board itself would be separated from the investigative function. It is appropriate here
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avoid the commingling of judging with inconsistant duties, however.
For example, "impartial" investigative techniques might be used, or
prosecutorial type investigations might be allocated to non-board
members.
None of the statutes governing the procedures of the regulatory
boards requires that the members of a board voting for the revocation of a license be present at a hearing or that they read the record
of a hearing. These statutes usually provide that a quorum must be
present in order for the board to act,566 and many statutes56 7 further
provide that a license can be revoked only upon the concurrence of a
specified number of votes (usually a majority of a fully-staffed board).
Although this procedure may have an objective similar to the Revised
Model Act's requirementP68 that (in the absence of the proposal-fordecision-and-briefs-and-oral-argument procedure) a majority of the
officials who are to render the final decision must'have either heard
the case or read the record, neither the Tennessee regulatory board
procedure nor the Revised Model Act procedure seems to possess that
degree of protection to which an accused should' be entitled.569 It
to note that the procedures for a de novo hearing before the board apart from a
license revocation proceeding are not described in the statute. It is also appropriate
to point out the desirability of making the report and recommendations of the administrative committee available to the license applicant or public accountant concerned
before the hearing before the board. Cf. Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498, 105 A.2d
545 (1954). The desirability increases as the work of the administrative committee
combines in an objectionable way investigating and judging activities. See text
accompanying notes 377-416 supra.
566. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-120 (Supp. 1966) (board of accountancy), 62-205
(1955) (state board of examiners for architects and engineers), 62-302 (1955) (board
of barber examiners), 62-607 (1955) (state board for licensing general contractors),
62-1306 (1955) (Tennessee real estate commission), 63-533 (Supp. 1966) (state
board of dental examiners), 63-603 (1955) (state board of medical examiners), 63-705
(1955) (Tennessee board of nursing), 63-808 (1955) (Tennessee state board of
optometry), 63-902 (1955) (state board of osteopathic examination), 63-1104 (1955)
(state board of examiners in psychology), 63-1203 (1955) (state board of veterinary
medical examiners), 63-1401 (Supp. 1966) (Tennessee board of dispensing opticians).
567. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-215 (1955) (state board of examiners for architects
and engineers), 62-618 (1955), (state board for licensing general contractors),
62-1326 (1955) (Tennessee real estate commission), 63-724 (1955) (Tennessee
board of nursing), 63-1119 (Supp. 1966) (state board of examiners in psychology. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 63-303, 63-321 (1955) (board of registration in
chiropody). A unanimous vote sustaining charges made against a chiropractor is required for the revocation of a license by the state board of chiropractic examiners.
TEN. CODE ANN. § 63-417 (1955). A vote of 4/5ths of the entire state board of
osteopathic examination was required for revocation of a license issued by that board
under the now repealed TEN.

CODE ANN. § 63-912 (1955).

Compare TENN. CODE

ANN. § 63-912 (Sup. 1966).
568. REVISED MODEL AcT § 11. See text accompanying notes 420-33 supra.
569. Many of the Tennessee statutes are so phrased as to.-permit a quorum to be
present at a hearing, and to permit a differently composed quorum to revoke a license.
Such a result could occur also under the Revised Model Act. A licensee would seem
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seems desirable that all officials who are to render a decision be
present at a hearing; absentee officials should be disqualified from
voting adversely to the accused. Whether an official should be
qualified to vote by merely reading the record probably ought to
depend upon the extent to which a case turns upon an issue of
demeanor evidence.1 0
At least three of the regulatory board statutes5 71 expressly provide
for the rendition of legal services to the respective boards by the office
of the attorney general. The statutes572 governing the board of
accountancy and the board of osteopathic examination make provision
for such legal services in connection with license revocation hearings,
and the statute5 73 governing the real estate commission provides for
such services generally "in connection with the affairs of the commission." Apart from statute, however, it appears that the attorney
general's office is frequently involved in the actions of the regulatory
boards.5 74 For example, when "questions of law" arise in connection
with a revocation proceeding, it appears to be the practice for the
boards to consult with the attorney general's office upon those
questions.575 Some care should be taken to prevent the attorney
generals representative from developing an adversary mentality which
could affect his determination of whether an accused's activities
constitute a 'law" violation.
to receive a better guarantee of fair treatment from the New Mexico Uniform Licensing
Act which provides as follows:
"Decision.-After a hearing has been completed the members of the board shall
proceed to consider the case and as soon as practicable shall render their decision,
provided that the decision shall be rendered by the board at a meeting where a
majority of the members are present and participating in the decision. All members
who were not present throughout the hearing must thoroughly familiarize themselves
with the entire record including all evidence taken at the hearing before participating
in the decision. In any case the decision must be rendered within sixty [60] days
after the hearing." N.M. STAT. ANtN. § 67-26-13 (1961) (Emphasis added.)
To the extent that the license revocation question turned on an issue of credibility,
however, it might be better to prohibit adverse votes from board members who were
not present at the hearing whether they read the record or not.
570. Cf. NLR.B v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1951), stating
that "those parts of the evidence which are lost in print become especially pregnant"
and indicating that those who had no access to such "lost" evidence "should have
hesitated to assume" that such lost evidence would not be controlling. Id. at 431.
Accordingly, the court reversed the NLRB for reversing a trial examiner's fact findings
because the NLRB did not have access to the demeanor evidence of the witnesses
which could not be embodied in the printed record read by the NLRB.
571. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-138 (Supp. 1966) (state board of accountancy), 63-912
(Supp. 1966) (state board of osteopathic examination), 62-1304 (1955) (Tennessee real
estate commission).
572. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 62-138, 63-1001 (Supp. 1966).
573. TmN. CoDE ANN. § 62-1304 (1955).
574. Interview with Tennessee Attorney General, June 25, 1964.
575. Ibid.
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B. Commissioner of Revenue.-The commissioner of revenue has
general supervision over the state's collection of revenue. The state's
share of real property taxes is collected primarily by local (county and
municipal) officials. In the collection of these taxes, the commissioner's
function is supervisory with respect to the local officials. The comfor the collection 5of77
missioner, however, has primary responsibility
57 6
inheritance tax,
the
tax,
gift
the
including
certain other taxes,
5 78
the tax on income from stocks and bonds, the excise tax on corporate
earnings, 5 9 the corporate franchise tax, 580 the sales tax, 581 the tobacco
tax,5" the gasoline tax,58 the motor vehicle fuel use tax, 584 the tax on

dealers in petroleum products, 585 and certain other privilege taxes. 586
In administering the taxes for which the commissioner has direct re-

sponsibility, his office usually audits reports which are filed with him.
58
- 7
He is usually authorized to investigate further any matter he desires.

Often this authorization embodies a power of subpoena over the

taxpayers,5 88 their books and records, 589 and sometimes other witnesses.

590

The statutory procedures for the collection of the various taxes
vary considerably. Under most of the statutes governing tax collection,

the commissioner is authorized to issue distress warrants or otherwise
to execute upon a taxpayer's property to collect the amount of taxes
TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 67, ch. 25.
TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 30, ch. 16.
TEN. CODE AiNr. tit. 67, ch. 26.
579. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 67, ch. 27.
580. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 67, ch. 29.
581. TEN. CODE ANN. tit. 67, ch. 30.
582. TEN. CODE ANN. tit. 67, cL. 31.
583. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 67, ch. 32.
584. TENr. CODE ANN. tit. 67, ch. 38.
585. TEN. CODE ANN. tit. 67, ch. 35.
586. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-4315 through 67-4323 (1955, Supp. 1966).
587. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2509, 67-2517 (1955) (gift tax), 67-2619

576.
577.
578.

through
67-2626 (Supp. 1966) (tax on income from stocks and bonds), 67-3030, 67-3031
(1955) (sales tax), 67-3222 (1955) (gasoline tax), 67-3817 (Supp. 1966), 67-3829(1955) (motor vehicle fuel use tax), 67-4321, 67-4322 (1955) (general revenue law).
588. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2509, 67-2517 (1955) (gift tax), 67-2619 (Supp.
1966) (tax on income from stocks and bonds), 67-3030 (1955) (sales tax), 67-3829,
(1955) (motor vehicle fuel use tax), 67-4321 (1955) (general revenue law).
589. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2509, 67-2517 (1955) (gift tax), 67-2623 (Supp..
1966) (tax on income from stocks and bonds), 67-2714 (1955) (excise tax on corporate earnings), 67-2923 (1955) (corporate franchise tax), 67-3030 (1955) (sales tax),
67-3829 (Supp. 1966) (motor vehicle fuel use tax). Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3502.
(1955) (access to books and records of manufacturers and refiners of petroleum
products), 67-311 (Supp. 1966) (access to books and papers of tobacco dealers),
67-3721 (1955) (access to records of dealers and refund permit holders in connection
with gasoline tax).
590. E.g., TEEN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2509 (1955) (gift tax), 67-3829 (1955) (motor
vehicle fuel use tax), 67-4321 (1955) (general revenue law).
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administratively determined to be due.59 ' The taxpayer is given the
right to pay the tax "under protest" and then to institute a suit for
5 92
refund in court within thirty days after such protest payment.
The suit-for-refund provisions of the tax statutes are analogous to the
provisions of the federal statutes which provide for taxpayers' refund
suits in the federal district courts. 593 The suit-for-refund provisions
provide the taxpayer with the opportunity to have his case tried
before an adjudicating body which is independent from the commissioner; hence, he can expect an impartial decision at least with
respect to the so-called "basic" facts in issue.
The administrative determination of the taxes due is important not
only because of its relation to the issuance of distress warrant collection
procedures but also because of its connection with the judicial decision
in a suit for refund.594 The statute governing the excise tax on corporate earnings provides 595 that "in all matters requiring the exercise
of judgment and discretion as to what may or may not be net earnings, the judgment and opinion of ... [the] commissioner shall be
final and conclusive" except for the suit-for-refund procedure. In such
a suit, the commissioner's determination will be upheld, however,
unless he used an "obviously arbitrary" method of determining earnings or abused his discretion. 596 The statute governing the administration of the gasoline tax provides 97 that an administrative determination of taxes owed may be made upon failure to file a required
report "or to pay the taxes due" and that the commissioner's determination "shall be deemed prima facie correct and the burden of proof
shall be upon the distributor or dealer to prove its incorrectness in
any action growing out of matters and things contained therein." In
a somewhat similar vein, the statute governing the administration of
the sales tax provides5 98 that an administrative determination made
"in the event any dealer fails to make a report and pay the tax... or
.. makes a grossly incorrect report, or a report that is false and
591. TrEN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2201 (1955) (generally), 67-2520 (1955) (gift tax),
67-2718 (Supp. 1966) (excise tax on corporate earnings), 67-2929 (Supp. 1966) (corporate franchise tax), 67-3033 (Supp. 1966) (sales tax), 67-3224 (1955) (gasoline
tax), 67-4324 (1955) (general revenue).
592. T N . CODE ANN. §§ 67-2303 through 67-2310 (1955) (generally), 67-2524
,(1955) (gift tax), 67-2629 (Supp. 1966) (tax on income from stocks and bonds),
67-2930 (1955) (corporate franchise tax), 67-3033 (Supp. 1966) (sales tax).
593. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964).
594. In addition to the administrative determinations referred to in text compare the
now repealed provisions of TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 67-2619 through 67-2630 (1955)
providing for a full administrative hearing prior to such a determination of tax liability.
595. TENr. CODE ANN.§ 67-2715 (1955).
596. Southern Coal Co. v. McCanless, 183 Tenn. 457, 192 S.W.2d 1003 (1946).
597, TNr. CoDE ANN. §§ 67-3222, 67-3223 (1955).
598. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3031 (1955).

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

fraudulent" shall be "prima facie correct and the burden 'to show the
contrary shall rest upon the dealer." The extent to which the prima
facie correctness of the commissioner's determination can affect the
administration of the sales tax, however, may be less than in the case
of the gasoline tax.599
The payment of the sales tax, 600 the tobacco tax,601 the gasoline
tax, 602 and the motor vehicle fuel use tax603 is enforced by the commissioner through his power to revoke licenses or permits to do
business for failure to file returns or pay taxes due. In the case
of the sales tax and the gasoline tax, license revocation is additional
to the distress warrant method of collection.. To the extent that
the license revocation procedures preserve the taxpayer's remedy of
paying an asserted tax under protest and suing for refund, the taxpayer is given the opportunity of having a dispute concerning the
amount of taxes owed tried before an independent body. The statutes
do not always make it clear, however, that the suit for refund is
preserved as an effective remedy. Since the taxpayer's suit for refund
generally cannot be filed before the commissioner (or other tax
collecting official) has instituted proceedings against the taxpayer's
property, the commissioner seems to have the power of forestalling
a refund suit. Where taxes are collected pursuant to the license system,
the commissioner possibly could revoke the license or permit of the
taxpayer for nonpayment of taxes before proceeding with the issuance
of a distress warrant. For example, section 67-3222 of the Tennessee
Code Annotated provides that upon the failure of a taxpayer to pay
the amount of gasoline taxes "due," it is the commissioner's duty to revoke his permit and then to proceed against the taxpayer by distress
warrant. It is possible that the threat of a revocation, which would
precede court review of taxes due, would effectively coerce the
64
taxpayer to forego the court test nominally given by the statutes. 0'
Where license revocation proceedings are based upon a failure to
pay the amount of taxes deemed by the commissioner to be due,
599. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3029 (Supp. 1966), provides for such prima facie
correctness of the commissioner's sales tax estimate upon the satisfaction of any one
of three conditions, each of which probably ought to be read in the context of the
others in order to determine its proper meaning. See text accompanying note 598,
The wording of the analagous gasoline tax provision, TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3222
(1955) differs and may be exposed to an interpretation that a prima facie correct
administrative determination can be made where an amount of tax is paid which is.
officially determined to be incorrect. Cf. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-2927 (1955).'
600. TEN. CODE ANN. § 67-3041 (Supp. 1966).
601. TEN. CODE AN . § 67-3117 (Supp. 1966).
602. TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-3311 (1955).
603. TENN. CODE ANt. § 67-3822 (Supp. 1966).
604. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407
(1942).
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some procedure ought to be provided in which the amount of taxes
allegedly due could be challenged 605 apart from the coercive method
of a license revocation proceeding. Where such proceedings depend
upon the resolution of a question of "fact" which can best be determined by a judgment about the credibility of witnesses as determined
by personal observation, the power of the commissioner to revise the
factual determination of a hearing officer perhaps ought to be curtailed.606 Before the commissioner reverses a fact finding of a hearing
officer favorable to a private party, the commissioner should have read
the relevant portions of the record.6° Reading the record is probably
contemplated by the statutes which refer to a revision by the commissioner "upon review of the record." 60 It would perhaps be advisable, for purposes of review by the commissioner, to include in the record the briefs of the parties as well as testimony. 6 9 In relatively simple
proceedings, argument before the commissioner in addition to argument before a hearing officer probably would be unnecessary if it
can be assumed that the commissioner will read relevant portions
of the record and that the parties have said everything they have to
say before the hearing officer. However, when an administrative hearing centers around the "evaluation" of the facts brought out in a hearing, the commissioner ought to be cautious about revising the hearing
officer's evaluation if it depends upon an issue not argued before
the hearing officer. 610
It appears to be the practice in the revenue department to refer
"questions of law" to the attorney general for decision.6 ' Although
the attorney general is required by statute to give to state officials
"when called on, any legal advice required in the discharge of their
official duties"612 and "to give to the officers of the state, when called
on, written legal opinions on all matters submitted by them in the
discharge of their official duties,"6 13 it would appear that these statutory
provisions were drafted without license revocation proceedings or
605. The procedure presently used seems to be intormal discussions with revenue
department personnel. Such a procedure would seem to be a good one, although
some thought might appropriately be given to structuring those discussions in such
a way that the time of higher echelon personnel of the department is not consumed
unduly. See text accompanying notes 620-21 infra. This procedure, however, does not
provide for a determination of taxes due by a body outside of the department.
606. Cf. text accompanying note 385 supra.
607. Cf. text accompanying notes 417-33 supra.
608. TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 67-3041 (Supp. 1966) (sales tax), 67-3123 (Supp. 1966)
(tobacco tax).
609. The suggestion is that the commissioner's review of the record should include
familiarity with the contentions of the parties, preferably as made by the parties.
610. Cf. text accompanying note 370 supra.
611. Interview with Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue, June 15, 1964.
612. TENN. CODE'AzN. § 8-609(2) (1955).
6
613. TxEN. CoDE ANN.§ 8-609( ) (1955).
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other adjudications in mind. The resolution of a ."question of law"
frequently depends upon the facts to which the law is applied, and
in some instances may even depend upon the manner in which the
question is phrased. For these reasons, it may not be inappropriate
to permit private parties to submit briefs to the attorney general
with respect to the resolution of the "question of law," or at least
to require that the briefs which are submitted to an agency in connection with such a question be transmitted to the attorney general's
office. To the extent that an important question is determined to be
a "question of law" which is resolved by the attorney general, parties
ought to be made aware of that determination and ought to be
permitted to submit briefs upon such question.
The relation of the attorney general to the commissioner of revenue
poses further questions about the development of the revenue department "policy." In the language of the Tennessee revenue administrators, no middle area between "fact" and "law" exists in which
policy is developed. To the extent that there is an attempt to maintain
such an exclusive dichotomy in practice, the attorney general, through
his determinations of "questions of law" and through his approval of
revenue rules and regulations, is shaping many of the policies of the
revenue department. 614 Some consideration should be given to whether
such administration is desirable. Although a tax specialist in the
attorney generals office may promote informed decisions upon "legal'
questions, power over major tax policy decisions is placed outside of
the commissioner of revenue's office. Moreover, the separation of an
important policy formulator from the department of revenue detracts
somewhat from the justification for the existing commingling of
investigating and adjudicating functions within the department. 615
A further word about the relation of the attorney general to the
department of revenue is necessary. The revenue department feels
that it must be guided by the opinions of the attorney general upon
questions of law.616 The department keeps numerous unpublished
opinions of the attorney general on file for the purpose of guiding
its staff in the administration of the revenue statutes. In connection
with the sales tax alone, there are over one thousand opinions of
the attorney general on file with the department. 6 7 These opinions
appear to be "unpublished laws" in the objectionable sense of that
614. This depends, of course, upon the scope which "questions of law" are given in
practice.
615. The coordination of policies between enforcement officials and adjudicating
officials is a prime reason for permitting a commingling of enforcement and adjudicating
functions in one agency. See text accompanying notes 284-96 supra.
616. Interview with Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue, June 15, 1964.
617. Ibid.
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term. 18 The commissioner has refrained from publishing these
opinions because of lack of funds, but he feels that such publication,
by enlightening the public about the policies followed by the department, would save administrative expense in the long run. Presently,
the department is obliged to deal with taxpayers individually about
questions which are fully explained in the attorney general's
619
opinions.
Finally, it should be noted that the commissioner feels620 that more
of a hearing ought to be provided with respect to the revocation of a
license to do business. He believes that a licensee would feel better
about a revocation proceeding if it were conducted by a person
independent of the department which was prosecuting him. The
commissioner also tends to be sympathetic toward the idea of a tax
court or other form of external separation of functions, although he
indicated that the department has not made a full study of the idea
and would not speculate concerning ultimate approval of such a
procedural arrangement. Again, however, he is of the opinion that
a taxpayer would feel better about tax rulings if there were some way
in which he could appeal outside the department without going to
the expense of a tax refund suit.
The commissioner has indicated that some administrative reform
of his department would be advisable, especially reform designed to
promote more efficient handling of the numerous tax questions that
come before his department. As an example, it appears that thirty to
forty gasoline tax violations occur each month. Questions of tax
assessment are usually handled by time-consuming informal negotiations with the divisional directors of the department. These violations
and negotiations should be handled expeditiously, without consuming
undue time on the part of higher-eschelon personnel. The publication
of the attorney generars opinions, department policies, and an appellate structure of review might serve a useful purpose in conserving
the time of these officers. Possibly consideration should be given to
an authorization enabling the department to establish its own internal
tax assessment procedures, including appellate review staffs.
C. Commissioner of Agriculture (partial survey).6 21-The commissioner of agriculture supervises generally the implementation of various
618. See text accompanying notes 163-69 supra.

619. Interview with the Tennessee Commissioner of Revenue, June 15, 1964.
620. The statements in text which expressly describe the commissioner's feelings
with respect to matters connected with the administration of the revenue department
are based upon an interview with the commissioner on June 15, 1964.

621. The survey of the administrative activities of the Commissioner of Agriculture
is limited to titles 43 and 44 of TENN. CODE ANN.
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product regulation statutes 2 2 and other agricultural regulatory
statutes.623 Product regulation is administered by the commissioner
through a process of inspection and sampling in connection with
seeds, commercial fertilizers, economic poisons, and commercial
feed.624 Important in connection with product regulation is insurance
that product sampling and analysis is properly done. Disputes over
the commissioner's analysis appear to occur only infrequently; but
when they do occur, the commissioner will attempt to run a sample
through a second analysis if the party affected has arrived at a
different analysis. 625 Although the older statutes do not provide
for a portion of a product sample to be supplied to a manufacturer,626 it would seem to be a relatively simple matter for the
commissioner to direct that duplicate product samples be supplied
to any manufacturer from whom one is taken. Sampling and analysis may have serious adverse effects upon a manufacturer; for
example, the requirements in the commercial fertilizer regulatory
statutes and in the Tennessee Commercial Feed Law provide for
refunds for defective products or payments to the state in lieu of
refunds.6 2 7 In such situations, checks on the sampling and analysis
of the department should be available. Independent analysis by the
party affected-the surest way to find an error in the department
analysis-ought to be permitted as a check on official analysis. Also,
in both refund and license-revocation proceediigs, the' state officials
who collect samples probably should be subject to cross-examination
628
in an administrative hearing.
Under a number of statutes the commissioner is authorized to seize
offending products. Specifically, he is authorized tb seize defective
agricultural and vegetable seeds and to hold them until the defect
is cured. 629 Assuming that such a seizure is reviewable, the statutes
are silent about the effect to be given an official analysis upon that
622. E.g., Tennessee Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Law, TENN. CODE ANN.
tit. 43, ch. 7; TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 43, ch. 9 (agricultural seeds); TENN. CODE ANN.

tit. 43, ch. 10 (vegetable seeds); TENN.' CoDE ANN. tit. 43, ch. 11 (commercial
fertilizers); TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 44, ch. 11 (Tennessee Commercial Feed Law).
623. See generally TENN. CODE ANN. tits. 43, 44 (1955).

624. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 43, ch. 9 (agricultural seeds), tit.
43, ch. 10 (vegetable
seeds), tit. 43, ch. 11 (commercial fertilizer), tit.
43, eh. 7 (economic poisons), tit. 44,
eh. 11 (commercial feed).
625. Interview with Tennessee Commissioner of Agriculture, June 24, 1964.
626. The Commercial Feed Law of 1963, however, provides for forwarding a portion
of the sample -inquestion to the manufacturer or distributor concerned., TENN. CODE
ANN. § 44-1110(d) (1964).
627. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1103, 44-1111 (1964).
628. Compare APA § 7(c) MODEL ACT § 9(3), REVIsED MODEL ACT § 10(3).. Cross
examination of the labQratory analysts perhaps ought to be allowed in the absence of
a check in the form of a second test.
629. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-915, 43-1009 (1964).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 20

review. The commissioner is also authorized 630 to issue a "stop sale,
use, or removal" order with respect to offending economic poisons;
such a seizure is made judicially reviewable upon a prayer by the
owner or custodian of the poison "for a judgment as to the justification
of said order."631 The commissioner is also empowered to seize noncomplying poisons on complaint to a court which must order the
poison to be condemned if it finds the poison to be in violation of
the act.6 2 In the case of a condemnation or a "stop sale, use, or
removal" order, a court would probably find an unchallenged state
6 33
and a
chemist's analysis to be adequate grounds for the former
634 for the latter; but it is unclear whether the
sufficient "justification"
court would admit evidence challenging the state chemist's analysis
and whether the court would itself resolve a conflict between experts, in deciding if a violation had occurred. Unless it would give
rise to a serious enforcement problem, the court ought to permit
the state chemist who made the analysis to be subjected at least to
the check of cross-examination.635 Some question may also exist
about the efficacy of court review of "withdrawal from distribution"
orders which the commissioner is authorized636 to issue under the
Tennessee Commercial Feed Law of 1963. A failure to eliminate
the defective condition of the feed specified in the order within
thirty days from its issuance empowers the commissioner to sell
the allegedly defective feed at public sale and to pay the proceeds of the sale into the state treasury. 63 7 Although administrative
review might be able to occur within thirty days, it is not clear
that court review could occur within that time. Unless court review can occur before the sale, it is unclear what remedy the
court can provide to a person whom it determines to have been
wrongfully injured by an administrative order.6 3 8 The statute, by
expressly forbidding a supersedeas or stay of a permit revocation order,
may impliedly permit the issuance of a supersedeas in connection with
a "stop sale, use, or removal" order upon application for certiorari
review; some benefit might occur from an express prohibition of a
sale until review procedures have been exhausted or, in the alterna630. TENN.
631. Ibid.

CODE ANN. §

43-710 (1964).

43 7
632. TENN. CODEANN. § - 11 (1964).
43-711 (1964) does not expressly provide a method for
§
633. TENN. CODE ANN.
ascertaining whether an economic poison is "in violation" of the law.
634. TEN. CODE ANN.§ 43-710 (1964).
635. See note 628 supra.

636. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-1111 (1964).
637. Ibid.
638. The difficulty would seem to arise from the fact that the money would already
have been paid into the state treasury in most instances.
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tive, from a provision creating a right of reimbursement at least in
639
the amount collected from a sale later determined to be wrongful.
64°
Under the Tennessee Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Law
registration of economic poisons with the commissioner is necessary
before they can be sold lawfully within the state. 1 Registration of
a poison must be granted "if it appears to the commissioner that the
composition of the article is such as to warrant the proposed claims"
and if the article, labeling, and other material submitted to the commissioner comply with the act.642 Embodying a "second chance"
provision analogous in some ways to the "second chance" licensing
provision of the Revised Model Act, 643 the law provides that, if the
commissioner determines that the article, labeling, or material do not
so comply, he is required to notify the registrant of the manner in
which the article is defective so that the registrant will have the
opportunity to make the necessary corrections. 64" The commissioner
is authorized to refuse to register or to cancel an existing registration;
upon satisfactory proof that the registrant has been guilty of fraudulent
and deceptive practices in the evasions or attempted evasions of the
provisions of this chapter or any rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder; provided, that no registration shall be revoked or refused
until the registrant shall have been given a hearing by the commissioner. Although the criteria for a refusal to register do not correspond
to the criteria governing approval of registration, 645 the principal
problem posed by the statute is whether the procedures incident
to a hearing in connection with a refusal to register or a revocation
646
of an existing registration should be specified in the statute.
Although it will be observed that the "second chance" provision of
the statute appears to govern only applications for registration and not
registration revocation procedures, the difference in procedures was
probably intentional.6 4
639. The latter procedure would not differ in effect from the "escrow" procedures
used in connection with public utility rate litigation.
640. TENN. CODE ANN. tit. 43, ch. 7.,
641. TEN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-703, 43-706 (1964).
642. TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-706(d) (1964).

643. Revised Model Act § 14 (c). See text accompanying notes 406-08 supra.
644. TEN. CODE ANN. § 43-706(e) (1964).
645. Compare TEEN. CODE ANNt. § 43-706(f) (1964) (quoted in text) with TENN.
CODE: ANN. § 43-706(d) (1964).
646. The complexity of the issues which might be involved in a hearing under the
Tennessee Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Law might make it difficult to
specify in detail by statute all the procedures involved in such a hearing.
647. It would appear that "the second chance" provision is designed principally
for use in connection with good faith differences between the registrant and the
commissioner. The statute appears to be drafted on the premise that such differences
will arise only prior to registration and that a defective product after registration
is probably due to the result of negligence or bad faith on the part of the registrant.
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Detailed statutory procedures surround license revocation and suspension proceedings under the pest control licensing statute.""8 These
procedures provide for representation of the licensee by counsel, for
the use of the subpoena power for the benefit of the licensee, and for
the stenographic recording of the proceedings. Although the pest
control statute does not expressly provide for the introduction of
evidence by the licensee, 49 this permission would seem to be implied
from the fact that the subpoena power is made available to the licensee.
The subpoena power under the pest control statute, however, is
limited to the subpoena of witnesses. 650 No provision in that statute
deals expressly with the availability of cross-examination, and it
appears to authorize a hearing only if the licensee requests one
within ten days from an initial license revocation or suspension
order.651 In this connection it would seem highly desirable that the
requirement of affirmative action by the licensee within the ten
day period be expressly stated in the enforcement order served upon
him. 652 No provision is made for a hearing officer, as is done in some
other statutes, in connection with pest control license revocation."'
No hearing is expressly required before the revocation of a license
under the Tennessee Garbage Feeding Law. 6 4 The only statutory
provision governing the administrative hearing required in connection with a livestock sale license revocation is one providing that the
licensee shall be entitled to be represented by counsel.65 5 The statutes
governing milk tester and sampler license revocation make no express
provision for a hearing or for any procedures which would govern a
656
hearing.
X.

CONCLUSIONS

In compiling this report the salient factors which have presented
themselves are the difficulties of definition which in here in any at648. TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-614 (1964).

See also the review of enforcement orders

under the Tennessee Plant Pest Act of 1955, TENN. CODE ANN., tit. 43, ch. 5. That
act, besides providing in detail for various aspects of a hearing also provides for
review of enforcement orders before a Board of Review composed of the Commissioner
of Agriculture, the Director of Entomology and Plant Pathology and one other member
appointed by the Governor. To the extent of the non-department member of the
Board, such review procedure embodies a limited separation of functions.
649. TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-614 (1964).

650. Ibid.
651. TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-614 (1964). See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 43-519
(1964).
652. See text accompanying notes 442-45 supra.
653. TENN.CODE ANN. § 43-614 (1964).
654. TENN. CODE ANN.§ 44-1006 (1964).
655. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-2306 (1964). The statute also provides for a ten-day
notice.

656. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-2002 (1964).
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tempt to codify administrative practice on a generalized basis. The
problems facing the various agencies are not so unique that they
cannot be discussed meaningfully in procedural language, but the
mixture of factors and policy considerations which make some procedures appropriate for some proceedings, may with slight alterations, call for different procedures. For example, it is relatively
easy to speak, as I have done in this report, of an "accusatory"
proceeding.6 5 7 It is not so easy, however, to define such a proceeding
in language which would appropriately establish generalized procedures for all cases falling within a given definition. Generally speaking,
an accusatory proceeding would seem to be one in which a penalty
is sought to be imposed for wrongful conduct. Many license revocation statutes seem to contemplate such an accusatory proceeding when
they provide for revocation of a license or permit, after hearing, for a
violation of law or of an agency rule; but the overlap in some types
of revocation proceedings between the factors relevant to misconduct
and those relevant to lack of qualifications may prevent any workable
differentiation between the two types of revocation proceedings. Moreover, when an alleged lack of qualifications is based upon a claim of
misconduct, the revocation proceeding would seem to include elements
of both a penalty proceeding and one in which punishment is only
incidental to a principal purpose of protecting the public. A proceeding taking cognizance of the failure of licensed goods to conform to
safety or product standards would be in form a license revocation proceeding based upon a law or rule violation; and if fault is involved, it
may involve misconduct. But the procedure appropriate to establish
such a violation may not be the same as that appropriate to revoke a
professional's license for misconduct in the practice of his profession.
It might be possible for a statute to establish procedures for an accusatory proceeding, but application of that procedural framework
ought to be made by painstaking reference to individual statutes,
rather than by an attempt to describe in general language the types of
proceedings to which such a procedure should refer.6 8 In regard to
accusatory proceedings, I have criticized the commingling of functions in the activities of the professional licensing boards, but my
objections are theoretical and are not based upon complaints of
prejudice or unfairness by persons whose licenses have been suspended
or revoked by those boards.
My reading of some of the Tennessee Supreme Court decisions
involving review of non-judicial decisions of some administrative
657. See text accompanying notes 248, 265, 342-47 -supra.
658. Otherwise, the difflculties of definition alluded to will force unwanted applications and will, at the very least, stimulate unnecessary litigation.
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agencies indicates that some improvement could be made. For example, the court could require the agencies to give reasons for their
decisions and could be more specific in defining the relationships between courts and agencies. It could restrict the use of the "material
evidence" phrase to descriptions of evidence and avoid its use as a
shorthand expression for general approval of agency action. But improvement in decisional language cannot be legislated; it must come
from an increasing awareness by the courts of their roles in administrative processes.
Criticism has been made at times of the narrow scope of review
accorded to non-judicial administrative action. 659 But as Dean Stason
has recently warned, 660 it is not necessarily advisable to increase the
scope of judicial review over matters that may perhaps be better performed by competent administrators. Again, the degree of judicial
review over varying types of agency action ought to be based, in part,
upon the relative degrees of competence of courts and agencies. Thus,
the degree of judicial review should perhaps vary from agency to
agency. For example, if the competence of the Tennessee judiciary is
substantially beneath that of the Public Service Commissioners in
some matters with which the Commission deals, then court review of
those matters ought to be minimal, as it now is. Even if improvement is needed in regard to review of some Public Service Commission decisions, it is peculiarly difficult for legislation which must
be phrased in general terms and in abstract language to accomplish
that result. Indeed, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has reminded us,6 1 the
subtleties of varying degrees of judicial review cannot be put into
language. Moreover, room ought to be allowed for variation in the
scope of judicial review even within the area of a single agency's
activities when, for example, the hardship or potential injustice resulting from a particular agency action calls for more penetrating
judicial scrutiny. 662 The scope of judicial review spelled out in consti659. See text accompanying notes 529-30 supra.
660. Stason, Administrative Law-1964 Tennessee Survey, 18 VAND. L. REV. 1047,
1052 (1965).
661. Cf. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951) (commenting
on statutory review standards): "Since the precise way in which courts interfere with
agency findings cannot be imprisoned within any form of words, new formulas attempting to rephrase the old are not likely to be more helpful than the old. There are
no talismanic words that can avoid the process of judgment. The difficulty is that we
cannot escape, in relation to this problem, the use of undefined defining terms."
662. See Jaffe, Administrative Law: Burden of Proof and Scope of Review, 79 IIHAv.
L. REv.914, 920 (1966):
"Each of us studying a series of cases will conclude that courts in certain situationssome unique, some typical-require either more or less evidence than what we would
generally consider to be 'substantial' . . . . Rules and principles have tremendously
important functions; but if they are taken to exclude a judge's appreciation of the
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tutional terms, as it has been by the Tennessee Supreme Court, is not
particularly amenable to statutory modification. It seems to me that
legislative tampering with the categories of administrative action
663
which the court has created in enunciating its review standards,
would be especially unwise. Thus, while "judicial," "legislative," and
"administrative" action may not be clearly definable at the fringes,
the court probably has a general understanding of the meanings which
it attributes to each category. Moreover, since these categories have
been given constitutional significance, they may not be easily changed,
and changes-give the difficulties of definition and the history of
judicial action based upon those categories-would probably create
more difficulties than they would solve.
I do not mean to sound entirely negative. Some changes may produce some good. The safest way to proceed with statutory reform
would be to isolate those areas in which change would seem to cause
the least disruption of present methods of administrative action but
which would appear to result in more than a theoretical improvement in procedure. For example, some good might come from legislative authorization for the publication of opinions of the Attorney
General which presently play such a large part in administrative
activity. Little disruption (but probably little positive improvement)
would result from standardizing procedures before the professional
licensing boards. Perhaps even across-the-board provisions for all
agency adjudications providing for subpoena practices, right to counsel, sworn witnesses, opportunities for cross-examination, and opportunities for submitting rebuttal evidence would serve a standardization purpose without causing substantial disruptive effects. In some
types of license revocation, such as those conducted by the regulatory
boards for misconduct, increased separation-of-functions provisions
special instance, if they are thought of as precise determinants, they become our
masters rather than our servants. The deviation from a generally valid principle may
be sensed in its applications without rising to the level of explicit recognition ....
A particularized response to a special case is a sign of a healthy and confident legal
system, a system at once sophisticated and sensitive."
663. Thus, for example, in an early draft of an administrative procedure act proposed
for Tennessee, three different review standards were embodied in the act for three
types of proceedings. Apart from the objections that the definitions were vague and the
difficulties of legislating review standards which cannot be reduced effectively to words,
the categories embodied in the statute did not correspond to the constitutional categories
of "judicial," 'legislative" and "administrative." It is possible that a distinction could
be made within the accepted judicial categorizations, but I would be wary of ignoring
the constitutional labels. I would also be inclined to embody no more than two review
standards-such as that of statutory and common law certiorari-which the courts know
and have worked with in a procedure act, and I would be extremely careful to use
definitions which can be applied without unnecessary dispute. As I have suggested in
text, the easiest way of doing this is by reference to cited statutory sections to which
a given procedure is made to apply.
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might be an improvement. I have warned of some of the dangers inherent in certain provisions of the Revised Model Act. With care in
specifying the statutes to which the procedures would be related, however, the provisions of the original Model Act or of a modified form of
the Revised Act would probably provide an appropriate model for a
Tennessee administrative procedure statute if a generalized act is to
be adopted. On balance, I am inclined to think that the enactment
of a generalized act based upon the original Model Act might contribute to a gradual awareness of, and sophistication about, administrative processes in Tennessee. I say this because some standardization in language would enable the Tennessee agencies and courts to
seek and to obtain guidance from decisions in other states interpreting
similar language and from treatises and law review articles discussing the provisions of the Model Acts. The potential disruptive effects
of the original act are not great.

